


Who are we?


- Runa A. Sandvik
- Michael Auger




Why are we doing this?

A gun with WiFi and fancy electronics... duh

Physical









```
Nmap scan report for 192.168.1.1

Host is up (0.0049s latency).

Not shown: 65533 filtered ports

PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION

80/tcp open http lighttpd

|_http-methods: OPTIONS GET HEAD POST

|_http-title: Site doesn't have a title (text/html).

554/tcp open rtsp GStreamer rtspd

|_rtsp-methods: ERROR: Script execution failed (use -d to debug)

Warning: OSScan results may be unreliable because we could not find at least...

Device type: storage-misc|general purpose|specialized|WAP|media device|phone

Running (JUST GUESSING): HP embedded (97%), Linux 2.6.X|3.X (95%)...


Aggressive OS guesses: HP P2000 G3 NAS device (97%), Linux 2.6.36 - 2.6.37 (95%)
```

Mobile Apps





TrackingPoint App







ShotView App



Public API

Mobile Apps

```
/clear_passcode/
/config/
/dateset/
/delete/
/dir/
/get_passcode/
/get_shot_data/
/gps/
/pkg-upload/
/progress/
/serial num/
/service/
/set_factory_defaults/
/set_passcode/
/set_windage/
/unwatch/
/updatescope/
/version/
```


Config

```
/set_ammunition/
/set_imagestab/
/set_killzone/
/set_temperature/
/set_record_cooltime/
/set_recording/
```


Initial Findings

- SSID contains the serial number, can't be changed
- WPA2 key can't be changed
- VLC or anything can stream the scope view
- Advanced mode lock is only a 4 digit pin and can be brute forced
- API is un-authenticated
- API settings can be modified regardless of advanced mode lock

Courtesy of TrackingPoint's Website




Courtesy of TrackingPoint's Website



Tearing it open




Courtesy of TrackingPoint's YouTube






Close Up



UART



Woot!

```
U-Boot 2010.06-00300-gfb2cb26 (Jul 10 2013 - 17:39:57)
TI8148-GP rev 2.1
ARM clk: 600MHz
DDR clk: 400MHz
I2C:
      ready
DRAM: 512 MiB
Flash: 16 MiB
TTTTTT RRRR
                  CCC K K III N N GGG PPPP
                                                OOO III N N TTTTTT
 TT R R A A C
                      к к
                             I NN NG
                                          P PO 0 I
      RRRR
           AAAA C
                      KK
                             I NNNG GG PPPP O O I NNN
            A A C
                      K K
                             IN NNG GP
                                               O O I N NN
                                                               TT
 TT RR
 TT R RR A A CCC K K III N N GGG P
                                                OOO III N N TT
                      SHOT. MADE!
MMC: OMAP SD/MMC: 0
Net: MAC:7c:66:9d:41:8:88 Dev:cpsw
Hit any key to stop autoboot: 0
Booting side 2
## Booting kernel from Legacy Image at 08360000 ...
  Image Name: Linux-2.6.37
              ARM Linux Kernel Image (uncompressed)
  Image Type:
              2314892 Bytes = 2.2 MiB
  Data Size:
  Load Address: 80008000
  Entry Point: 80008000
  Loading Kernel Image ... OK
OK
Starting kernel ...
```

Well played TrackingPoint...

```
usbcore: registered new interface driver ath9k_htc
usb 2-1.2: ath9k htc: Transferred FW: htc 9271.fw, size: 51272
ath9k_htc 2-1.2:1.0: ath9k_htc: HTC initialized with 33 credits
ath9k_htc 2-1.2:1.0: ath9k_htc: FW Version: 1.3
ieee80211 phy0: Atheros AR9271 Rev:1
Enabling iptables...
ip_tables: (C) 2000-2006 Netfilter Core Team
nf_conntrack version 0.5.0 (3969 buckets, 15876 max)
Starting portmap daemon: portmap.
Caching udev devnodes
INIT: Entering runlevel: 5
Starting Dropbear SSH server: NET: Registered protocol family 10
dropbear.
Starting Lighttpd Web Server: lighttpd.
                      SHOT. MADE.
Linux TP TP750-308FF89765R 2.6.37
Arago 2011.09 TP_TP750-308FF89765R tty00
TP_TP750-308FF89765R login:
```


...well played




TrackingPoint wins!

- Validating API input
- GPG signed and encrypted updates
- Password Protected Console


Let's get destructive!




The Real Filesystem



Had only we known!









Admin API

Mobile Apps Config /clear_passcode/ /set ammunition/ /config/ /set_imagestab/ /dateset/ /set killzone/ /delete/ /set_temperature/ /set_record_cooltime/ /dir/ /get_passcode/ /set recording/ /get_shot_data/ /gps/ Admin /pkg-upload/ /progress/ /compmode/ /serial_num/ /get_imu/ /service/ /powermgr/ /set factory defaults/ /set advanced mode/ /set_passcode/ /set_pgf/ /set_windage/ /set_tiltadjust/ /unwatch/ /set_wifi/ /updatescope/ /ssh_accept/ /version/

Demo: Got root?

Demo: You missed!

Findings

- Admin API is un-authenticated
- Un-authenticated access to core system functions
- Any GPG key in trust DB can encrypt and sign updates

Takeaways

- Small attack surface and a lot was done right:
 - USB ports are disabled during boot
 - Media is deleted from scope once downloaded
 - WPA2 is in use, even if the key cannot be changed
 - API settings are validated on the backend
 - Password protected console and single user mode
 - GPG signed and encrypted software updates

Thanks!

- Travis Goodspeed
- Babak Javadi -- The CORE Group
- Mickey Shkatov -- Intel Advanced Threat Research
- Joe FitzPatrick
- Jesse
- Kenny
- ^H -- Portland's Hackerspace