Attacks on uninitialized local variables

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Introduction

Abusing memory-corruption issues in order to compromise systems has a long history:

- Stack overflows abused since the 70's in various circles
- Public usage since the late 80's
- Heap overflows abused publically since around 2000, probably exploited earlier without public documentation
- More complex issues (double-free()'s etc) published since 2002

- Remediation focuses a lot on published exploit techniques
- Various countermeasures (stack & heap canaries, front/backlink checks) proposed & implemented
Introduction

Failure to initialize local variables is more common than most people think.

- Hardly any public discussion of exploitation methods
  (correction: Since late 2005 there is a paper dealing with a specific instance under http://www.felinemenace.org/mercy)

Public discussion seems to imply that exploitation is hard as the memory content of non-initialized memory is random or hard to control

Key points of this presentation:

- The contents of uninitialized local variables on the stack cases well-defined by the program that is running
- An attacker can attempt to determine paths that allow him to control these values
- Success in controlling the values will allow compromise
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Warning

This talk is work-in-progress

- My first approach to the problem will be presented
  - It was fairly useful in practice
  - But it suffers from severe problems
- My second approach to the problem will be presented
  - It is more accurate
  - It still suffers from problems, but fewer
- The discussed ideas are far from perfect
- It is often surprising how much 'wiggle-room' the complexity of the application leaves for an attacker
- Yes, there are quite a number of instances where non-initialized variables are not controllable. In that case, you will have to go fishing again
Some questions

How can we talk about a 'fish-class' or 'bug-class' in general?

- In many situations we do not have a large number of specimen at hand
- Every instance of a bug-class is often subtly different
- Generic methods usually emerge when lots of different fish of the same species have been caught and prepared for consumption

Now we're looking at a new 'species of fish' – how do we learn how to prepare it if we only have one?

Can we 'breed' fish for practice?
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Problems

Artificially creating fish has to be done with care – if we do it wrong, we will end up with different fish than what we would find in the wild.

- Manually created sample applications will hardly ever mirror complexity of real-world programs
- Creating sample apps with certain bugs is hard to do in a manner that is unbiased
- Perhaps a better approach: Take an arbitrary function that could exhibit such a problem in an arbitrary application and introduce the flaw there. Then think about exploitation methods

We might have 'created' a fairly realistic approximation of the 'real thing', and can study how to make use of it.
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Doesn't the compiler warn me?

Compilers will warn programmers about the failure to initialize local variables in many cases, but ...

- Compilers do not do interprocedural analysis
- Because of different compilation/linking situations, interprocedural checking isn't practical in many build situations
- If a pointer to a local variable is passed to a subfunction, the compiler considers this local variable to be initialized by the subfunction

Let's have two examples to clarify:
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Compiler warns

The compiler will warn in a case like this:

```c
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>

int main( int argc, char **argv )
{
    int b;
    printf( "%lx", b );
}
```
The compiler won't warn in a case like this:

```c
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>

void take_ptr( int *bptr )
{
    printf( "%lx", *bptr );
}

int main( int argc, char **argv )
{
    int b;
    take_ptr( &b );
    printf( "%lx", b );
}
```
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What is the scenario?

We're looking at the following situation then:

- Application uses some sort of data structure on the stack (including regular variables)
- Application calls a subfunction to initialize the data structure or variable
- Attacker can somehow make that subfunction fail
- Application does not check for success of that subfunction
- Further assumptions:
  - Attacker has input to trigger the issue
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Let's look at the stack ...

Frame A
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Let's look at the stack ...

Frame A

Arguments
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Let's look at the stack …
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Let's look at the stack ...
Attacks on uninitialized local variables

Let's look at the stack …
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Let's look at the stack ...
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Let's look at the stack ...
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Let's look at the stack ...

Frame of D overlaps with parts of the B, C frames and with some arguments
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So what do we do?

We need to “initialize” the stack variables ourselves to make use of them

- Identify which other program paths could access the memory that ends up being used
- Choose one that allows attacker-supplied data to be written to those memory locations
- Craft input to exercise this program path
- Exercise the vulnerable program path without 'clobbering' the data that we wrote again
- Have fun using pointers and data that we supplied
Approach #1: Delta-Graphs

The following slides will explain my first attempt to deal with the problem. It has many severe flaws, but served well in a few situations.

The silly name comes from the fact that we are building graphs annotated with stack-delta's.
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Local vs. Global analysis

• Ideally, we should look at the program in its entirety – consider the whole program
• Problem: The number of possible paths through the program is exponential in the number of functions
• Problem: Most algorithms in code analysis are $O(n^2)$ or worse
• Cop-out: Instead of looking at the entire program, we only consider a small subset that might be interesting for us.
• Reason: We can always increase the scope of the analysis if we fail with the 'restricted' scope
Local vs. Global analysis

Let's create some terminology:

- “Init Path” -- the path that we are going to use to write the data
- “Trigger Path” -- the path that is going to use the data

It is in our best interest if the “Init Path” is very close to the “Trigger Path”:

- We need to build input for the “Init Path”, which is time-consuming
- If we take a drastically different path we increase the risk of accidentally clobbering our data again (more on this later)
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Local vs. Global analysis
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Local vs. Global analysis

We will work locally, but parametrized: Only “Init Paths” which diverge from the “Trigger Path” only on the last “n” steps will be considered.

- We can start with small “n” (2, 3) and expand if we need
- In simpler cases we can actually see & understand everything
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A “stack-delta”-graph

We walk back the chain n steps (let's take 2 for now)

From this point onwards, we generate a callgraph of all functions.

Each edge in the graph represents a “call”

Each call has a 'stack delta', specifically the change to ESP done in this function before the call

We annotate each edge in the graph with that number
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A “stack-delta”-graph
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Calculating the distance

We now calculate the distance the stack variable we want to initialize has from ESP upon entry to our chosen “START”:

-56
-40
-36
-04
-04
=-140

Variable to initialize is at offset -0x38 = -56
A “reachability”-graph

We now start to explore all paths through the “stack-delta”-graph.

- Explore graph in depth-first-search
- On each edge, keep track of the stack delta accumulated at this point
- Each time a function can be reached with a different stack delta, it receives a separate node in the graph
- Normally, this graph would be exponential in size to the “stack-delta”-graph
- We limit our search: If the accumulated delta is already lower than the distance we calculated, we stop
A “reachability”-graph

The resulting graph gives us a number of functions which can have “overlapping” stack frames with our target variable.

This is nice and a good point to start, but the generated graph suffers from a severe problem:

● Problem: The graph has no sense of “order” -- if one of the calls on our “path” happens at the beginning of a function, this will lead to a large number of false positives

So for better results we will need a better graph
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Illustration of the problem

Order can end up being quite important.
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**Approach #2 (I)**

The first approach obviously abstracted too far. A second approach will have to stay closer to the assembly code. A short overview of what we're going to do then:

- Use the path that we already know how to exercise
- Take the flowgraphs of the functions in this path and 'glue' them together in a sensible manner
- Inline all called functions into the resulting graph
- Annotate each basic block with the change it imposes on the stack pointer
- Create a 'reachgraph' – traverse the graph upwards
- We get a graph that shows us basic blocks that might access our memory
Approach #2 (II)

Illustration of what we are going to do:

- Decide on a path through the callgraph – we take the one we already use. It ends up just being a linked list:
- From each flowgraph, cut the nodes that will not lead to where we want to go
- Add edges from the “call” instructions to their call targets
- Resulting graph shows all possible paths to the target function using the sequence of functions from our original path
- Pretty output is not yet available, so back to VCG :-(

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Approach #2 (III)

The resulting graph is weakly ordered by stack-depth – nodes are “deeper” on the stack by being further away from the beginning of the graph.

Therefore nothing in this graph overlaps with our target stack-frame.

We now inline all subfunction calls in this graph several steps deep (if possible all the way).

The resulting graphs can be quite large.
Approach #2 (III)

We associate each basic block with the change it imposes on the stack pointer.

We then work similarly to the “reachgraph”: Traverse the graph upwards, accumulating the delta's on each step – if the delta ever drops below zero, we have a function that overlaps.
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The resulting graphs

We get 2 choices 'nearby', but also 2 more quite far removed.
How about more results?

- We stuck directly to the path that we were already taking
- We only inlined 2 function layers deep
- Inlining more deeply will give us more liberty
- Allowing more variation along the path will give us more liberty: Instead of considering only paths that follow the calltree path that we recorded, we can consider all paths between two points
- Careful: The further we move away from paths that we exercise, the more prone we are to choosing logically inconsistent paths
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What's next?

- The current algorithm only determines functions that have overlapping stack frames
- The next improvement should be: Determining basic blocks that write to our variables
- Problem: We might end up with aliasing issues
- What about research on uninitialized heap variables?
Other limitations:

- Most of this was developed on embedded targets
- No handling of C++ indirection: All dynamic calls have to be resolved in the disassembly
- No handling of external libraries – you will have to load all relevant DLLs into your IDB along with the application on Windows
- All code x86-centric at the moment
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Tools used

- Datarescue's IDA Pro Disassembler as disassembly engine: http://www.datarescue.com/ida
- IDAPython for scripting http://www.d-dome.net/idapython
- A home-brew IDAPython library that provides more comfortable access to flowgraphs, inlining etc. http://www.sabre-security.com/x86_RE_lib.zip
- Warning: The above library is experimental code without documentation. Using or reading it can be detrimental to your health.
Questions?

- I probably have at least as many questions that I can't answer yet as the audience
- Practical experience: This stuff works surprisingly well
- Being able to initialize program pointers directly bypasses heap / stack canaries