Catch me, Yes we can! - Pwning Social Engineers using Natural Language Processing Techniques in Real-Time

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lan G. Harris

- Professor of Computer Science at the University of California Irvine
- Research in HW Verification and Security
- Applies Natural Language Processing techniques

Marcel Carlsson

Principal consultant

ingenico

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Lootcore

- Red teaming, consulting and security research
- Hardware hacking &

Social Engineering

Social Engineering (SE) 101

"Any act that influences a person to take an action that may or may not be in their best interest"

- social-engineer.com


SE == complex concept




SE threat underestimated

« SE awareness low

User decision burden





SE methodology



Open Source Intelligence Gathering (OSINT)







Blended SE attacks

Remote Email Messaging SMS Voice etc

Local






F**k


0-days






Inbox x

0 B






COMING SOON

New improved Deepfakes

POrn drives innovation once again

Generative Adversarial Network (GAN)



Training Samples

https://github.com/goodfeli/adversarial

"Generative Adversarial Networks." Ian J. Goodfellow, Jean Pouget-Abadie, Mehdi Mirza, Bing Xu, David Warde-Farley, Sherjil Ozair, Aaron Courville, Yoshua Bengio. ArXiv 2014.

Photo: Marvel Entertainment; John Byrne and Glynis Wein

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Current SE defense

- Technology focus (headers etc.)
 - Emails, mainly
- Keyword filters
 - Without context

Use Cases for Attack Detection



- Difficult because evidence is only in the text of the dialog
- Cannot rely on vector-specific cues
 - images on a phishing website
 - links in a phishing email
- Need to perform some semantic analysis
 - consider the meaning of the dialog

Common Features of SE Attacks


- In a social engineering dialog, the attacker must perform one of the following dialog acts:
 - 1. Ask an inappropriate question
 - "What is your social security number?"
 - 2. Issue an inappropriate command
 - "Please click on this link."

ian@ian-virtual-machine:~/Downloads/social-engineering-defense/command_analyze

Different approach needed

- Not just technical headers
 - Not just emails
- No filtering without context
 - Goodbye"spam filter"

System Structure




 Question Analysis and Command Analysis are the main steps

Detecting Questions/Commands

- Parse each sentence using a syntactic parser
 - Stanford Parser, <u>https://nlp.stanford.edu/software/lex-parser.shtml</u>
- Resulting parse tree reveals syntactic structure
 - Parts of speech, phrase decomposition
- Syntactic features are used to identify questions/commands

Question Detection

- Yes/No questions include subject/auxiliary inversion
- The auxiliary verb appears before the subject
 - Auxiliary verbs are "helper" verbs which add meaning
 - "will", "may", "can", etc.
- "I can eat." vs. "Can I eat?" Recognition of Yes/No Questions
 - SQ or SINV tag



Question Analysis

- Our goal is to determine if the answer to a question is private or not
- Sound an alarm if the answer is private data

- 1. "Where is the bathroom?", answer is not private
- 2. "What is your social security number?", private, alarm

Question Answer Systems

- User enters a question in natural language
- System provides an answer to the question "What is the tallest building in South Korea?" Lotte World Tower
- Search a structured database
 - DBPedia structured data from wikipedia

Paralex QA System

"Paraphrase-Driven Learning for Open Question Answering", Anthony Fader and Luke Zettlemoyer and Oren Etzioni, ACL, 2013

rel	arg1	arg2
be_official_language.r	Cantonese	Hong Kong
be_plural_for.r	Bacterium	Bacteria
be_highest_mount.r	Ararat	Turkey

- Searches SQLite database
- Each entry is a triple, (relation, arg1, arg2)

Paralex QA Queries

Natural language: "What is the nickname of Kansas?"

Query:

SELECT arg2 FROM tuples WHERE rel= "be-nickname.r" AND arg1= "kansas.e"

> Answer: sunflower-state.e, Private = No

Multiple Queries

- Many SQL queries are generated from each question
- Top ranked SQL query is chosen

"What year was apple founded?"

- 1. SELECT arg1 FROM tuples WHERE rel= "found.r" AND arg2= "apple.e"
 - Answer is **steve-jobs.e**
- SELECT arg2 FROM tuples WHERE rel= "be_found_on.r" AND arg1= "applecomputer.e"
 - Answer is **april-1-1976.e**

Modification to Database

rel	arg1	arg2
social_security_num.r	<user></user>	
password.r	<user></user>	
location.r	router	

- Only keep private triples which describe your assets
- If triple is found in the database, the data is private
- Do not keep actual private data

Privacy from Queries

- Assume that the correct answer is somewhere among the top 15 answers
- A question is private if any of the top 15 answers private
- Increases the rate of true positives
- May create false positives

Command Analysis

- Determine if the answer to a command is forbidden or not
- Sound an alarm if the command is a forbidden action

- 1. "Take a left at the next corner.", command is OK
- "Please tell me your social security number." forbidden, alarm

Command Summarization

- Represent command with verb-direct object
- 1. "Take a left at the next corner"

("take", "left")

2. "Please give me your password."

("give", "password")

topic blacklist

Verb and Direct Object

- Use Stanford Typed Dependency Parser to find the verb and its direct object
- Determines semantic relationships between words

"Please give me your password"
dobj(give-2, password-5)

• **dobj** relates verb to its direct object

Topic Blacklist

Verb	Direct Object
give	password
send	money

- Pairs can be compiled to protect your assets
- We found most relevant pairs in phishing emails
- Used term-frequency inverse document frequency (TF-IDF) metric
 - TF-IDF ranking is high if pair is in phishing emails but not in non-phishing emails
 - 100,000 phishing emails and non-phishing emails examined

Custom Blacklist



Experimental Datasets

Database

- Evaluated phishing emails
 - Non-email attacks not available
- Trained with 100,000
 - private answers
 - verb-object blacklist

Scamdexhttp://www.scamdex.com56555Scamwarnershttp://www.scamwarners.com43241Scamalothttp://scamalot.com18149Antifraudintlhttp://antifraudintl.com69209Total187154

Size

URL

Non-phishing emails taken from the Enron Email Dataset
 https://www.cs.cmu.edu/~enron/

Experiment Results

	Phishing	Enron
Detected	56616 (True Positive)	14168 (False Positive)
Not-Detected	30432 (False Negative)	72880 (True Negative)

- Precision (TP/(TP+FP)) = 0.80
- Recall (TP/(TP+FN)) = 0.65
- Why so many False Negatives and False Positives?

False Negatives

- 35% of phishing emails were not detected
- Our approach only detects the punchline of the attack
 Malicious question/command
- We cannot detect pretexting or elicitation
- Phishing attacks often involve a sequence of emails
- Only the final email may contain the punchline

Analysis of False Negatives

- Manually checked 100 False Negative emails
- 79% were early in the sequence, before the punchline

MY NAME IS MR TERRY ARUMAH FROM GHANA WEST AFRICA . I AM A MARKETING MANGER ... IF YOU ARE INTERESTED PLEASE YOU CAN CALL US HERE +2335403977 OR REPLY US HERE OKAY.

- All pretext, invitation to continue the conversation
- Punchline would occur in a later email

Our approach

- Focus on human communication
- Any text-based communication
 - Or speech converted to text
- Language and context analyzed

Thank You