Shell on Earth: From Browser to System Compromise

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Introduction

• Security Researchers
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• Trend Micro – Zero Day Initiative
  – World’s Largest Vendor Agnostic Bug Bounty Program
  – Focused on Vulnerability Discovery and Remediation
  – Research Advanced Exploitation Techniques
  – #1 in Vulnerabilities/CVEs for Microsoft and Adobe in 2015
Evolution of Exploit Development

PWN2OWN CASE STUDIES
Exploit Mitigations Prior to P2O 2013

- ASLR (Address Space Layout Randomization)
- DEP (Data Execution Prevention)
- Sandboxing technology
- Stack cookies
- Low Fragmentation Heap (Heap hardening)
- JS JIT mitigations
- SEHOP
Exploit Mitigations P2O 2013 - Present

• 2013
  – VTGuard – Virtual Table
  – ForceASLR
  – AppContainer
  – Pool Integrity Checks
  – Kernel ASLR

• 2014
  – EMET
  – PartitionAlloc
  – Java click to play

• 2015
  – Control Flow Guard
  – Isolated Heap
  – Memory Protection
  – win32k access prevention in Chrome

• 2016
  – Adobe Flash Isolated Heap
  – Adobe Flash Memory Protection
History of Pwn2Own Remote Browser to Kernel Exploits

- **Pwn2Own 2013 - Jon Butler and Nils**
  - Used a type confusion vulnerability in Google Chrome within SVG processing
  - Kernel vulnerability - NtUserMessageCall - exploiting a pool overflow in win32k.sys

- **Pwn2Own 2014 - Sebastian Apelt and Andreas Schmidt**
  - Two Internet Explorer 11 use-after-frees, which evaded ASLR/DEP
  - Kernel vulnerability - IOCTL 0X1207F and IOCTL 0X120C3 AFD.sys dangling pointer vulnerability

- **Pwn2Own 2015 - Peter Hlavaty, Jihui Lu, Zeguang Zhao (Team509), wushi (KeenTeam), Wen Xu, and Jun Mao (Tencent PCMgr)**
  - Exploited heap buffer overflows in Adobe Flash
  - Integer overflow and achieved pool corruption through True Type Font vulnerabilities

- **Pwn2Own 2015 – Mariusz Mlynski**
  - Same-origin policy violation and resource:// URL loading privileged pages
  - Used EMET’s Windows Installer to uninstall EMET, which led to SYSTEM level privileges

- **Pwn2Own 2015 – Jung Hoon Lee (lokihardt)**
  - Buffer overflow race condition in Google Chrome and Google Chrome beta
  - Info disclosure and race condition within two Windows kernel drivers
Apple Safari to Kernel

TENCENT KEENLAB – TEAM SHIELD
Team Shield Exploit Demo
Apple Safari GraphicsContext UAF

- Proof of concept results in an access violation in the debugger

```cpp
WebCore::WebCore::GraphicsContext::setPlatformTextDrawingMode:
0x10dec437d <+13>: mov rdi, qword ptr [rax]
```

- In pseudocode, the crash is here:

```cpp
result = **(WebCore::GraphicsContext ***)this;
```
Exploitation Steps

1. Attained a write primitive from the UAF vulnerability
   - Initial spray to reclaim Graphics Context object of size 0x100
   - Primitive comes from WebCore::GraphicsContext::save() in Safari
     
     qmemcpy((void *)(v3 + v4 + 16), (char *)this + 20, 0x4Du);

2. Second spray with the following memory layout
   
   [String][Frame] [String][Frame] [String][Frame] [String][Frame]

3. Bypassed ASLR utilizing a write primitive to enlarge the string object’s length and leak a Frame object’s vtable

4. Achieved execution with ROP and writing a vtable for the frame object
   - Calls .blur() which calls Webcore::jsElementPrototypeFunctionBlur
Apple OS X WindowServer MultiTouch UaF

- `_mthid_unserializeGestureConfiguration` function
  - CFData is checked and a free can occur
  - Race condition can occur where the CFData can be reclaimed by another thread

```c
if ( v2 )
{
    if ( !(unsigned __int8)_mthid_isGestureConfigurationValid(v2) )
        CFRelease(a1);
    v1 = v2;
}
```
Race Condition Details

- Invoked by _XSetGlobalForceConfig which resides in CoreGraphics which the WindowServer utilizes
- Shortly after _mthid_unserializeGestureConfiguration is invoked, there is another call to a CFRelease

```
0x7fff88ec6ebd <+111>:    call  _mthid_unserializesGestureConfiguration;
             mov   r15, rax
             test  r12, r12
             je    0x7fff88ec6ed2 ; <+132>
             mov   rdi, r12
             call  0x7fff892c7c12 ; symbol stub for CFRelease
```

- If you are able to reclaim the data in time, you can fake out the method call within objc_msgSend when CFRelease is called and get direct code execution
Exploitation Steps

1. QuartzCore has a server that is running within WindowServer
2. The server port is acquired through calling CGSGetConnectionPortById
3. Spray memory with CFDataCreateWithBytesNoCopy and CGSPropertyListCreateSerializedData
4. In order to win exploit the race condition, call CGSPropertyListCreateSerializedData which sends to _XRegisterClientOptions
5. Utilize a buffer of size 0x30 and send several times
6. Buffer contains the ROP chain and shellcode
7. Once the race condition is won, code is running inside of WindowServer, and root execution is achieved simply by calling setuid(0)
Team Sniper Exploit Demo
Apple Safari to Kernel

LOKIHardt
Lokihardt’s Exploit Demo
Apple Safari TextTrack Object UaF

- If m_cues is NULL and only m_regions exists, setTrack(0) on the items in m_regions never gets called.

    TextTrack::~TextTrack()
    {
      if (m_cues) {
        if (m_client)
          m_client->textTrackRemoveCues(this, m_cues.get());
        for (size_t i = 0; i < m_cues->length(); ++i)
          m_cues->item(i)->setTrack(0);
        if (m_regions) {
          for (size_t i = 0; i < m_regions->length(); ++i)
            m_regions->item(i)->setTrack(0);
        }
      }
      clearClient();
    }
Exploitation Steps

1. Leak a heap address off of m_regions in the VTTRegionList object
2. A series of string objects are allocated around a track element
3. Leak arbitrary addresses with the mode attribute from the track element
4. Spray ArrayBuffer objects and corrupt the aforementioned m_list attribute
   - Achieves write primitive allowing for out-of-bounds read and write access
5. Execution achieved through the JavaScript interpreter
   - Assigns a function to oncuechange from the controlled object
   - Runtime evaluates the shellcode

```javascript
var jit_func = new Function("return 0x1234;");
jit_func();
for (var i = 0, n = tracks.length; i < n; i++)
    tracks[i].oncuechange = jit_func
```
Apple OS X fontd Heap-based Buffer Overflow

• fontd process provides the com.apple.FontObjectsServer
• Send a 0x2e message to reach a function which allocates memory of the size it reads from a controlled pointer
• Data passed to GetUncompressedBitmapRepresentation
• GetUncompressedBitmapRepresentation function contains no bounds checking
• Data copied into the buffer resulting in a heap-based buffer overflow
Exploitation Steps

1. Heap spray by sending a series of `mach_msg` to the `fontd` process
2. Trigger the heap-based buffer overflow
3. Utilizing leaks of CoreFoundation and `libsystem_c` with ROP techniques to call `mprotect` and gain code execution
Apple OS X fontd Sandbox Escape

- fontd process is sandboxed
- com.apple.fontd.internal.sb contains a list of non-sandboxed applications
  - Located in /usr/share/sandbox
- FontValidator is not sandboxed
  - Uses XT_FRAMEWORK_RESOURCES_PATH environment variable as a path to look for libFontValidation.dylib
- Exploits the environment variable to escape the sandbox
Apple OS X SubmitDiagInfo Arbitrary Directory Creation

- `/System/Library/CoreServices/SubmitDiagInfo` runs as root
  - Provides and XPC service called: `com.apple.SubmitDiagInfo`
- Method `[Submitter sendToServerData:overrides:]` reads values from the following configuration file:
  - `/Library/Application Support/CrashReporter/DiagnosticMessagesHistory.plist`
- `SubmitToLocalFolder` key allows for an attacker to write an arbitrary directory
Exploitation Steps

1. Create the following directory
   - `/var/db/sudo/{USER_NAME}`

2. Allows the `sudo` command to run without any password authentication

[Image of XKCD comic with the text:](https://xkcd.com/149/)
Google Chrome to SYSTEM

360 VULCAN TEAM
360 Vulcan Chrome Demo
Google Chrome V8 Out-Of-Bounds Access

• IterateElements
  – Responsible for visiting elements with an array
  – Assumed element access had no side effects

• Custom accessor for array
  – Modify array size while it is being iterated

• Fixed in the source code repository
  – Just three days before Pwn2Own
Google Chrome V8 Out-Of-Bounds Access

```javascript
function evil_callback() {
    delete Array.prototype[0];
    this.length=1;  // Free the old storage

    return 0.1;
}

Array.prototype.__defineGetter__("0", evil_callback);

var arr=[];
for(var i=1;i<3;i++)
    arr[i] = 0.1;

arr = arr.concat();
alert(arr);
```
Exploitation Steps

1. Allocate an ArrayBuffer object in the freed storage
2. Craft a custom ArrayBuffer object
   - Arbitrary reads and writes
3. Leak address to Text object
   - Used to find base address of chrome_child.dll
4. Leak address of kernel32
Adobe Flash AS2 Transform Use-After-Free

- `flash.geom.Transform`
  - Contains a matrix property
    - `Instance of flash.geom.Matrix`
- Custom accessor on `flash.geom`
  - *Modify the object before returning the original Matrix*
- Only useful as an information leak
Adobe Flash AS2 Transform Use-After-Free

```actionscript
var mc:MovieClip = movies[movies.length - 0x100];
var t = new Transform(mc);

var geom = _global["flash"]["geom"];   
var OriginalMatrix = flash.geom.Matrix;

g geom.addProperty('Matrix', function() {
    for ( var i = movies.length - 0x200; i < movies.length; ++i )
        movies[i].removeMovieClip();
    return OriginalMatrix;
}, function() {});

var m = t.matrix;
```
Exploitation Steps

1. Trigger the vulnerability
2. Within the custom accessor
   1. Free the MovieClip object
   2. Reclaim freed memory by allocating custom objects
3. Read values from the matrix property
Adobe Flash AS2 LoadVars Use-After-Free

• **LoadVars**
  – Contains a decode method
    • Takes URL-encoded string
    • Set properties on an object

• **Object.watch**
  – Set a callback on a property
  – Called when the property is modified
Adobe Flash AS2 LoadVars Use-After-Free

```javascript
var mc:MovieClip = movies[movies.length - 0x200];
var my_lv:LoadVars = new LoadVars();

mc.watch("aaa", function() {
    for (var i = 200; i < movies.length; ++i)
        movies[i].removeMovieClip();
});

try {
    my_lv.decode.call(mc, "aaa=1&bbb=2");
} catch (e) { }
```
Exploitation Steps

1. Trigger the vulnerability
2. Use the kernel32 information leak to bypass a dynamic call
3. Decrement arbitrary address
   1. Decrement reference count from leaked custom object
   2. Reclaim freed memory by allocating ByteArrays
4. Modify size of ByteArray
   1. Arbitrary read and write access
Microsoft Windows win32kfull.sys Surface Object UaF

- Issue arises because the code does not properly handle the reference count of a CompatibleDC object
- Window object creation handled by win32k
- Associated Surface object handled by Desktop Window Manager
- Cleanup more important
Exploitation Steps

1. Trigger the vulnerability
2. Allocate AcceleratorTable objects
3. Bitmap object used for memory access
   - GetBitmapBits used to read
   - SetBitmapBits used to write
Adobe Flash to SYSTEM

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360 Vulcan Team Exploit Demo
Adobe Flash AS2 NetConnection Type Confusion

• **AS2 ScriptObjects contain:**
  – Type ID
  – Private data specific to the type

• **Both typically set during object construction**
  – *Not the case with NetConnection objects, which are set during connection*

• **Implicit type conversions during function call**
  – *Allow for object modification*
Adobe Flash AS2 NetConnection Type Confusion

```javascript
var nc:NetConnection = new NetConnection()
var o = this;
o.toString = function() { super(); return "WIN 10,2,153,2"; }

var xml:XML = new XML("<mytag name='Val'> item </mytag>" );
xml.firstChild.attributes.aaa = o;

nc.connect.call(this, url, xml);
```
Exploitation Steps

1. ColorMatrixFilter objects interpreted as a NetConnection objects
   - Contains an array of 20 floats that can be modified
2. Leak a pointer to a string
3. Trigger an arbitrary use-after-free
4. Modify a ByteArray object
   - Read/write access to memory
Microsoft Windows xxxEndDeferWindowPosEx Window UaF

- Issue arises because the code does not increment a reference count prior to calling userland code
- PostIAMShellHookMessageEx method takes a HWND
  - Does not verify that it is still valid
  - Typically done by calling ValidateHwnd

```c
void __stdcall PostIAMShellHookMessageEx(int a1, int a2, int a3) {
    if ( !a1 ) return;
    v3 = _gpsi;
    if ( !*(BYTE *)((DWORD *)_gpsi + 1712) & 8 ) || !*(DWORD *)(a1 + ?) )
        return;
    if ( a2 == 35 ) {
        v5 = *(DWORD *)(*(DWORD *)(a1 +4) +92);
        if ( v5 )
            _PostMessage(v5, *(DWORD *)(*(DWORD *)v3 + 520), a2, a3);
            return;
    }
    v4 = *(DWORD *)(*(DWORD *)(_gSharedInfo + 8) * (unsigned __int16)a3);
}
Microsoft Windows xxxEndDeferWindowPosEx Window UaF

- **xxxEndDeferWindowPosEx method**
  - Calls PostIAMShellHookMessageEx
  - Does not increment the WND reference count

```c
if ( v52 ) {
  v28 = *(DWORD *)(v26 + v27 + 24);
  if ( v28 & 0xF0000000 ) {
    if ( v28 & 0x10000000 ) {
      if ( *(BYTE *)(v26 + v27 + 120) & 8 ) {
        PostIAMShellHookMessageEx(*(_DWORD *)(*_DWORD *)__gptiCurrent + 216), 21, v52);
      }
      //...
      if ( *(DWORD *)(v45 + *(DWORD *)v2 + 6) + 24) & 0x80000000 )
        xxxSetTrayWindow(v3[54], 1);
    v26 = v45;
  }
}
```
Exploitation Steps

1. WND replaced by AcceleratorTable object

2. Bitmap objects allocated adjacent
   - First Bitmap used to modify pointer in second Bitmap
   - GetBitmapBits used to read
   - SetBitmapBits used to write
Adobe Flash to SYSTEM

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Team Sniper Exploit Demo
Adobe Flash JPEG-XR Parsing Stack-based Buffer Overflow

- Variant of a Google Project Zero discovery
  - Nobody checked the 'else' branch of a condition

```c
int k, i = 1;
for (k = 0; k < num_nonzero; k+=1) {
    i += RLCoeffs[k*2];
    AdaptiveLPScan(image, LPInput[ndx], i, RLCoeffs[k*2+1]);
    i += 1;
}
```
Vulnerability in AdaptiveLPScan

```c
void __cdecl sub_108A208B(_DWORD *a1, int a2, signed int a3, int a4)
{
    unsigned int v4; // ecx@4
    unsigned int v5; // eax@5
    int v6; // eax@6
    int v7; // ecx@6

    if ( !*a1 ) {
        if ( a3 > 0 ) {
            *(DWORD *)(a2 + 4 * a1[a3 + 345]) = a4;
            v4 = ++a1[a3 + 360];
            if ( a3 > 1 ) {
                v5 = a1[a3 + 359];
                if ( v4 > v5 ) {
                    a1[a3 + 360] = v5;
                    v6 = a1[a3 + 344];
                    a1[a3 + 359] = v4;
                    v7 = a1[a3 + 345];
                    a1[a3 + 345] = v6;
                    a1[a3 + 344] = v7;
                }
            }
        }
    }
}
```
Exploitation Steps

1. Trigger vulnerability several times
2. Leak stack address
   - Used to craft a fake object pointer
3. Modify two objects on the stack
   - One to update pointers in the second object
   - The other to perform arbitrary reads and writes
4. Return
Microsoft Windows NtGdiGetEmbUFI Info Disclosure

• Simply calling NtGdiGetEmbUFI is sufficient
• NtGdiGetEmbUFI returns a pointer to a PFFOBJ
  – *Supposed to return an ID*
  – Issue is due to GreGetUFI

```c
if ( PFFOBJ::bInPrivatePFT((PFFOBJ *)&v23) )
{
    *v8 |= 1u;
    if ( a7 )
        *(_DWORD *)a7 = *v16;
}
```
Microsoft Windows PFFOBJ::bDeleteLoadRef Font UaF

- bDeleteLoadRef frees PFFOBJ resources
- Return code depends on reference count
- Caller wouldn’t know if resources freed or not

```c
if ( v9 )
{
    PFFOBJ::vKill(v5);
    v4 = 1;
}
return *( _DWORD * )(*( _DWORD * )v5 + 44) == 0 ? v4 : 0;
```
Exploitation Steps

1. Free the PFFOBJ resources
2. NtUserConvertMemHandle used to reclaim freed memory
3. Results in a primitive to OR a value with 2
   - Used to increase a WND object’s extra byte size
4. SetWindowLongPtr to set pointer in other WND
   - InternalGetWindowText to read arbitrary memory
   - NtUserDefSetSetText to write arbitrary memory
Microsoft Edge to SYSTEM

LOKİHARDT
Lokihardt Exploit Demo
Microsoft Edge JavaScript Concat Method Uninitialized Variable

- From JavascriptArray::ConcatArgs

Var subItem;
uint32 lengthToUin32Max = length.IsSmallIndex() ? length.GetSmallIndex() : MaxArrayLength;
for (uint32 idxSubItem = 0u; idxSubItem < lengthToUin32Max; ++idxSubItem)
{
    if (JavascriptOperators::HasItem(itemObject, idxSubItem))
    {
        JavascriptOperators::GetItem(itemObject, idxSubItem, &subItem, scriptContext);
        if (pDestArray)
        {
            pDestArray->DirectSetItemAt(idxDest, subItem);
Exploitation Steps

• Simple Trigger

```javascript
var bug = new Proxy(new Array(1), {has: () => true});
alert(bug.concat());
```

1. Spray JavascriptDate objects of size 0x90
2. Push one of the JavascriptDate objects, which resided in the middle of the spray deep in the stack using Array.slice
3. Free memory
4. Spray DataView object at the freed space
5. Trigger the vulnerability to get the reference to the pointer that we pushed in step 2
Exploitation Steps

- Object that will be referenced using the vulnerability is the last JavascriptDate object which points to DataView+0x30

- The following is a representation of the DataView object structure:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>+ 0x00</th>
<th>+ 0x08</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0x00</td>
<td>*vtable</td>
<td>*type</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x10</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x20</td>
<td>length</td>
<td>*arrayBuffer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x30</td>
<td>byteOffset</td>
<td>*data</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Exploitation Steps

• Read and write primitives
  – DataView objects memory is freed and filled with NativeFloatArray objects
  – As long as the size of NativeFloatArray is small, elements for the array are created next to each other
  – Fake DataView objects are created to perform read/write from process memory

• Control Flow Guard bypass
  – Use a setjmp call to obtain the stack address and overwrite the return address
Microsoft Windows Diagnostics Hub Standard Collector Directory Traversal

- Standard Collector is SYSTEM-level COM service
  - Communication is possible from within the Microsoft Edge's sandbox
- COM interface exposes the AddAgent function that takes two arguments
  - DLL path
  - GUID
DLL Path Not Validated

```
le a  r9, [rbp+lpLibFileName]
cmp [rbp+var_10], 8
cmovnb r9, [rbp+lpLibFileName]
lea r8, aValidAgentAsse ; "Valid agent assembly path found at \"%s\"
mov rdx, r14 ; unsigned __int16 *
call DiagHubCommon::LogStream::Write(ushort const *, ushort const *, ...)
```

```
loc_18000C394:
le a  rcx, [rbp+lpLibFileName]
cmp [rbp+var_10], 8
cmovnb rcx, [rbp+lpLibFileName] ; lpLibFileName
xor edx, edx ; hFile
lea r8d, [rdx+8] ; dwFlags
call cs:_imp_LoadLibraryExW
mov [rbp+hModule], rax
test rax, rax
jnz loc_18000C443
```
Microsoft Edge with SYSTEM

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Team Sniper Exploit Demo
Microsoft Edge JavaScript fill Out-of-Bounds Access

- Length is fetched from the length property
- Length property can be overwritten in certain cases

```cpp
Var JavascriptArray::EntryFill(RecyclableObject* function, CallInfo callInfo, ...) {
    //....
    Var lenValue = JavascriptOperators::OP_GetLength(obj, scriptContext);
    length = JavascriptConversion::ToLength(lenValue, scriptContext);
}

return JavascriptArray::FillHelper(pArr, nullptr, obj, length, args, scriptContext);
```
Execution Flow

Var JavascriptArray::FillHelper(JavascriptArray* pArr, Js::TypedArrayBase* typedArrayBase, RecyclableObject* obj, int64 length, Arguments& args, ScriptContext* scriptContext)
{
    //...
    int64 end = mxin<int64>(finalVal, MaxArrayLength);
    uint32 u32k = static_cast<uint32>(k);

    while (u32k < end)
    {
        if (typedArrayBase) {
            typedArrayBase->DirectSetItem(u32k, fillValue, false);
        }
        else if (pArr)
        {
            pArr->setItem(u32k, fillValue, PropertyOperation_ThrowIfNotExtensible);
        }
    }
}
inline BOOL BaseTypedDirectSetItem(__in uint32 index, __in Js::Var value, __in bool skipSetElement, TypeName (*convFunc)(Var value, ScriptContext* scriptContext))
{
  // This call can potentially invoke user code, and may end up detaching the underlying array (this).
  // Therefore it was brought out and above the IsDetached check
  TypeName typedValue = convFunc(value, GetScriptContext());

  if (this->IsDetachedBuffer()) // 9.4.5.9 IntegerIndexedElementSet
  {
    JavascriptError::ThrowTypeError(GetScriptContext(), JSERR_DetachedTypedArray);
  }

  if (skipSetElement) { return FALSE; }

  AssertMsg(index < GetLength(), "Trying to set out of bound index for typed array.");
  Assert((index + 1) * sizeof(TypeName) + GetByteOffset() <= GetArrayBuffer()->GetByteLength());
  TypeName* typedBuffer = (TypeName*)buffer;
  typedBuffer[index] = typedValue;
Exploitation Steps

• Simple trigger

```javascript
var ua = new Uint32Array(0x10);
ua.__proto__ = new Array(0xffffffff);
ua.fill(0x41, 0x41414141, 0x41414141 + 1);
```

• Corrupt the length of a JavascriptNativeIntArray
  – Achieves arbitrary read and write

• Two heap sprays were used during the exploitation process
  – First one to stabilize the heap
  – Second one to fetch the index
Exploitation Steps

• Read and write primitive
  – Once the index of the target object was found, the bug was triggered against the object to overwrite the length with 0x7FFFFFFC
  – Using this corrupted object, arbitrary read/write is possible against a large chunk of the Chakra heap

• Control Flow Guard bypass
  – Use a set jmp call to obtain the stack address and overwrite the return address
Microsoft Windows Dxgkrnl Driver Buffer Overflow

- dxgkrnl.sys kernel driver has a structure called _D3DKMT_PRESENTHISTORYTOKEN
  - Token and TokenSize members vary according to the Model member
  - There is a model called Flip model
  - Flip model's corresponding token structure is D3DKMT_FLIPMODEL_PRESENTHISTORYTOKEN
- _D3DKMT_PRESENTHISTORYTOKEN structure contains a structure called D3DKMT_DIRTYREGIONS
- D3DKMT_DIRTYREGIONS contains an array of RECTS

typedef struct _D3DKMT_DIRTYREGIONS
{
    UINT NumRects;
    RECT Rects[D3DKMT_MAX_PRESENT_HISTORY_RECTS];
} D3DKMT_DIRTYREGIONS;
Microsoft Windows Dxgkrnl Driver Buffer Overflow

- Driver checks whether NumRects is greater than \texttt{D3DKMT\_MAX\_PRESENT\_HISTORY\_RECTS}:

```assembly
cmp  dword ptr [r15+334h], 10h  ; jump table 00000001C0098BBB case 1
jbe  short loc_1C0098C0B

call cs::\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_imp\_WdLogNewEntry5\_WdAssertion
mov  rcx, rax
mov  qword ptr [rax+18h], 38h

call cs::\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_imp\_WdLogEvent5\_WdAssertion

loc_1C0098C0B:

mov  eax, [r15+334h]
shl  eax, 4
add  eax, 338h
jmp  short loc_1C0098C7D
```
Microsoft Windows Dxgkrnl Driver Buffer Overflow

• Execution continues after logging the violation
• Code reaches `loc_1C0098C7D` regardless of the value specified for `NumRects`:

```
loc_1C0098C7D:
  lea  r8d, [rax+7]
  mov  rdx, r15  ; Src
  mov  eax, 0FFFFFFFF8h
  mov  rcx, rsi  ; Dst
  and  r8, rax   ; Size
  call  memmove
```
Exploitation Steps

1. Trigger overflow vulnerability to overwrite a subsequent history token record
2. When the record is read, the address that was specified (during the overwrite) will actually be read
3. BITMAP objects are sprayed into the kernel memory pool
   - Address of these BITMAP objects can be guessed using the GDI handle table, which can be accessed with user32!gSharedInfo
4. Using that address, arbitrary data can be written
5. The specific BITMAP object that was written to, can be found by traversing the sprayed BITMAP objects
6. Kernel-mode read and write can be achieved using SetBitmapBits and GetBitmapBits APIs on this corrupted BITMAP object
7. IDT table can be dumped and the ntoskrnl base address can be fetched
8. System process and the current process' EPROCESS structures can be fetched by traversing the PspCidTable
Conclusion
Conclusion

• Application sandboxing is a step in the right direction
• Kernel attack surface remains expansive and exposed
• Exploitation is getting harder…but still very possible
  – Write exploit primitives are a mainstay in exploits
  – Logic bugs can be high impact
• Vulnerability/Exploit research is becoming increasingly popular ;-)
  – New researchers setting a new standard
  – Becoming a team sport
Questions?

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