

Cyber War in Perspective: Analysis from the Crisis in Ukraine

Kenneth Geers / Comodo

NATO CCD COE / Atlantic Council / DSI-Berlin / TSN Univ Kyiv
Ukraine

Revolution: Humans




Revolution: Machines

NETFLIX



Russian reaction: invasion, annexation



NATO CCD COE research

- Cyber dimension of conflict
- Ukraine / Russia
 - Necessary ingredients
 - Geopolitical stakes
 - IT / hacking expertise
- Malware: espionage / crime
- Skeptics: no cyber war
- International norms
 - Limits to state hacking
 - Tallinn Manual



NATO Warsaw Summit Communiqué - July 2016

- Cyber attacks present a **clear challenge** to the security of the Alliance.
- Could be as harmful to modern societies as a **conventional attack**.
- Cyber defence is part of NATO's **core task** of collective defence.
- We ... recognise **cyberspace as a domain** of operations in which NATO must defend itself as effectively as it does in the air, on land, and at sea.



US Army FM 3-38: Electromagnetic Cyber Activities

- project power, apply force through cyberspace
- deny, deceive, degrade, destroy, disrupt, [betray]
- enemy / adversary -> activity / capabilities
- may rise to physical damage
- assure access during hostilities
- weapons systems / operator decision-making
- support land objectives (maneuver)
- physical / logical (websites, cyber-persona, IPs)
- within public infrastructure
- comply with the law of war



Context: RU SIGINT



Cyber War in Perspective - authors

1. Kenneth Geers - CCD COE
2. Keir Giles - CSRC
3. James J. Wirtz - NPS
4. James A. Lewis - CSIS
5. Martin Libicki - RAND
6. Nikolay Koval - CERT UA
7. Glib Pakhareenko - ISACA KYIV
8. Jen Weedon - FireEye
9. Tim Maurer - New America
10. Margarita Levin Jaitner - SDU
11. Liisa Past - CCD COE
12. Elina Lange-Ionatamishvili & Sanda Svetoka - STRATCOM COE
13. Nadiya Kostyuk - U Michigan
14. Jan Stinissen - CCD COE
15. Henry Rõigas - CCD COE
16. Jarno Limnéll - Aalto U
17. Jason Healey & Michelle Cantos - Columbia U
18. Richard Bejtlich - Brookings

Free download

Complete book:


https://ccdcoe.org/sites/default/files/multimedia/pdf/CyberWarinPerspective_full_book.pdf

Chapters:

<https://ccdcoe.org/multimedia/cyber-war-perspective-russian-aggression-against-ukraine.html>

NATO Cyber Defence Library:

<https://ccdcoe.org/publication-library.html>



CERT UA

- Geopolitical correlation
 - Incidents rise w/ tension
- 2012: defacements
 - UA gov
- 2013: advanced malware
 - Red October, MiniDuke, NetTraveler
- 2014: political doxing
 - UA gov
- Most advanced hack
 - Central Election Commission (CEC)



ISACA Kyiv

- EuroMaidan
 - Physical / logical attacks
 - Servers, smartphones, sites, accounts
 - Most serious when shooting started
- Crimea
 - Severed network cables, commandeered satellites, mass changes to *Wikipedia*
- Eastern Ukraine
 - Targeting: mobile phone, Wi-Fi
 - Isolation via censorship, forensics



SIGINT + WWW

Ukraine crisis: Transcript of leaked Nuland-Pyatt call

🕒 7 February 2014 | Europe

BBC

YouTube UA


Search



Пайет: Думаю, если ты с ним напрямую свяжешься, это поможет разобраться с ролями всех троих. Также это дает тебе шанс быстро действовать в этой ситуации и обогнать нас. До того, как они, и он объяснит, почему ему это не нравится.

Presidential election hack: 25 May 2014

- **CyberBerkut** vs. Central Election Commission
- Most technically advanced hack (CERT-UA)
- 2+ months recon / Admin access
- Sofacy / **APT28** / Sednit malware
- Disabled core CEC nodes
- Possible Cisco ASA **zero-day**
- Announced “**winner**” on CEC website
- UA Right Sector boss Dmitry Yarosh
- Broadcast on **Russian TV**
- **Real paper ballots** guarantee



Christmas 2015: electricity grid hack

1. Spear phished IT staff
2. VPN credentials to SCADA
3. Backdoor: Black Energy 3
4. Changed passwords
5. Disabled backup power
6. Overwrote firmware: no reconstitution
7. Opened circuit breakers: 3 power distro centers
8. Launched KillDisk via logic bomb
9. 50+ substations offline; 200K+ residents in dark
10. TDoS customer call centers





Russian e-billboard



FEBRUARY 2015
BMP-2 'Lavina'
in Uglegorsk, Ukraine
48.311252, 38.288002



AUGUST 2014
BMP-2 'Lavina'
in Staraya Stanitsa, Russia
48.350068, 40.272248



SEPTEMBER 2014
Msta-S in Novoazovsk,
Ukraine
47.1275441, 38.0892229



JULY 2014
Msta-S in Rostov-on-Don, Russia
47.262757, 39.660493

Military equipment

LUHANSK

DONETSK

BORDER BETWEEN UKRAINE
AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

MARIUPOL



VICE
NEWS

Social Media



14:42

23:13



Igor Rosovski

- May 2: **Odessa** fire
- May 3: new **Facebook** account
 - “local doctor”
- **Claims** atrocities, anti-semitism
 - Like “**fascist occupation**”
- 1000s FB, *ВКонтакте* shares
 - Multiples translations
- Stolen pic: **Ruslan Semenov**
 - Russian dentist



Здравствуйте, меня зовут Игорь Розовский, мне 39 лет, я живу в городе Одессе. В течении 15 лет я работаю врачом в службе скорой помощи. Вчера, как вы знаете, в нашем города случилась страшная трагедия, одни люди убили других. Убили жестоко - сожгли живыми. Не в состоянии опьянения, не за наследство бабушки, а потому что они не разделяют политических взглядов националистов. Сначала жестоко избивали, потом жгли.

Как врач я поспешил оказать помощь тем, кого можно было спасти, но меня остановили боевики, не дав подойти к раненому. Один из них грубо оттолкнул меня, пообещав, что скоро меня и других евреев Одессы ждет такая же участь.


Я видел парня, которого можно было спасти, если бы я смог забрать его в больницу, но все уговоры закончились ударом по моему лицу и потерей очков.



Sorry, this content isn't available right now

Pavel Sheremet, Journalist in Ukraine, Is Killed in Car Bombing

By ANDREW E. KRAMER JULY 20, 2016



Pavel G. Sheremet, 44, who had worked for Russian state



Embed


Cyber War in Perspective

- CND -> CNO -> CNE -> CNA
 - Espionage / Sabotage / PSYOP
- Evolution
 - Estonia 2007
 - Availability
 - Ukraine 2014
 - Integrity
 - USA 2016
 - Confidentiality



CYBERCOM: Cyber Analogies Project

- Cyber war
 - Yes it exists
 - But likely **not decisive**
- Strategy / tactics
 - Can win individual battles
 - May gain **time and space**
- ADM Yamamoto
 - No WW2 victory at Pearl Harbor
 - Adversary will respond
 - **Attacker beware**



National security challenges

- Defense: connectivity, vulnerability
- Attack: **peacetime limits?**
- Intent: CNE or CNA?
- **Deterrence**: proactive, reactive
- Security dilemma
- Retaliation: **laws of war**
- Critical infrastructure: Big Brother
- **Arms control**: prohibition, inspection
- Policy / law: tech too fast
- Attribution: **SECRET** (crowdsource?)



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