

Memory Forensics using Virtual Machine Introspection for Cloud Computing

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ABOUT ME

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 - Consulting, Audit, Advisory, Training
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WHAT IS IT ABOUT? AND WHY DO WE NEED IT?





Introduction & Background

Virtual Machine Introspection (VMI)

► Use cases







MOTIVATION

Relocation of systems and services into cloud environments is on the rise

Users loose direct access / control over their systems

Forensic methods are limited in the cloud


Enable the user to perform their own forensic investigations

Forensic as a Service



MEMORY FORENSICS & VIRTUAL MACHINE INTROSPECTION







HARDWARE VIRTUALIZATION

One / Multiple guest OS on virtualized hardware


Managed by Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM) – Hypervisor

Provides interfaces and controls interactions with hardware

- CPU, memory, network, storage,...
- Hypervisor on own OS Host OS



NATIVE VS. HOSTED VIRTUALIZATION



VIRTUAL MACHINE INTROSPECTION

"Virtual Introspection (VI) is the process by which the state of a virtual machine (VM) is observed from either the Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM), or from some virtual machine other than the one being examined. "1"




SEMANTIC GAP

- Difference between the presentation of data from volatile memory by the OS and the raw data format
- Requires VMI to perform the same translation of the the raw memory data as the OS
- At least some knowledge about the guest OS is necessary



HOW DOES IT WORK?



Using Introspection To View A Kernel Symbol

(1) The VMI application requests to view a kernel symbol. (2) LibVMI finds the virtual address for the kernel symbol. (3) Kernel page directory mapped to find correct PT. (4) PT mapped to find correct data page. (5) Data page returned to LibVMI Library. (6) LibVMI returns the data requested by the VMI application (may require mapping multiple pages).

User VM



Kernel Data

http://libvmi.com/docs/gcode-intro.html

ADVANTAGES

No altering of the target system

Very hard to detect the monitoring

Live analysis of memory content

Data size for analysis (storage much larger than memory)

Detection of advanced memory only malware

More reliable data

No data corruption through malware



COUNTERMEASURES

Detection

- **Timing analysis -** unusual patterns in the frequency at which it is scheduled for execution
- **Page fault analysis** the target VM may be able to detect unusual patterns in the distribution of page faults
- Direct Kernel Structure Manipulation (DKSM)
 - VMI assumes that OS implement certain kernel- and data structures
 - DKSM modifies this structures and prevents monitoring
 - Sytanx based: targeted deletion/addition/manipulation of data structures
 - **Sematic:** semantics of the data structures are changed
 - **Combined:** mix of syntax and semantics manipulation



FIELDS OF APPLICATION

EXAMPLES

Rootkit detection

- Manipulation of memory access
- Interception of system calls

Cryptographic key extraction

- On the fly encrypted container
- Network forensics

IDS / IPS







SOLUTION APPROACH

Combining existing tools for a novel approach

Open Source

Minimal overhead

Transparent for the user




ARCHITECTURE


- Cloud Solution
 - Open Nebula
- Cloud Management Server
- Cloud Node
- Host OS Ubuntu
- ← Guest VM

- Memory Forensic Services
- VMI Library LibVMI
- ← Forensic Tool Volatility
- Hypervisor Xen












OPEN NEBULA EXTENSIONS



www.opennebula.org




MEMORY FORENSIC SERVICES


- Self developed management and control services
- Client Server model
- Platform independent
- PKI for secure communication
- Command whitelisting

l onevm memfor <VMID> <Volatiliy Profil> <Volatility Kommando>





























ADVANTAGES

- User gets easy access to the data
- No changes on the target VM necessary
- Memory analysis not on the possibly compromised system
- No stop/pausing of the analyzed machine required
- Operation of the VM does not get influenced
- Analysis can be done either local or over the network
 - Reduction of local load / network load
- Usage of existing authentication and authorization system



DISADVANTAGES

Configuration necessary

Knowledge about the guest OS required

Installation overhead for cloud provider

Additional attack surface

Security is crucial for the added services

User segregation is very important



LIBVMI CONFIG EXAMPLE

1

1	UbuntuLucid {
2	sysmap = "/usr/local/libvmi-0.8/Systemmaps/vm1lucid/
	System $map-2.6.32-45-server$ ";
3	ostype = "Linux";
4	$linux_name = 0x490;$
5	$linux_tasks = 0x258;$
6	$linux_mm = 0x290;$
$\overline{7}$	$linux_pid = 0x2b8;$
8	$linux_pgd = 0x50;$
9	$linux_addr = 0x100;$
10	}



VOLATILITY / LIBVMI USAGE

1 python vol.py -1 vmi://win7 pslist # win7 is the target



USE CASE

KERNEL LEVEL ROOT KIT DETECTION

 Modifying of data structures, which display the processes currently running on the system

System call interception

Interrupt hooking

Modifying the kernel memory image


Intercepting calls handled by the VFS

Virtual memory subversion





ENDUSER VM IN IAAS CLOUD









SUMMARY





Investigations in cloud environments get more and more common

Hypervisor forensics VMI is a very interesting solution approach

Fully Open Source based working prototype

Enables fast responses to security incidents

Lot of room for enhancements

Different use cases for VMI in clouds possible



BLACK HAT SOUND BYTES

 Hypervisor forensics / VMI are very powerful and interesting technologies

FaaS gives power to the end user

Memory analysis is a huge benefit for forensic investigations





Please fill out the Black Hat Feedback Form

ZILLNER

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