Abusing Bleeding Edge Web Standards for AppSec Glory

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• Does AppSec stuff, usually.
• Mentors security startups, sometimes.
• “Mentors” others on AppSec, occasionally.
• Paid a buck to make Steve Ballmer dance, but just once.

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• Runs an E2EE communication startup
• Codes for an E2EE communication startup
• Ran QA automation at a rocket factory
• Got sued by Napster (and not for piracy)
Bleeding Edge Web Standards

For Your (Ab)use, we'll talk about these:

- **SubResource Integrity**
  - SRI Fallback
- **Content Security Policy**
  - CSP Meta-Hardening
- **HTTP Public Key Pinning**
  - HPKP Suicide
But Why?

• New standards are frequently drafted.
• Many introduce unforeseen complications.
• Novel uses encourage future tweaks.

Source: Harold & Kumar Go to White Castle
SubResource Integrity

• Validate resources beyond your trust (e.g. CDNs)
  <script
    src="https://code.jquery.com/jquery.min.js"
    integrity="sha256-[hash] sha256-[hash2]"
    crossorigin="anonymous"
    fallback-src="jquery.min.js">
  </script>

• caniuse.com/subresource-integrity
SRI Fallback

Per the SRI Spec:

NOTE

On a failed integrity check, an error event is fired. Developers wishing to provide a canonical fallback resource (e.g., a resource not served from a CDN, perhaps from a secondary, trusted, but slower source) can catch this error event and provide an appropriate handler to replace the failed resource with a different one.

...so we implemented it for you.
SubResource Integrity

• Validate resources beyond your trust (e.g. CDNs)

```html
<script src="https://code.jquery.com/jquery.min.js" integrity="sha256-[hash] sha256-[hash2]" crossorigin="anonymous" x-sri-fallback="jquery.min.js"></script>
```

• caniuse.com/subresource-integrity
heisenberg.co/srifallbackdemo/

Kneel to the demo gods
Do source gods even exist?
CVE-2016-1636 Demo

heisenberg.co/sridemo/sameorigin

(゜° Legislation)

(゜°)
Content Security Policy:
script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'

Test <script> src with valid hash
Test <script> src with invalid hash
Content Security Policy:
script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'

Test <script> src with valid hash  Test <script> src with invalid hash
Content Security Policy:
script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'

Execution of remote code with hash BADHASH0000000000000000000000000000000000000000= at 7/25/2016, 4:51:43 PM was a success!
CSP Meta-Hardening

• Combines semi-strict header with strict `<meta>`.
• Allows for pre-loading of trusted complex logic.
• Does not work for the verbs `frame-ancestors`, `report-uri`, or `sandbox`.

(We really like that name.)
BUILDER DEMO

heisenberg.co/metacspdemo/

Fall on thy sword for the demo gods.
Content Security Policy:
script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'
Content Security Policy:
script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'

Execution of inline code at 7/25/2016, 4:59:46 PM was a success!
Content Security Policy:
script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' 

Execution of non-inline code at 7/25/2016, 4:59:54 PM was a success!

Test inline code  Test non-inline code  Harden CSP via <meta> element
Content Security Policy:
script-src 'self'

Execution of non-inline code at 7/25/2016, 4:59:54 PM was a success!

Test inline code  Test non-inline code  Harden CSP via <meta> element
Content Security Policy:
script-src 'self'

Execution of non-inline code at 7/25/2016, 4:59:54 PM was a success!

Test inline code  Test non-inline code  Harden CSP via <meta> element

Refused to execute inline event handler because it violates the following Content Security Policy directive: "script-src 'self'. Either the 'unsafe-inline' keyword, a hash ('sha256-...'), or a nonce ('nonce-...') is required to enable inline execution.
CSP Meta-Hardening

• Best for adapting a semi-recent application for use with CSP.
• Application’s trusted static logic is allowed to execute on initial load.
• Meta-Hardening prevents dynamic content from potentially executing later on.
Http Public Key Pinning

• This can break brick sites. Use Reporting!
  – (Chrome 46+ only; no reporting in Firefox 😞)

Public-Key-Pins-Report-Only:
max-age=5184000; includeSubdomains;
pin-sha256="az9AwClWuHM+fYV+d8Cv9B4sAwdcoUqj93omk180/pc=";
pin-sha256="5UONcYAsFtYscIlFlm4+aodoL20RRHzGaOeoSNEZ+iA=";
report-uri="https://report-uri.io/report/[id]/reportOnly"

• caniuse.com/hpkp
Deliberate self-bricking via HPKP + Rapid Key Rotation.

Let's spend 20 minutes on how we can use this:

- to enable in-browser code signing
- to control content changes and harden SRI.
- to enable nuanced web content blocking. (NetSec)
- to track users...
- to be total jerks...

...in ways we shouldn't put in print.
(Thanks Jann Horn @ Cure53 for putting us onto this!)
HPKP Suicide

Content Pinning

Browser Presentation Layer

Browser AppCache or Service Worker

Web Server

Certificate Authority

GET /

200 OK
Public-Key-Pins
<html/>

POST /rekey
new.csr

200 OK
new.crt

GET /

200 OK
(from service worker)
<html/>

GET /
Wait, in-browser code signing? No extensions?

In theory.

In the last slide’s content pinning scheme, code signing logic goes in the ServiceWorker.

This effectively gets us Trust On First Use for current and future code.
Why “In theory”? This sounds like it should work.

In fact, Cyph employs a mature, audited implementation of exactly this.

*However*, it was considered so novel that we had to apply for a patent on it.

But, you can come close to this for free if you...
Control local storage updates! Harden SRI!

- Set HPKP max-age to count down to your deployment date.
- Rotate routinely.
Benefits:

• Retain control of front-end content between releases.
• Mitigate risks of SRI hash tampering server-side.
• **Decent security and performance gains**
I don't believe in demo gods
HPKP Suicide

for Builders

Web Content Gateway e.g. [SomeVendor]?
Lock your users out of sites even when they're not on your network!
1. For flagged domains, set HPKP headers.
2. Optionally, Rotate keys weekly at the gateway.

Done! (By us disclosing it, is this now prior art? 😊)
HPKP Suicide

for Builders

Oh...  https://crt.sh/?id=19538258

Issuer:
commonName  = VeriSign Class 3 Public Primary Certification Authority - G5

Subject:
commonName  = Blue Coat Public Services Intermediate CA
organizationalUnitName  = Symantec Trust Network
organizationName  = "Blue Coat Systems, Inc."
User tracking?
Well, we really shouldn't talk about this...
But since this is Black Hat...

...let's track users!
HPKP Suicide

for Builders

Pre-requisites:
1. Lots of (sub)domains to pin
2. Browsers that allow HPKP incognito
3. Rapid Key Rotation

Let’s Encrypt
(Thanks! 😊)
HPKP Suicide

HPKP SuperCookies

Server-side

• \texttt{/set}: Returns HPKP header

• \texttt{/check}: No-op — no HPKP header, status code 200

Client-side (JavaScript)

• **Set new ID**: Hit \texttt{/set} on random subset of domains

• **Check ID**: Hit \texttt{/check} on all domains; note failures
I don't believe in demo gods
Not implemented by Google.
We only ran the script in console.
HPKPSupercookie('cyph.wang').then(o => console.log(o))
HPKPSupercookie('cyph.wang').then(o => console.log(o))

Promise {[[PromiseStatus]]: "pending", [[PromiseValue]]: undefined}
2016-07-25 17:06:48.206 Object {id: 4565566, isNewUser: true}
Not implemented by Reddit. We only ran the script in console.
New York City just witnessed an absolutely massive lightning strike completely spanning the Hudson River. I happened to have my camera set up to capture it. (i.imgur.com)
ELIS: Why do some people wipe their nose when they're proud of something? Other

submitted 13 minutes ago by MrNodreams to /r/explainlikeimfive

New York City just witnessed an absolutely massive lightning strike completely spanning the Hudson River. I happened to have my camera set up to capture it. (i.imgur.com)
Considerations:

Risk: DoSing tracker domains as a public service

1. Domain whitelist for your own tracker, or
2. App-issued and tracker-verified nonce if analytics is your business model.

The pattern described is similar to others here:

SOURCE (New BSD)

github.com/cyph/hpkp-supercookie

Do source gods even exist?
...to be total jerks?
we really shouldn't talk about this...
Who are we kidding?
This is Black Hat.
HPKP Suicide

for Breakers

Pre-requisites:
1. A high-traffic target
2. A way to shell the box
3. A free certificate authority

Let's Encrypt
(Sorry 😞)
1. Determine target\textsuperscript{1}
2. Generate ransom keypair (the recovery key)
3. Pwn\textsuperscript{2} target webserver.
4. Generate new lockout keypair + CSR\textsuperscript{3}
5. 🐑
6. Profit!
While owned users < n
1. "public-key-pins: max-age=31536000; includeSubdomains; pin-sha256=LOCKOUT_KEY; pin-sha256=RANSOM_KEY"
2. If owned users = n,
   1. Generate new lockout keypair + CSR^3
   2. Blow old lockout keypair. This locks out n users.
   3. n = 0
Breaker Demo

isis.io

"You tweachewous miscweant!"
-- Elmer Fudd
HPKP Suicide

RansomPKP

Considerations (i.e. why this is *not* a High):
1. Let's Encrypt rate limit: 20 certs weekly.
2. Chrome + Firefox have HPKP lockout mitigations
3. You still need to pop the box.
HPKP Suicide
RansomPKP

Programmatic Mitigations:

Chromium: WontFix Pre-Mitigated
Firefox: Match Chrome HPKP Max Age
Let's Encrypt: WontFix Out of Scope
Host Mitigations

1. Use DNS Certification Authority Authorization (CAA) – RFC 6844.
2. Use HPKP.
3. Don't get popped.
HPKP Suicide

RansomPKP

End User Mitigations (Clearing key pins):

1. **Chrome:** chrome://net-internals/#hsts
2. **Chrome:** (alt): clear any browsing data. "due to a curly brace mishap, we've been clearing it over-aggressively for years." (CVE-2016-1694) Clear your cache 😊
3. **Firefox:** about:config >>
   security.cert_pinning.enforcement_level = 0, visit site to take new header, re-enable.
SOURCE (New BSD)

github.com/cyph/ransommpkp

Do source gods even exist?
Hat Tip

To Geller Bedoya, Jonn Callahan, Jann Horn and all of Cure53, Samy Kamkar, Jim Manico, Mike McBryde, Jim Rennie and his superb legal skill, Garrett Robinson, John Wilander, Doug Wilson, as well as the Chrome, Firefox, and Let's Encrypt security teams for their contributions.
Thank You!

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