# Get Rich or Die Trying "Making money on the Web, the black hat way"



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#### WhiteHat Sentinel

- Unlimited Assessments customer controlled and expert managed – the ability to scan websites no matter how big or how often they change
- Coverage authenticated scans to identify technical vulnerabilities and custom testing to uncover business logical flaws
- Virtually Eliminate False Positives Operations Team verifies results and assigns the appropriate severity and threat rating
- Development and QA WhiteHat Satellite Appliance allows us to service intranet accessible systems remotely
- Improvement & Refinement real-world scans enable fast and efficient updates





### The other half of the Top Ten



# Percentage likelihood that a website has a particular vulnerability by class

# **QA overlooks them**

Tests what software should do, not what it can be made to do

# Scanners can't identify them

Lack intelligence and don't know if something worked (or not)

# WAFs / IDSs can't defend them

All the HTTP requests appear completely normal

# Business logic flaws = \$\$\$ 3-5 years XSS, SQLi, and CSRF probably on the way out

# Online Ballot Stuffing for Fame and Fortune

Web-based online polls are an extremely common way to capture or sway public opinion. No niche is too big or too narrow.



In response to an Austin beagle winning the Westminster Dog Show, the Austin American Statesman newspaper held on online poll (Austin's Best in Show) for Central Texas (grouped by breed). Thousands submitted photos and voted on their favorite underdogs.



### Prize: Bragging rights

Winning the contest was all about **percentages**, not total votes...

## 3 ways to cheat

- 1. Overwhelming the positive votes
- 2. Overwhelming the negative votes towards competitors
- At the last minute create a new dog and give it a positive vote - no chance of negative votes and you'll win at 100% positive.

Robert "RSnake" Hansen's girlfriend's co-worker asks him to help her chihuahua "Tiny" win the contest.

RSnake fires up Burp proxy...





# Taking the path of least resistance attempts #1 - submits 2,000 votes

	😵 burp suite v1.1 beta	
😵 burp suite v1.1 beta	burp intruder repeater window help	
<b>burp suite v1.1 beta</b> burp intruder repeater window help proxy spider intruder repeater sequencer decoder comparer comms alerts intercept options history request to http://content.coxnewsweb.com:80 [66.232.58.215] forward drop intercept is on action raw params headers hex render viewstate POST /cxn_hon/cxn_hon_photo_vote.php HTTP/1.1 Host content coxnewsweb.com User-Agent Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; nv1.9) Gecko/2008052906 Firefox/3.0 Accept text/htmi,application/xhtmi+xmi,application/xmi,q=0.9,*/*,q=0.8 Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5 Accept-Charset ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*,q=0.7 Keep-Alive: 300 Proxy-Connection: keep-alive Referer: http://alt.coxnewsweb.com/cnishared/templates/hon/hon_v1.swf Content-Length: 65 vote%5Fdata=pos&mediahub%5Fphoto%5Fid=817638&hon%5Fconfig%5Fid=82	Support intruder         repeater         sequencer         decoder         comparer         comms         alerts           Ive capture         manual load         options         select request         select request         1         http://content.coxnewsweb         POST /cxn_hon/cxn_hon_photo_vote.php.HTTP/1.1Host.content.coxnews	remove
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## RSnake boosts Tiny into 1st...

Burp Proxy http://portswigger.net/proxy/

### "ChooChoo" pwns Tiny with technique #2 During the last minutes of the contest the competition submitted 450+ negative votes, which still made Tiny the winner in total by more than 2:1, however as a percentage of positive to negative, Tiny lost by a landslide.



# FTW!



# Artificial Scarcity DoS

To prevent multiple-purchase of a scarce item (airline seats, physical goods, usernames, etc.), an application will "lock" the object for a period of time to prevent process conflicts.



### Book an Airline Seat First, Flight Later

- 1. Choose a flight provide personal details
- 2. Select seat
- 3. When YOU are ready, enter payment information

\*Seat is reserved and no user may select it for a variable amount of time - few minutes to several hours. DoS Option of Repeat and automate for every seat on the flight

### Other application DoS possibilities

- Event tickets (concerts, movies, conferences, etc.) Great for scalpers who want to drive up the price on their existing tickets may place or "reserve" tickets without risking a cash outlay.
- 2. Disrupt an eCommerce business selling a soughtafter product (video games/consoles, iPhone, etc.)
- 3. Login Denial of Service

# Solving CAPTCHA's for Cash

Completely Automated Public Turing test to tell Computers and Humans Apart. Used for protection against bots.









Spammers want to defeat CAPTCHAs to register for free online accounts on Gmail, YahooMail, Windows Live Mail, MySpace, FaceBook, etc. for spam distribution.

As CAPTCHA technology has become more ubiquitous a market has emerged for those who can successfully defeat the security measures in any manner possible.

CAPTCHA solving done in 3 ways...

# 1) Flawed Implementation

- Not enough entropy in the answers
  - i.e. "what is 4 + 1?"
- The same answers can be replayed multiple times



- 1) Test should be administered where the human and the server are remote over a network.
- 2) Test should be simple for humans to pass.
- 3) Test should be solvable by humans in less than a several seconds.
- 4) Test should only be solvable by the human to which it was presented.
- 5) Test should be hard for computer to pass
- 6) Knowledge of previous questions, answers, results, or combination thereof should not impact the predictability of following tests.
- 7) Test should not discriminate against humans with visual or hearing impairments.
- 8) Test should not possess a geographic, cultural, or language bias.



# 2) OCR

#### A Low-cost Attack on a Microsoft CAPTCHA

"Our attack has achieved a segmentation success rate of 92%, and this implies that the MSN scheme can be broken with an overall (segmentation and then recognition) success rate of more than 60%."

A Low-cost automated attacks on Yahoo CAPTCHAs "Our second attack achieved a segmentation success rate of around 33.4% on this latest scheme. As a result, we estimate that this scheme could be broken with an overall success rate of about 25.9%. Our results show that spammers never had to employ cheap human labour to pass Yahoo CAPTCHAs. Rather, they could rely on low-cost automated attacks. "

Jeff Yan and Ahmad Salah El Ahmad School of Computing Science, Newcastle University, England

Low-cost automated attacks on Yahoo CAPTCHAs http://homepages.cs.ncl.ac.uk/jeff.yan/yahoo.htm

A Low-cost Attack on a Microsoft CAPTCHA http://homepages.cs.ncl.ac.uk/jeff.yan/msn.htm

## 3) Mechanical Turk / "The Turk"



Solving and creating captchas with free porn http://www.boingboing.net/2004/01/27/solving-and-creating.html

#### RSnake is contacted by a Romanian CAPTCHA Solver...

"300-500 CAPTCHAs per person per hour. The clients pay between \$9-15 per 1000 CAPTCHAs solved. The team works around 12 hours a day per person. That means they can solve somewhere around 4800 CAPTCHAs per day per person, and, depending on how hard the CAPTCHAs are, that can run you around \$50 per day per person (his estimate)."

Solving CAPTCHAs for Cash http://ha.ckers.org/blog/20070427/solving-captchas-for-cash/

web visum (vision, in latin) is your eyes for the web <a href="http://www.webvisum.com/">http://www.webvisum.com/</a>

Which Web App Scanners can Ha.ck It? Check the October 1-Ith post for Study Results Not Gallow

#### ha.ckers

NNO 1 - F Change of West

#### Solving CAPTCHAs for Cash

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The same adaptive it has been been to same them up on these CMPEOME Combining theory particular of naming them. In the SCS is day, you can get provide them in CMPCOM, object. The opposit of the advector mergin from (SC2) priors with Field protecting shaft, which is enough pair.

This only one particular have a first 225, 2007 at 125 are and in ball scene throughout CaPTONA for one have a registric doubt.

#### Hello,

#### I'm from VietNam

We have a group with 20 person. We working some site rabot, rubl, look...

Our rate just 4\$ for per 1000 captcha solved.

We hope work you

Best Regard, QuangHung



Hill Hope you are doing well. We the leading Data processing company in Bangladesh. Presently we are processing 100000+ captcha per day by our 30 operators. We have a well set up and We can give the law rate for the captcha solving.

### Our rate **\$2 per 1000**

captcha.yahoo,hotmail,mayspace,gmail, facebook etc.

We just wanna make the relationship for long terms. can we go forward? Thank you.

Best Regards shakilur rahaman shohe

#### Babu Says:

#### Dear Sir,

# I am interested to work for data enty. Please call me 0171-3335000

# Recover someone else's password - it's a feature!

Everyone forgets their password(s) eventually and to ease customer support costs, password recovery features are heavily relied upon.

#### What is the manufacturer/model of the first vehicle you drove?

What is the name of your best friend in high school? What is your favorite childhood book? What is your favorite city to visit? What is your favorite fabric? What is your favorite garden tool? What is your favorite holiday? What is your favorite household tool? What is your favorite perennial flower? What is your favorite school subject? What is your favorite vacation place? What is your high school's mascot? What was the name of your first cat? What was the name of your first dog? What was the name of your first pet? Who is your favorite author of all time? Who is your favorite college professor? Who is your favorite high school teacher? Who is your favorite historical figure? Who was your first employer?

### Hijack a Sprint user's accounts

With just a cell phone number...

Shop My Sprint	Digital Lounge	Support
Answer the follow	ing questions	
	elow to verify that you are the ac Once you answer the questions o	
Where do these questions	come from?	
as the account holder. The question	tion company that has developed an a s that you will be asked to answer are ws. This anti-fraud tool has been used ntity theft and fraud.	randomly generat
	Which of the following vehicle	○ Lotus
	makes has been registered at the	() Honda
	following address	O Lamborgh
		O Fiat
		C I Inte

#### Answer the following questions

Please answer the questions below to verify that you are the account holder and to help us to protect your accoun from identity theft and fraud. Once you answer the questions correctly, you'll be able to create your PIN.

#### Where do these questions come from?

Sprint has partnered with a verification company that has developed an anti-fraud tool that will ask a short series of questions to ve as the account holder. The questions that you will be asked to answer are randomly generated through the use of publicly available in information regulated by Federal Laws. This anti-fraud tool has been used by numerous industries, as well as the Federal Government Katrina, to successfully prevent identity theft and fraud.

Which of the following vehicle makes has been registered at the following address	<ul> <li>Lotus</li> <li>Honda</li> <li>Lamborghini</li> <li>Fiat</li> <li>None of the above</li> </ul>
Which of the following people have resided with you or used the same address as you at	<ul> <li>Jerry Steft Iii</li> <li>Ralph Argen</li> <li>Jerome Ponicki</li> <li>John Pace</li> <li>None of the above</li> </ul>
In which of the following cities have you NEVER lived or used in your address?	<ul> <li>Longmont</li> <li>North Hollywood</li> <li>Genoa</li> <li>Butte</li> <li>All of the above</li> </ul>

#### Change Billing Information signed on as

Account Administrator:

| Sign Off

To change your billing address or contact information, update the fields below:

If you want your billing statements sent to a different address than where the phones are used, please contact Customer Care. This may affect how you are taxed. Explanation of Taxes

\*Due to billing cycles, your changes may not be reflected on your next invoice.

#### Billing and Contact Information

\* Indicates Required Information

.

. .

Account number:

)rder Number/Attn:	minu	ites	
treet Address or PO Box:		Change Plan Add-ons	24.90
Suite, Apt. or Department:	Ac	Id-ons for	
City:	WASHING		
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IP Code:	20012	Cellular Call Detail	Included
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		Sprint Family Locator Service	\$9.99
		300 SMS Text Messages	\$5.00
		Unlimited SMS Text Messaging	\$15.00
	/		
		Save changes	

#### Add-ons > Mobile Locator Signed on as

< Back to the Phone & Plan landing page



See where people are. In real time.

Contact Employees Anytime. Anywhere.

With Web-based Mobile Locator<sup>™</sup> you can see the current location of an employee's phone. In real time. In the advanced mapping display on your PC. It's the information you need to provide superiro customer service, avoid delays and increase productivity. Or simply enjoy peace of mind.

### Email preferred over secret questions

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Email						Reset Pa	ssword			
Forgot your email	address or	Password?	If you have a differer	nt problem	accessing	your account, p	lease see ou	ır Login Pr	roblems Help Pa	ige.

## **Heavy WebMail Adoption**

Provider Yahoo Mail Hotmail/Live Gmail AOL Mail QQ.com No. of Users (mm) 262.2 256.4 87.1 48.9 31.4



China-based online "Password Recovery" services: You pay them to hack into "your" account.

300 Yuan (\$43) to break an overseas mailbox password, with 85% probability of success.

200 Yuan (\$29) to break a domestic mailbox password, with 90% probability of success.

1000 Yuan (\$143) to break a company's mailbox password (no success rate given).

Also on the menu: passwords for 163, 126, QQ, Yahoo, Sohu, Sina, TOM, Hotmail, MSN...etc.





Any Instructions ?

Submit your Order

Variable project-based pricing \$150 (USD) minimum. They accept Western Union.

http://www.hire2hack.net/

# Usernames are valuable too, especially when they're email addresses.

Phishers use login and password recovery screens to mine for valid email addresses using timing attacks.

Many large ecommerce portals and social networks consider valid email address disclosures a high severity issue because of how their websites operate and what it can lead to.

Unfortunately the only tool we have to fight against timing attacks is time. And time = money.

# Monetizing eCoupons

eCoupons are used during online checkout. The customer enters a unique id and a discount is applied to their order.



# A large online retailer offered an eCoupon program...

 Coupon (i.e. AmEx) worth between a couple dollars and several hundred contained 16-digit IDs where large sections were static and the rest sequential.

3400 0000 0000 0093400 0000 0000 1093400 0000 0000 509

- Initially only 3 coupons were allowed to be applied to a single order, until the program became popular with larger orders and the restriction was removed.
- Someone developed a script trying thousands of possible valid coupon IDs. Orders of merchandise worth over \$50,000 were bought for mere dollars where 200 or more individual coupons applied.

### The problem went unnoticed until...

- A system capacity planning exercise uncovered CPU utilization during the night was spiking at 90%+, where during normal peak usage it was never that high.
- The FBI investigated, but the products were sent to a non-existent address.
- Apparently the person colluded with a mail carrier who intercepted the merchandise.

Coupons are not currency, only a tool for marketing. Instead investigated by the Secret Service and now they face counts of mail fraud.

# Real life: Office Space Hack

"Micro-deposits" of a random few cents (\$0.01 - \$2.00) are used to verify financial accounts and routing numbers are correct and to verify that customers received it.



Michael Largent, 22, of Plumas Lake, California allegedly...

Opened 58,000 brokerage accounts "used fake names, addresses and Social Security numbers for the brokerage accounts. Largent allegedly favored cartoon characters for the names, including Johnny Blaze, King of the Hill patriarch Hank Hill, and Rusty Shackelford. That last name is doubly-fake -- it's the alias commonly used by the paranoid exterminator Dale Gribble on King of the Hill."

Linked to a dozen online bank accounts including Capital One, Bancorp Metabank, Greendot and Skylight.



Michael Largent allegedly used a script to open 58,000 online brokerage accounts in the names of cartoon characters, and other aliases. Hank Hill courtesy Fox Broadcasting



Google's Checkout: \$8,225

## E\*TRADE, Schwab: \$50,225

# Profited using pre-paid debit cards

Faces four counts each of computer fraud, wire fraud and mail fraud.

### Snared by the U.S. Patriot Act
# "You're a hacker!? Can you hack a bank?"

Application Service Providers (ASP) offer hosting for banks, credit unions, and other financial services companies. ASPs are attractive targets because instead of hacking a single financial institution, an attacker could compromise dozens/hundreds/thousands.



## The System

- An ASP provides hosting for banks, credit unions, and other financial services companies. ASPs are attractive targets because instead of focusing on one back at a time, an attack could compromise dozens/hundreds/ thousands at a time with the same vulnerability.
- The banking application had three important URL parameters: client\_id, bank\_id, and acct\_id. To the ASP, each of their clients has an unique ID, each potentially with several different banking websites, and each bank having any number of customer bank accounts.

http://website/app.cgi?client\_id=10&bank\_id=100&acct\_id=1000

#### How to hack 600 banks...

- We changed the acct\_id to an arbitrary yet valid account #, and the error said, "Account #X belongs to Bank #Y"
- We then changed the bank\_id to #Y, and an error said,
  "Bank #Y belong to Client #Z"
- We changed the client\_id to #Z, and you could drop into anyone else's bank account, on any bank, on any client.

# Success!!!

No notion of "authorization" First pass at the fix *commented out the error in the HTML*, while the "real" fix would go in at some unspecified time in the future.

http://website/app.cgi?client\_id=10&bank\_id=100&acct\_id=1000

#### **Reverse Money Transfer**

#### Normal: \$10,000 from Account A to Account B A = A - (\$10,000) B = B + (\$10,000)

#### **Negative: -\$10,000 from Account A to Account B** A = A - (-\$10,000)B = B + (-\$10,000)

Breaking the Bank (Vulnerabilities in Numeric Processing within Financial Applications) http://research.corsaire.com/whitepapers/technical.html "Back-end business controls will prevent these issues." ASP Security Contact

# a few weeks later ...



# a couple months later...

# \$70,000 illegally wired to an eastern european country.

Money not recoverable.

# ASP lost a customer.

Other customers affected: unknown

# When back-end order cancellation procedures are a little too slow

People order things online, then change their minds, and cancel.



Quantina Moore-Perry, 33, of Greensboro, N.C.,

Ordered (then cancelled) over 1,800 items online at QVC including handbags, housewares, jewelry and electronics

Products were shipped anyway

# Auctioned off on eBay

# **Profited \$412,000**

Woman admits fleecing shopping network of more than \$412,000 http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/10/30/website\_fraud\_guilty\_plea/ http://consumerist.com/consumer/crime/woman-exploited-bug-on-qvc-website-to-steal-over-400k-in-merchandise-317045.php http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21534526/









"QVC became aware of the problem after being contacted by two people who bought the items, still in QVC packaging, on the online auction site."



Pleaded guilty in federal court to wire fraud.

Home News Competition Consumer Protection Economic	s General Counsel Actions Congressional Policy
About BCP   Consumer Information   Business Information   Re	esources   File a Complaint
Protección del Consumidor en Español	
Facts for Consumers	Email PDF Format
Unordered Merchandise	
You respond to an advertisement offering a free "trial" pair of par	ntyhose. To your surprise, you receive four pair with a bill.
You receive a pocket knife that you never ordered. Despite your o	objections, the company continues to send you notices demanding
payment and threatening your credit rating.	
payment and threatening your credit rating.	der? According to the Federal Trade Commission, you don't have a to consumers and then demanding payment.
payment and threatening your credit rating. What do you do when you receive merchandise that you didn't or	e to consumers and then demanding payment.

#### Q. Am I obligated to return or pay for merchandise I never ordered?

#### A. No. If you receive merchandise that you didn't order, you have a legal right to keep it as a free gift.



FTC - Unordered Merchandise http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/consumer/products/pro15.shtm

# Affiliate Scams

Online merchants and advertisers enlist the services of affiliate networks to drive traffic and/or customers to their websites in exchange for a share of the revenue generate.



#### The players

**Merchant**: Pays commissions to affiliates for customer clicks, account sign-ups, purchases, etc.

Affiliate: Collects commissions for driving customers towards merchants in the form of cost per-click (CPC) or cost per-acquisition (CPA).

**Customer**: The person who buys stuff or signs-up for promotions.

**Affiliate Network**: Technology framework connecting and monitoring the merchant, affiliate, and customer.



#### The way it's supposed to work...

1. Affiliate signs-up with an affiliate network and places special links on their web page(s)

<a href="<u>http://Affiliate</u>Network/p? program=50&affiliate\_id=100/">really cool product!</a>

2. When users click the link their browser is sent through affiliate network where they receive a special tracking cookie and then redirected to the merchant page.

#### Set-Cookie: AffiliateID=100

3. If the customer buys something within X time period (i.e. affiliate cookie still exists) the affiliate receives a commission.

Using effective SEO tactics...







Or Order.

#0 97/320 u.s.

Willin Mul



"It was a check for 2 months because the first check they sent was so big it was rejected by his bank."

Cheque No: Client No: FEBRUARY 27, 2006 Date: \*901,733.84 CAD Amount: Or Order 54/100 CANADIAN DOLLAR Willin Mul Antiorized Signature

## Cookie-Stuffing Circa 2002

Nothing besides pesky affiliate networks terms of service requires the user to actually "click a link" to be cookied with an affiliate ID.

Instead of:

<a href="<u>http://Affiliate</u>Network/p? program=50&affiliate\_id=100/">really cool product!</a>

#### Use:

<img src="<u>http://Affiliate</u>Network/p?program=50&affiliate\_id=100/">

or:

<iframe src="<u>http://Affiliate</u>Network/p?program=50&affiliate\_id=100/" width="0" height="0"></iframe>

Invisible!

Aggressive affiliates figure out they can post their code anywhere online and not just on their own websites (message boards, guest books, social networks, etc).



By 2005, Merchants and Affiliate Networks got wise to cookie stuffing, start monitoring referers and conversion rates, and began kicking out suspicious affiliates.

http://www.blackhatworld.com/blackhat-seo/ http://www.seoblackhat.com/forum/

#### Cookie-Stuffing Circa 2007

Affiliates start posting their code on SSL pages.

"Clients SHOULD NOT include a Referer header field in a (nonsecure) HTTP request if the referring page was transferred with a secure protocol." - RFC 2616

Bottom line: No referer is sent to the affiliate to be tracked. FYI: Not every browser behaves this way, but there are many other methods to do the same using meta-refreshes and JavaScript.

2008: DNS-Rebinding, GIFAR, Flash malware

# Making Millions by Trading on Semi-public Information

Insider: someone with a fiduciary role within a company. A corporate executive, investment banker or attorney. Not a hacker.



### Getting the word out...

Business Wire provides a service where registered website users receive a stream of up-to-date press releases. Press releases are funneled to Business Wire by various organizations, which are sometimes embargoed temporarily because the information may affect the value of a stock.

Press release files are uploaded to the Web server (Business Wire), *but not linked*, until the embargo is lifted. At such time, the press release Web pages are linked into the main website and users are notified with URLs similar to the following:

http://website/press\_release/08/29/2007/00001.html http://website/press\_release/08/29/2007/00002.html http://website/press\_release/08/29/2007/00003.html

Before granting read access to the press release Web page, the system ensures the user is properly logged-in.

# Just because you can't see it doesn't mean it's not there.

An Estonian financial firm, Lohmus Haavel & Viisemann, discovered that the press release Web page URLs were named in a predictable fashion.

And, while links might not yet exist because the embargo was in place, it didn't mean a user couldn't guess at the filename and gain access to the file. This method worked because **the only security check Business Wire conducted was to ensure the user was properly logged-in, nothing more**.

According to the SEC, which began an investigation, Lohmus Haavel & Viisemann profited over **\$8 million** by trading on the information they obtained.

# A Ukrainian hacker breaks into Thomson Financial and steals a gloomy results announcement for IMS Health, hours before its release to the stock market ...

62

- Hacker enters ~\$42,000 in sell orders betting the stock will fall
- The stock fell sharply making the hacker ~\$300,000
- Red flags appear and the SEC freezes the funds
- Funds are ordered to be released, "Dorozhko's alleged 'stealing and trading' or 'hacking and trading' does not amount to a violation" of securities laws, Judge Naomi Reice Buchwald
- The Times speculates that the DoJ has simply deemed the case not worth pursuing - probably due to the difficulties involved in gaining cooperation from local authorities to capture criminals in Ukraine.

Ukrainian Hacker Makes a Killing in Stock Market Fraud http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2008/02/ukrainian-hacke.html

Ukrainian hacker may get to keep profits http://www.vnunet.com/vnunet/news/2209899/hacker-keep-profits

## Passive intelligence gathering

When online purchases are made, customers are usually provided an order tracking ID - often (semi)-sequential.

3200411 3200412 3200413

...

Pen-testers notoriously try to rotate URLs to gain access to other people's order information often containing PII:

http://foo/order\_tracking?id=3200415 http://foo/order\_tracking?id=3200416 http://foo/order\_tracking?id=3200417

...

but we don't care about PII, only the number itself...

#### The art of inference

If one could closely estimate how many "orders" a public company was on track to process at the end of a quarter, you may be able to infer (*based upon historical data*) how well they are going to do (*or how the stock price will move*).

Often these order numbers can be obtained without actually fulfilling order, OR, order then cancel.

Hopefully the items won't show up anyway. :)

3200418 3200419 3200420

....

# **Business logic flaws = \$\$\$**

Prime target for the bad guys

# Test often, test everywhere

Not all vulnerabilities can be identified in the design phase, by analyzing the code, or even during QA

# **Detect attacks by profiling**

HTTP requests appear legitimate, but active attacks will appear anomalous



#### Solving CAPTCHAs - \$ four figures



Manipulating payment systems - \$ five figures



Hacking Banks - \$ high five figures

Scamming eCommerce - \$ six figures



Exploiting Affiliate Networks - \$ high six figures



Gaming the stock market - \$ seven figures



pwning RSnake in a chihuahua contest

## PRICELESS

# Questions!?

For more information: http://www.whitehatsec.com/



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