MORE SHADOW WALKER: THE PROGRESSION OF TLB-SPLITTING ON X86

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• Leads low-level computer architectures group
  – SMM
  – VMM
  – BIOS
  – Kernel
• Lover of the great outdoors
• Opinions are my own, I don’t speak for:
  - AIS
  - DARPA
  - GRSecurity
  - Jamie Butler

• PLEASE interrupt (politely) with questions if something is unclear
• Background
• History
  – PaX/GRSecurity - Defensive
  – Shadow Walker - Offensive
  – MoRE - Defensive
  – MoRE Shadow Walker - Offensive
• Conclusions
• Wrap up
“Rings” of protection:
- Ring 3 – User apps
- Ring 1 & 2 – nada
- Ring 0 – OS kernel
- Ring -1 – Hypervisor
• Intel x86 provides OS method to abstract view of memory: virtual memory / paging
The virtual address consists of array indices and an offset:
Every memory access requires several memory bus transactions to perform page translation

- This is slow!
The solution to this problem is to cache previous translations in a buffer called the Translation Lookaside Buffer (TLB).
• The CPU’s TLB is used to cache memory page translations to increase performance.

• De-synchronizing a CPU’s Translation Look-aside Buffer (TLB) (e.g. Shadow Walker or PaX).
In pre-Nehalem CPUs, the D-TLB and I-TLB were completely separate:
On a pre-Nehelam CPU, the TLB is split by:

- Trapping on a fault (page or protection)
- Determining if data or instruction (check EIP and CR2 or exit condition)
- “Priming” the proper TLB by either setting data access bit(s) and reading then clearing bit(s) (but not TLB) or allowing 1 instruction to go (trap flag)
- Repeat as needed
Questions Yet?
PaX Team - PAGEEEXEC

Set of Linux kernel patches to emulate no execute (NX) bit on earlier x86 CPUs without NX support

Uses user/supervisor bit as NX bit, and splits the TLB for performance gains (data entries are cached)

Works on pre-Nehelam CPUs
• Jamie Butler and Sherri Sparks
• Windows memory-hiding rootkit
• Hooks page fault handler to split the TLB and hide kernel rootkit pages
  – FU rootkit
  – Prevents detection by anti-virus, etc.
• Works on pre-Nehalem CPUs
• Intel releases the Nehelam architecture (1st generation Core i-series)
• Addition of a level 2 cache for TLB, a shared TLB, or S-TLB
• Previous TLB splitting tools will not work due to this major architecture change
  – Hangs in endless loop as S-TLB merges entries
  – Not enough permission granularity
• After Nehelam, Intel introduced the shared TLB (S-TLB):
• Extended page tables (EPT) adds additional levels to traditional virtual memory hierarchy
  – Maps “guest physical” to “machine physical”
  – Triggers EPT Fault VM Exit instead of page fault
  – Allows OS to manage memory without VMM interference
  – Implements new instructions similar to INVLPG
  – Supports execute-only permission bit

• VM process ID (VPID) adds a word to each TLB line with the VM ID (VMM = ID 0) to prevent performance hit from VM Exit TLB flush
Along with EPT, the TLB was extended to prevent the performance hit of virtualization:
On a Nehelam+ CPU, the TLB is split by:

- Setting up EPT tables; trapping on EPT faults
- Determining type of fault
- Setting R/W or E bits in EPT
- Setting trap to VMM bit
- Run 1 instruction to prime proper TLB VPID
- Reset EPT to E/R/W = 0
- Resume guest
We believe that the same TLB desynchronization used by Shadow Walker can be used to automatically separate data references from already existing applications in real-time for real-time trust measurements.
The DARPA CFT MoRE program sought to identify if TLB splitting could be used to detect application subjugation even if an executable’s data and code are mixed.
MoRE
Challenges

• Intel’s Nehalem S-TLB

• Windows 7 Memory Manager

• TLB is cleared on VMEXIT

• Windows Copy-on-write
• Luckily Intel created a way around the S-TLB: Extended Page Tables (EPT)

• EPT is hardware-assisted VM memory management
  – Allows a hypervisor to create page tables mapping “guest physical addresses” to “machine physical addresses”

• EPT supports more granular permissions than standard paging (E/R/W)
  – The S-TLB will not merge entries with conflicting permissions for security
• Shadow Walker also focused on hiding kernel pages, many of which are rarely (if ever paged out)

• When you muck with the paging structures for user-space applications, Windows does not approve
• What to do...

• EPT to the rescue!
  – The hypervisor can modify the EPT page tables without the OS noticing and preempt any faults (fixing things before the OS wizens up)

• Thanks again Intel for providing a solution to our problems!
Now that MoRE has moved from a kernel page-fault hook (ala Shadow Walker) to a hypervisor to bypass those problems, a new problem arises:

- The TLB is cleared when VM EXITing/VM RESUMEing to prevent guests from reading hypervisor memory.

- Hard to prime a TLB if it gets cleared!
• Intel to the rescue! VPID (tagged TLB entries)

• Thanks Intel!
Windows COW Challenges

- Windows loads 1 copy of code into memory for each application, even if multiple instances are running
  - Performs copy-on-write to only duplicate code for changed pages

- Our test application interleaved code and data
  - Always triggering COW

- We would set up the split and the initial write would trigger Windows to move our application out from under us!
  - TLB splitting was now on unused pages, where did our app go?

- Simple, yet ugly solution:
  - VM EXIT on CR3 change (context switch)
  - Walk kernel page tables to see if COW occurred and update list of application pages
• Intel’s Nehalem S-TLB
  – The MoRE VMX hypervisor uses extended page tables (EPT) to create different permission sets to prevent TLB merging

• Windows 7 Memory Manager
  – VMX hypervisor with EPT bypasses Windows memory manager

• TLB is cleared on VMEXIT
  – MoRE implements VPID tagged TLB entries for TLB persistence

• Windows Copy-on-write
  – MoRE monitors page table modifications for target applications upon CR3 change
• Built a custom VMX hypervisor with EPT and VPID support that could monitor process creation

• Would VMEXIT on:
  – CR3 change – Monitor process change for Windows COW activity
  – EPT violations – Essentially the same as a page fault to the hypervisor
  – Trap Flag – Let us prime the TLB entry with the correct VPID

• Like Shadow Walker, we either:
  – If data access – Mark EPT as R/W for 1 instruction
  – If code access – Mark EPT as E for 1 instruction
  – If both – Special case, copy 1 instruction to data copy, run as R/W/E then reset to no permissions
    • Including TLB flush
• Even with the prototype nature of MoRE, performance hits were <2%

• Could perform periodic measurements of an application and the MoRE system (designed to be measurable) very rapidly – re-verifying trust every <1/10th of a second!

• Required no modification of application, no recompilation or source
TLB-splitting is just a technique – clear that is can be used for both offense and defensive

MoRE Shadow Walker is a modification to MoRE that allows memory hiding even from ring 0 code
  – Patch Guard?

Can split on arbitrary pages on Nehelam and newer CPUs
• Why bother?
  – Can just use VMM to protect root kit
• Higher granularity of control, can run and hook kernel functions
• VMM shim is very small to minimize performance hit
• To show that technology has no default good/evil, depends on intent if you are a white-hat or “merchant of death”
• The immense complexity of the Intel x86 ISA enables huge architectural modifications to be effected *through software*
  – Ex: Turing-complete MMU

• Even as architecture evolves, so too does the techniques to misuse it
  – Ex: NX bit
The code

- The code for a simple TLB splitting VMM (for Windows 7) can be found on AIS’s Github repository:
  - http://github.com/ainfosec/MoRE

- Released this week!
Shout outs

- @grsecurity & PaX team for helping make Linux more secure
- @jamierbutler for helping provide guidance on the CFP submission
- @dotMudge and @DARPA for taking MoRE from proposal to implementation
- @ainfosec for putting up with me and my long periods of dropping off the face of the earth
• Thanks for listening!
  – Let the heckling begin
  – Rotten tomatoes?

• I’m here all week, tweet @JacobTorrey if you want to meet up later
  – To the bar I go now!