"Shadow Walker" — Raising The Bar For Rootkit Detection

Last year at Black Hat, we introduced the rootkit FU. FU took an unprecedented approach to hiding not previously seen before in a Windows rootkit. Rather than patching code or modifying function pointers in well known operating system structures like the system call table, FU demonstrated that it was possible to control the execution path indirectly by modifying private kernel objects in memory. This technique was coined DKOM, or Direct Kernel Object Manipulation. The difficulty in detecting this form of attack caused concern for anti-malware developers. This year, FU teams up with Shadow Walker to raise the bar for rootkit detectors once again. In this talk we will explore the idea of memory subversion. We demonstrate that it is not only possible to hide a rootkit driver in memory, but that it is possible to do so with a minimal performance impact. The application (threat) of this attack extends beyond rootkits. As bug hunters turn toward kernel level exploits, we can extrapolate its application to worms and other forms of malware. Memory scanners beware the axiom, 'vidre est credere'. Let us just say that it does not hold the same way that it used to.

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What Is A Rootkit?

• Defining characteristic is *stealth*.
  – Viruses reproduce, but rootkits hide!

• Greg Hoglund, author of NT Rootkit defines a rootkit as "a set of programs which patch and trojan existing execution paths within the system".
What is a rootkit used for?

- It is usually used by a hacker to conceal his / her presence on a compromised system and make it possible to return undetected at some later date.

- Indirect overlap with parental control software and spyware.

Rootkits & x86 Hardware Architecture: Pentium Protection Rings

- Ring 0 – full access to all memory and the entire instruction set.
  - Kernel Rootkits

- Ring 3 – restricted memory access and instruction set availability.
  - User Rootkits
**Rootkits & The Operating System**

- The user / application view of the system is defined by what the OS provides to it via the API interface.
- A rootkit hides by intercepting and altering communications at the interfaces between various OS components.
- Rootkits are a form of “man in the middle attack”.

**OS Components Attacked By Rootkits**

- I/O Manager
  - Logging keystrokes or network activity
- Device & File System Drivers
  - Hiding files
- Object Manager
  - Hiding object (process / thread) handles.
- Security Reference Monitor
  - Disable security policies governing runtime access checks on objects.
- Process & Thread Manager
  - Hiding processes & threads
- Configuration Manager
  - Hiding registry entries
First Generation Rootkits

- Replaced / modified system files on the victim’s hard disk
- Example: UNIX login program

Second Generation Rootkits

- Modify static OS components / structures loaded in memory.
  - Table based hooking approaches (IAT, EAT, SSDT, IDT)
  - Inline function hooking
  - Kernel and user mode rootkits
Third Generation Rootkits

- Modify dynamic OS objects loaded in memory.
  - Direct Kernel Object Manipulation (DKOM)
    - Example: FU Rootkit
      - Unlinks process objects from the Windows dynamically linked list of active process objects.
    - Kernel objects represent just about everything in the system (processes, threads, drivers, security tokens, etc.) so the possibilities are virtually unlimited.
    - Exclusively kernel mode rootkits.

Process Hiding w/ DKOM
Current Rootkit Detection Methods

- Behavioral Detection
- Integrity Detection
- Signature Based Detection
- Diff Based Detection

Rootkit File System Detection

- Signature Scanners – AV Products
- Integrity Checkers – Tripwire
- Diff Based Approach
  - Microsoft Strider GhostBuster
  - System Internals Rootkit Revealer
  - F-Secure Blacklight
Behavioral Detection

- Attempts to detect the effects of a rootkit on the victim system which means it may detect previously unknown rootkits.
  - Detecting diverted execution paths.
    - Deviations in executed instructions – PatchFinder by Joanna Rutkowska
    - Detecting Hooks – VICE by Jamie Butler
  - Detecting alterations in the number, order, and frequency of system calls.
- May suffer from a high false positive rate.
  - Most end users don’t have the skill to screen out false positives.

Integrity Checking

- Detects unauthorized changes to system files or to loaded OS components in memory.
- Creates an initial baseline database containing their CRC values.
- Periodically calculates and compares the CRC’s of these files against the initial trusted baseline.
  - Example: Tripwire
    - Files system integrity checks are ineffective against most modern rootkits which make their changes to memory rather than system files on the disk.
Signature Based Detection

• “Fingerprint Identification”
  – Searches memory or the file system for unique byte patterns (signatures) found in the rootkit’s code.
  – Tried N’ True Approach - Has been used by AV scanners for many years.
  – Highly accurate, but ineffective against unknown rootkit / malware variants (for which a signature does not exist) or deliberately obsfuscated code.

Motivations

Shortcomings Of Current Rootkit Technology

• The most advanced public kernel rootkits are sitting ducks for primitive signature scans and integrity checking techniques.
  – Large parts of rootkit drivers themselves sit in non paged memory leaving them vulnerable to simple signature scans of system memory.
  – Rootkit modifications to operating system components in memory give them away to memory integrity checkers heuristic checkers like VICE.
  – Need a method to hide the rootkit driver code and its modifications to kernel memory.
Early Viruses Faced A Similar Problem

- Viruses sought to hide their code from file system signature scanners.
  - Their solution: Polymorphism / Metamorphism
  - Attempts to vary the appearance of the viral code from one variant to another.
    - Functionally equivalent, but semantically different copies of the code.
    - Few rootkits have integrated viral polymorphic techniques.

Introducing Shadow Walker
Prototype For A 4th Generation Rootkit?

- An alternative to viral polymorphism – *Virtual Memory Subversion*!
- Proof of concept demonstration that a rootkit is capable of transparently controlling the contents of memory viewed by other applications and kernel drivers.
- Minimal performance impact!
Implications Of Virtual Memory Subversion

- In-memory security scanners rely upon the integrity of their view of memory even if they don’t rely upon Operating System API’s (which may potentially be hooked).
- If we can control a scanner’s memory reads we can fool signature scanners and potentially make a known rootkit, virus, or worm’s code immune to in-memory signature scans!
- We can also fool integrity checkers and other heuristic scanners which rely upon their ability to detect modifications to code (i.e. VICE).

Review

- Windows virtual address space layout
- Virtual Memory
  – Paging vs. Segmentation
  – Page Tables & PTE’s
  – Virtual To Physical Address Translation
  – The Role Of The Page Fault Handler
  – The Paging Performance Problem & the Translation Lookaside Buffer
  – Memory Access Types
Virtual Memory

- Separate virtual and physical address spaces.
- Virtual & physical address spaces are managed by dividing them into fixed size blocks.
  - Paging: All blocks are the same size.
  - Segmentation: Blocks may be different sizes.
- The OS handles virtual physical block mappings.
- Virtual address space may be larger than physical address space.
- Virtually contiguous memory blocks do not have to be physically contiguous.
Virtual To Physical Memory Mapping (Paging)

- Paging - virtual and physical memory address spaces are divided into same size blocks.
  - Virtual blocks known as "pages".
  - Physical blocks known as "frames".
  - Virtually contiguous blocks are not necessarily physically contiguous!

X86 PTE Format

- Virtual to physical mapping information is kept in page tables in structures called PTE's.
The Big Picture

Physical Frame

Virtual Memory

- Application code
- Global variables
- Per thread stacks
- DLLs
- Ntoskrnl
- HAL
- Paged Pool
- Nonpaged Pool

Physical Memory

Virtual Pages

- Virtual addresses form indexes into page tables.
- Page tables may be single or multi-level.
- X86 uses a 2 level page table structure w/ support for 4K and 4MB sized pages.

X86 Virtual Address

Virtual Page Number

31 0 (LSB)

Page directory index Page table index Byte index

10 bits 10 bits 12 bits

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X86 Virtual To Physical Address Translation

Page Faults

- Because physical memory may be smaller than the virtual address space, the OS may move less recently used pages to disk (the pagefile) to satisfy current memory demands.

- A page fault occurs on:
  - An attempted access to a virtual address whose PTE is marked not present and whose translation is not cached in the TLB.
  - Memory protection violations.
    - User mode code attempting to write to a kernel mode memory.
    - An attempt to write to memory marked as read-only.
The Paging Performance Problem

- Virtual memory incurs a steep performance hit!
- 2 level page table scheme like x86:
  - Best Case: 3 memory accesses per reference!
    (page dir + page table + offset)
  - Worst Case: 3 memory accesses + 2 disk I/O requests per memory reference!
    (page dir + I/O + page table + I/O + offset)
- Solution: Translation Lookaside Buffer (TLB)
  - The TLB is a high speed hardware cache of frequently used virtual to physical mappings (PTE's).
Translation Lookaside Buffer

- On memory access, TLB is searched first for the virtual to physical translation!
- High speed associative memory
  - “Hit” translation was found in the TLB
  - “Miss” translation was not found in the TLB
- X86 Uses Split TLB architecture
  - ITLB: holds virtual to physical translations for code
  - DTLB: holds virtual to physical translations for data
- Modern TLB’s have extremely high “hit” rates and seldom incur the performance hit of a page table walk.

Translation Lookaside Buffer (TLB)

**Virtual Address**

Virtual Page Number = 17

**TLB**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Virtual Page 5</th>
<th>Page Frame 100</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Virtual Page 64</td>
<td>Invalid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virtual Page 17</td>
<td>Page Frame 84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virtual Page 6</td>
<td>Invalid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virtual Page 7</td>
<td>Page Frame 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virtual Page 65</td>
<td>Page Frame 844</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Associative Memory**

(Simultaneous read and compare)
Memory Access Path
w/ TLB (Hit)

Memory Access Path
(TLB Miss w/ Page Fault)

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Memory Access Types

• Basic memory access types:
  – Read
  – Write
  – Execute

• Under IA-32, execute access is implied:
  – Read / Execute
  – Read / Write / Execute

NX?
Execute Only Memory

• For some applications it is advantageous to be able to differentiate between read / write and execute accesses.
  – Buffer Overflow Protection

• IA-32 does not provide hardware support for execute-only memory
  – PaX Read / Write / No Execute memory semantics on the IA-32 with software support
  – Side Note: Hardware support for NX (Execute-Only) memory has been added to some processors including AMD 64 processors, some AMD sempron processors, IA-64, and Intel Pentium 4.
  – Windows XP SP2 and Windows Server 2003 SP1 added OS software support for NX.
Hiding Executable Code

- We take an offensive spin on the defensive PaX technology.
- We want to hide code, therefore we also want to differentiate between read / write and execute accesses to the hidden code.
  - Read accesses of the code section of a rootkit driver may indicate presence of a scanner.
  - Nearly the inverse of PaX: Software implementation of Execute / Diverted Read-Write semantics.

Implementation Issues

- We need a way to filter execute and read / write accesses.
- We need a way to “fake” the read / write memory accesses when we detect them.
- We need to ensure that performance is not adversely affected.
Differentiating Between Execute and Read / Write

• We can trap memory accesses by marking their PTE’s “non present” and hooking the page fault handler.

• In the page fault handler, we have access to the saved instruction pointer and the faulting address.
  – If `instruction pointer == faulting address`, then it is an execute access! Otherwise, it is a read/write.

• We also need to differentiate between page faults due to the memory hook and normal page faults.
  – Pages must be nonpaged memory.
  – Pages must be locked down in memory.

Faking Read / Writes By Exploiting The Split TLB (1)

• Normal Synchronized ITLB and DTLB translate code and data memory accesses to the same physical frame.
Faking Read / Writes By Exploiting The Split TLB (2)

- Desynchronized ITLB and DTLB translate code and data memory accesses to different physical frames.

![Diagram showing ITLB and DTLB with different memory access types and frames](image)

Software TLB Control

- Reloading cr3 causes all TLB entries except global entries to be flushed. This typically occurs on a context switch.
- The invlpg causes a specific TLB entry to be flushed.
- Executing a data access instruction causes the DTLB to be loaded with the mapping for the data page that was accessed.
- Executing a call causes the ITLB to be loaded with the mapping for the page containing the code executed in response to the call.

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Shadow Walker Components

- Memory Hook Engine
  - Hook Installation Module
  - Custom Page Fault Handler
- Modified FU Rootkit

Memory Hook Installation

- Install new PF handler (Int 0E).
- Insert page into global hash table of hooked pages for quick lookup in PF handler.
- Mark page not present.
- Flush the TLB to ensure that we trap all subsequent memory accesses in the PF handler.
**Custom Page Fault Handler**

- Primary task is to filter read / write and execute accesses for hooked pages.
  - Passes down faults on unhooked pages to the OS page fault handler.
  - Manually loads ITLB on execute access to hooked page.
  - Manually loads DTLB on data access to hooked page.
- Most memory references will be resolved via the TLB path and will not generate page faults.
- Page faults on hooked pages will occur:
  - On the first execute and data accesses to the page.
  - On TLB cache line evictions of a hooked mapping.
  - On explicit TLB flush (i.e. context switch).

**PF Handler Pseudocode**

- Pseudocode for enforcing execute diverted read / write semantics on kernel pages.

```plaintext
Page Fault Handler:
if( ProcessorMode == USER_MODE )
    jmp PassDownToOs
if( FaultingAddress == USER_PAGE )
    jmp PassDownToOs
// faulting address is from a hidden page
if( FaultingAddress == HIDDEN_PAGE)
    { if(FaultingAddress == EIP)
        jmp LoadItlb //execute access
      else
        jmp LoadDtlb
    }
else jmp PassDownToOs

Load Itlb:
ReplaceFrame(PTE.FaultingAddress)
PTE.FaultingAddress == PRESENT
CallIntoHiddenPage //load ITLB
PTE.FaultingAddress == NOT PRESENT
ReplaceFrame(old_PTE.FaultingAddress)
jmp ReturnWithoutPassdownToOs

Load Dtlb
PTE.FaultingAddress == PRESENT
ReadFaultingAddress //load DTLB
PTE.FaultingAddress == NOT PRESENT
jmp ReturnWithoutPassdownToOs
```

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What About Data Hiding

- Less optimal
  - DTLB must be kept empty of hidden page mapping.
  - One page fault per data access to hidden page.
- For memory access to go through, data accesses must be filtered in PF handler and the DTLB must be loaded with the correct mapping.
- Memory hook must maintain control (i.e. DTLB must be flushed after access).
  - Protocol based approach between driver and PF handler.
  - Debugging approach (i.e. single step).

Modified FU Rootkit

- Proof of concept rootkit hidden by our memory hook engine.
- Runs as a system thread and regularly scans the active process list looking for processes named _fu_ and unlinks them.
- No dependence on userland initialization.
  - No symbolic link
  - No functional device
- In memory rootkit
  - Could be installed from a kernel exploit to avoid disk detection.
Impact On System Performance

- Modern TLB’s have extremely high “hit” rates.
- Therefore, most translations on our “hidden pages” will go through the TLB path rather than the slower page fault path.
- Using the memory hook engine to hide a rootkit driver’s code has no subjectively noticeable impact on overall system performance!

Known Limitations

- No PAE Support
- No Hyperthreading / Multiprocessor Support
- Currently hides only 4K sized kernel pages (i.e. system space / upper 2 GB of the virtual address space).
Detection

- Non present pages in non paged memory range are abnormal!
- The PF handler code itself cannot be concealed using this technique since we cannot mark the page containing the PF handler non present (must use polymorphic solution).
- Difficult to conceal IDT hooks (i.e. PF handler).
- Cannot protect against remapping.
  - Virtual memory scans are inadequate!
  - More advanced scanners should be based upon remapping of the physical address space.
  - Hardware memory scanners.

Yin and Yang

- Beyond the offensive rootkit, there are defensive applications
  - IDS, AV, Firewall Drivers
- Rootkits and other malicious software often compromise security software via in memory patching.
- Execute / Diverted Read-Write semantics can be used to provide light weight code integrity.
  - Malicious read / write accesses to a security driver’s code section can be deflected to a separate “shadow” page frame where they would have no effect!
DEMO

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References / Acknowledgements

- The PaX Project
- Halvar Flake
- Joanna Rutkowska
- A generic attack on checksumming-based software tamper resistance by Glenn Wurster, P.C. van Oorschot, and Anil Somayaji
  - Concurrent, related work on memory subversion.