

Overview of Contactless Payment Cards

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July 20, 2015

Blackhat USA 2015

Introduction

Contactless payments have exploded in popularity over the last 10 years with various schemes being popular in many domestic markets. Internationally the dominate contactless payments standard has have been from the traditional major international credit card companies and are based around the EMV chip card protocols. Utilisation of these protocols has allowed for the cards and terminals to support contactless payment technologies with minimal changes to existing devices in the field. However due to these cards utilising the EMV protocols; they also carry many of the existing flaws in the existing systems.

Key Identified flaws in EMV systems include:

- Ability to downgrade authorization method.[1]
- Insufficient replay prevention.[3, 10]
- Lack of Man In The Middle protection.[7]
- No protection against relay attacks.[4][6]
- Insecure generation of random numbers. [5]
- Plaintext transmission of sensitive data. [2]

Additionally EMV software used in commercial products has been shown to be vulnerable to basic logical attacks. [9, 8]

Many of these flaws can be prevented through prevention on the terminal side; proper monitoring by payment processors to ensure that transactions are using secure defaults and have not been tampered with.

Contactless implementations of the EMV standard frequently support simplified processing flows to ensure compatibility with older systems and reduce the time it takes to perform a transaction. These alterations affect the ability of existing protections to prevent fraud on cards.

Additionally contactless payment cards use altered EMV processing flows compared to the contact variety. This is due to the need for compatibility with older payment networks and for

transactions to be completed quickly. This need introduces other vulnerabilities to the system in which they are used.

An overview of the EMV standards

The EMV standard is a publicly available set of documents available at <http://www.emvco.com>. These standards cover the physical and logical properties of the cards, terminals and protocols used in the EMV world. Cards and terminals are certified for use by EMVco to ensure they interoperate with each other safely and reliably. Certification is performed through independent laboratories internationally. Terminals and Cards operate in a “Master/Session” configuration; where the Terminal controls all steps of the transaction with the card providing responses or calculations as necessary.

Contactless Banking Cards

The major standard used for contactless banking cards is ISO14443. This standard provides how cards physically and logically communicate with a reader. It is separated into two card types - Type A and Type B cards. This is due card technologies being initially developed in private companies which have been since incorporated into the ISO standardization process.

Type A and B are separated with how the card physically communicates (different modulation schemes and binary encodings) and initialization processes. The higher level data is formatted the same.

The ISO14443 standard is separated into 4 sections:

1. Physical Characteristics
2. Radio frequency power and signal interface
3. Initialization and anticollision
4. Transmission protocol

Mastercard Paypass

Mastercards implementation of contactless payments is branded “PayPass”. It is separated into two modes M/Chip and MagStripe.

M/Chip

This is MasterCard's contactless EMV implementation. It follows the full EMV standard fairly closely - emitting the PIN capture phase.




Figure 1: Mastercard M/CHIP Transaction Flow

MagStripe

This is the legacy mode provided for use in environments that cannot yet support the additional messaging EMV transactions requires. It utilizes the "Compute Cryptographic Checksum" command to generate dynamic Card Verification Codes (CVCs) for returned tracks. The terminal will then construct a transaction specific track from the returned data and send it to the payment network for processing.




Figure 2: Mastercard MagStripe Transaction Flow

VISA Paywave

VISA's implementation of contactless payment is branded "Paywave". It is separated into four operating modes - VSDC, qVSDC, CVN17 and dCVV.

VSDC

Visa Smart Debit Credit is a full implementation of the Combined DDA and TC Authorization (CDA) EMV standard. It is not widely supported by current cards due to customers having to keep the card in the contactless field for the complete transaction




Figure 3: VSDC Transaction Flow

qVSDC

Quick Visa Smart Debit Credit is a cut-down version of the EMV protocol for use in contactless environments. It removes the “Generate AC” step from the EMV protocol to allow for customers to remove their cards from the field prior to authentication from the payment network.




Figure 4: qVSDC Transaction Flow

CVN17

Card Verification Number 17 (CVN17) is a mode provided for use in environments that do not yet support EMV messaging. It relies on the “Get Processing Options” command to generate a cryptogram which is transmitted with the track data to the payment network. This mode is a replacement for the dCVV method previously used for older environments




Figure 5: VISA CVN17 Transaction Flow

dCVV

Dynamic CVV mode is an obsolete mode for use in environments which does not support EMV messaging. dCVV mode utilises the “Read Record” function to generate and return a dynamic CVV in the track data. However many cards will implement a static value for the CVV (which is permitted by the VISA standards).




Figure 6: VISA dCVV Transaction Flow

ApplePay

ApplePay was announced with the release of the iPhone 6 device. This has been developed in conjunction with the major card brands to provide payments utilising special hardware on the device. It can be separated into two methods - Card Not Present (Online) and Card Present (Contactless) transactions.

Accessing List of approved cards in a secure element

```
ps aux | grep "passd" //get PID of the passd daemon
cycrypt -p {PID of passd}
mySE = [[PDSecureElement alloc] init] //initialize a "SecureElement" object
mySE.secureElementCards //dump the contents
```

References

References

- [1] [1] Ross Anderson, Mike Bond, and Steven J Murdoch. Chip and spin. *Computer Security Journal*, 22(2):1–6, 2006.
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- [3] Mike Bond, Omar Choudary, Steven J Murdoch, Sergei Skorobogatov, and Richard Anderson. Chip and skim: cloning emv cards with the pre-play attack. In *Security and Privacy (SP), 2014 IEEE Symposium on*, pages 49–64. IEEE, 2014.
- [4] Saar Drimer, Steven J Murdoch, et al. Keep your enemies close: Distance bounding against smartcard relay attacks. In *USENIX Security*, volume 2007, 2007.
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- [8] Nils and Jon Butler. Mission mpossible. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iwOP1hoVJEE>.
- [9] Nils and Rafael Dominguez Vega. Pinpadpwn. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=18IAjDG0dKo>, 2012.
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Appendix A - EMV Cryptographic Keys

EMV Cards contain a number of private and public cryptographic keys. Cards and terminals use Triple-DES and RSA ciphers for encryption and signing as well as the SHA-1 standard for hashing.

Symmetric Keys:

Key	Name	Description
KDcvc3	ICC Derived Key for CVC3 Generation	Symmetric Key used for generating the CVC3
MKac	ICC Application Cryptogram Master Key	Symmetric Key used to derive the session key for generation of the Application Cryptogram
SKac	ICC Application Cryptogram Session Key	Symmetric Key used to generate the Application Cryptogram

Table 1: Symmetric Keys in an EMV card

RSA Keys

Key	Name	Description
Pi	Issuer Public Key	Used to verify signature on static card data.
Sic	ICC Private Key	Generates signature on dynamic data
Pic	ICC Public Key	Used by Terminal for verification of cards signature on dynamic data

Table 2: RSA Keys present in an EMV card

Appendix B - BER-TLV Formatting

BER-TLV is the formatting used for EMV commands and data. It is defined in ISO7816.

Tag

Tag indicates the what the data represents in the Value field.

The top 2 bits indicate the class of the tag - Universal, Application, Context-Specific and Private. Bit 6 determines XXX while the lower 5 bits are reserved for the tag number.

If the Tag Number is 31 (i.e all 1s) then the tag number is stored in subsequent bytes after the initial byte.

If the high bit is set in the subsequent bytes - then we keep reading bytes as needed.

All tags used for financial messaging will be at most 2 bytes long

Length

Here we tell the parser how long the data is. It can take two types - a short form and a long form. The short form means the length is 1 byte long - and can represent a maximum value length of 127 bytes. The long form is used for data of greater then 127 bytes - with no upper limit of the length.

Value

Value is just this - there is no limit as to the values that can be represented here.

TLV Examples

a TLV of "8F0108" is a Tag of 8F, Length of 1, Value of "08"

a TLV of "9F320103" is a Tag of 9F32, Length of 1, Value of "03"

a TLV of "7081C95F20.." is a Tag of 70, 1 Length byte, Length of C9, and value of "5F20.."

Appendix C - Application Protocol Data Unit (APDU)

This is how a command to the card and responses to the terminal are formatted. Commands are sent from the terminal using the Command APDU format³ and responses are sent using the Response APDU format⁴. Response codes are formatted in the last two bytes of the Response APDU (SW1 and SW2); a response of “9000” indicates successful processing while anything other than this value is an error.

Byte	1	2	3	4	5	<VAR>	
	CLA	INS	P1	P2	Lc	data	Le
Desc	Class	Instruction	Parameter Byte 1	Parameter Byte 2	Data Length		Expected Response Length (0 for contactless)

Table 3: Command APDU format

Byte	<VAR>	<VAR>+1	<VAR>+2
Description	Response Data	SW1	SW2

Table 4: Response APDU Format

Appendix D - Common EMV Commands

Command	CLA	INS	P1	P2	Lc	Data	Le
Select	00	A4	04	00/02	05-10	AID	00
Get Processing Options	80	A8	00	00	<VAR>	PDOL data	00
Read Record	00	B2	Record Number	SFI	X	X	00
Compute Cryptographic Checksum	80	2A	8E	80	<VAR>	UDOL data	00
Generate Application Cryptogram	80	AE	Control Parameter	00	<VAR>	CDOL data	00

Table 5: Common EMV commands

Select

Used select the payment application stored on the card.

Get Processing Options

Initiates the transaction within the selected card.

Compute Cryptographic Checksum

Used to generate the dynamic CVC codes in MasterCard transactions. Also returns the Application Transaction Counter(ATC) and increments it.

Generate Application Cryptogram

Takes in various fields to identify the terminal and transaction; and returns a signature of these values (and internal ones) for verification by the issuer.

Read Record

Returns data stored in the card according to its record number and “Short File Indicator”(SFI).