ADVANCED IC REVERSE ENGINEERING TECHNIQUES: IN DEPTH ANALYSIS OF A MODERN SMART CARD

Olivier THOMAS <olivier@texplained.com>
Blackhat USA 2015
About Texplained

Texplained
[Technology Explained]

refers to the skill of making sense out of any IC in a black box situation

Invasive attacks

Invasive attacks are left out of evaluation and certification mainly because of the extensive resources needed

Whereas Invasive attacks are a major threat as:

• Piracy and counterfeiting have merged
• Hackers groups are getting professional

Texplained focuses on performing invasive analysis using the technologies developed in house to perform complicated analysis in a short amount of time

Expertise in Texplained comes from 10 years of active R&D experience for an independent security research laboratory focused on demanding pay-tv security
Overview

- Approach
- Results
- Background
- Conclusion
Overview

Background
This talk will focus on secure microcontrollers. A secure microcontroller is an Integrated Circuit (IC) with an integrated CPU, program memory and storage for sensitive data. Secure microcontrollers are available in different form-factors:

- Smartcards, biometric passports and ID cards
- SMD packages for TPMs, uSD, UMMC

Members of a particular product family will share device characteristics.
Background

Evaluation

• When it comes to invasive attacks, one can argue that the attack is time and resource consuming.
• BUT equipment can be rented and / or service labs can provide support
• There is no clearly defined process to study one IC in a reasonable time
• Invasive Attacks are under evaluated
Pay TV has been the first market to suffer from heavy piracy.
Background

Pay TV

The problem

A clone of a PayTV subscriber card will have the same level of access as the genuine subscriber card. Pirates can buy a single subscription with access to all the paid content and then produce copies of this card.

Pirate Card ca. 1995
Evolution

Pay TV actors always pushed to get the best security possible at a time

~1995
- No shield
- No scrambling
- Unencrypted

~2000
- Passive shield
- Bus scrambling
- Encrypted

~2005
- Internal Oscillator
- Active shield
- Bus scrambling
- Encrypted
- Attack Sensors
- Hardware redundancy
- Custom hardware function
Threat globalisation

• Piracy is not the only threat anymore
• Supply chain security is of concern for fabless manufacturers (backdoors)
• IP theft could be a critical issue
• Counterfeiting has become a bigger market
• Mass selling products are the new targets
  • Consumables (Ink cartridges for printers, ...)
  • Accessories (game console controllers, ...)
• Internet Of Things will create a global security need
Overview

Approach
Approach

• Research Project about new analysis methods - work in progress
• Time and resource limited project (one person - one month).
• The Target: State Of The Art Secure Smart Card
  • shield (mesh)
  • memory encryption
  • internal oscillator...
• Analysis methods
  • professional deprocessing
  • high resolution imagery (Scanning Electron Microscope)
  • Labless analysis through custom tools
Process Choices

- IC Material
- Secure IC
- Mixed deprocessing
- SEM imagery
- Assisted
DeProcessing

Card Material

- Chip is Aluminium based
- This means:
  - Lines are made of Aluminium
  - Vias are made of Tungsten
- Therefore, it is possible to:
  - remove lines
  - keep the vias

Mixed deprocessing
Imagery

- Optical pictures are not usable
- SEM brings high resolution
Imagery

- 5 layers have been imaged (4 interconnect layers + active layer)
- 1500 pictures per layer
Analysis

• SEM pictures are distorted
• Issue for correlating and stitching large scans
• Issue for aligning layers
• Tracing signal inside the core is mandatory for secure ICs
• Thousands of gates to reverse and link together
Analysis

- Extract lines, vias and standard cells
- Correlate images and features together
- Stitch images and features together
- Align layers together
Feature Extraction

Source Picture

Extracted Lines and Vias
Feature Extraction

Metal 1  Poly  Extracted Standard Cells

Feature extraction
Results

- 2 blocs of RAM
- ROM
- Flash
- Analog blocs
- Core
Results

- Core will be analyzed
- Lines and Vias are extracted
Results

- Standard Cell Library is reconstructed
Reading The Flash

- Flash is easy to spot:
  - Charge pump used to erase it relies on big capacitors
  - Charge pump can be disabled to prevent a flash erase in case of security interrupt.

Flash Memory
Reading The Flash

- Flash output buffers are directly visible from the backside
- Output lines get separated in 2 groups that travel along the flash to the core.
Reading The Flash

- Only one of the flash output could be traced to the core.
- Position of the other output is approximative.
Reading The Flash

- Tracing the known flash output leads to 2 multiplexers.

Flash output going inside the core
Tracing the selection signal of the multiplexer shows that the bus must be multiplexed.
Reading The Flash

- Tracing back from the multiplexers confirms the position of the other flash outputs.
- It also shows that bytes can be handled in different orders (endianness...)

6 flash outputs
Reading The Flash

- Next step is finding the Instruction Register
- 2 data paths.
Reading The Flash

- First group of Flip-Flops found.
- It could be the Instruction Register.
- Following bloc would be the Instruction Decoder then.

- Group bits inside the presumed Instruction Decoder.
- Compare with the instruction set.
- Match between the 2 : IR found
Attack Strategy For Reading The Flash

- Instruction register is made of Flip-Flops that have 2 interesting signals:
  - clk / read signal that can be used to synchronize data as some clk cycles may be suppressed by embedded counter-measures
  - Enable signal that disconnect the input from the Flip-Flop.
- Redundancy can be obtained by probing 2 data lines at a time (one needle will stay on its line for all the acquisition).
- 4 needles Linear Code Extraction
Comparison with old ICs

- Linear Code Extraction is still a valid attack scenario.
- Old chips had no protection against it.
- The target hides its bus logic inside a dense core
- This obfuscation does not help when the attacker can fully reverse the core.
Attack Strategy For Reading The Flash

- Performing the attack can be tricky depending on:
  - shield technology
  - Position of the interesting nets inside the chip (frontside or backside edit)
  - Planarization
- Having all features extracted, a gds2 file has been created. It can be loaded in the FIB for assisted navigation.

GDS2 active layer example

Core GDS2 for FIB NAVIGATION
Reading The ROM

- Getting the « raw » bits is feasible.
- Is the ROM encrypted?

Bits before wet chemical dopant etch

Dopant etch

Bits revealed by etching
Reading The ROM

- ROM data bus goes to an encryption bloc
- Having Muxes and Flip-Flops on the same path may indicate that decryption operation can take several clk cycles.
- This path has not been completely reversed
- ROM can be read after studying the encryption without any Focused Ion Beam edit.
2 Blocs of RAM

- Both RAM are encrypted
- RAM and ROM are on the same clk domain
- Shared RAM with the crypto accelerator?
Overview

Conclusion
Timing: generation benchmark

- The first Linear Code Extractions did not require expensive equipments such as FIB and SEM.
- The main memory was not scrambled neither encrypted.
- Buffers were easily accessible.
- Extracting such a chip would require very little effort nowadays.

Unprotected Bus
Timing: generation benchmark

- To avoid easy access to the logic, multiplexers and buffers have been hidden inside the core.

Scrambling
- 8 bits processor
- 32 bits FLASH output going to the core

Manual Tracing
Step by step

- Lines have to be traced inside the core
- The core contains a multiplexer for the 32-bit lines
- Identify the 8 output bits of the multiplexers

32 ROM Outputs

32:8 MUX

8 Instruction Registers
Timing: generation benchmark

Step by step

- 3 paths can be followed
- 2 of them can not be exploited
Timing: generation benchmark

Step by step

- Multiplexers were hidden
- Data was not encrypted
- Finding the correct spot took some time: ~ 2 months.
Timing: generation benchmark

- New methodology is already successful
- Time of this particular study is short
  - Deprocessing and imagery can be performed in less than 2 weeks.
  - Interconnects are extracted and the result checked in another 2 weeks.
  - The tools used for that study were in a mode used when picture quality is low or when feature extraction has not been verified.
  - Standard Cell Library has been extracted while tracing signals, leading to 22,000 extracted instances inside the core.
  - Tracing RAM, ROM and Flash to the Instruction Register and verifying its location with an overview of the Instruction decoder took 1.5 week.
Conclusion

• The target IC has the characteristics of a secure chip.
  • Shield
  • Internal Oscillator
  • Memory encryption
  • Obfuscation of the different parts inside a single core
  • ...
• Linear Code Extraction would be the best method to read the main memory
• ROM could be read by a deep Hardware Reverse Engineering
Conclusion

• Time necessary to perform the study was 2 weeks of feature extraction related work and an extra week and a half to find where and how to perform a Linear Code Extraction.

• This methods speeds up the regular process by a significant factor.
• It also opens doors for semi-invasive attacks where the position of important standard cells could be used to narrow down one study.
• Hardware custom implementation are questionable.
CONTACT

Olivier Thomas  
Chief Executive Officer  
+33 6 64 80 06 87  
olivier@texplained.com

Clarisse Ginet  
Head of Business Development  
+33 6 35 54 12 04  
clarisse@texplained.com

www.texplained.com