Abuse of CPE Devices and Recommended Fixes

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Based on a CERT whitepaper

“Abuse of Customer Premise Equipment and Recommended Actions”

Goals:

1. Make sure everyone is on the same page
2. Measure what we’ve all assumed
3. What we need to do about the problem
What is CPE?

“Customer Premise Equipment”

Home router
PBX
Phones
i.e. what interfaces with the telco provider
Threats that abuse CPE (I)

The home router is a network proxy for most things on your home network

So own that and you control even well-defended devices on the home network

DNS changer botnet

- Attempted to reconfigure home router DNS server to only use adversary’s DNS server
- See FBI’s “Operation Ghost Click”
Threats that abuse CPE (II)

DDoS – DNS reflection and amplification
- Home routers run a recursive DNS server
- If it is misconfigured to be “open”
  - Anyone can ask it anything
- Spoof UDP packets with target in source IP

Reflection
- Anonymizes attacker, makes hard to block

Amplification
- Responses are 20 times larger than requests
- (up to 50 times if DNSSEC is used)
How many open resolvers?

Total Open Resolvers

There is something of an organic drop, which is mildly encouraging

Data source: OpenResolverProject
Where are they?

It’s hard to say exactly what device is the open resolver.

But the link speed of the connection gives a good clue as to if it is a home or small-business user as compared to an enterprise

- Enterprises usually lease lines, or are high-speed
- Small users tend to be on DSL, cable, etc.
Where are they? – Internet connection and speed baseline

Connection type and speed data source: Neustar
Where are they? – Open resolver link speed

- DSL
- speed
- unknown
- tx
- cable
- mobile
- wireless
- dialup
- fixed
- wireless
- ocx

Millions

Where are they?

They’re on DSL links
- 11% of the Internet
- 50% of open resolvers

They’re not on enterprise links

Thus it seems the open resolver issue is disproportionately a CPE issue.
What do we do?

Device manufacturers need a path for continuous upgrades
Implement source address validation
Reconfigure each device so it can't be leveraged quite so effectively
Responsibility to manufacturers and providers
Continuous upgrades

Current regime is fire-and-forget
There is little to no user interface
Updates, such as they are, are very manual
Home routers may not be replaced until they break
  • They’re not shiny or forced into obsolescence like phones
There’s no path for continuous upgrades
  • And there are plenty of vulnerabilities to exploit\(^1\)

Source address validation

Prevent forged packets from being sent in the first place

http://tools.ietf.org/html/bcp38 (also BCP 84)
www.icann.org/en/committees/security/sac004.txt

This has been well documented for a while now

No seriously, please.

@ customer-facing edge
@ data centers
Responsibility

Who is responsible for the data emitted or forwarded as the result of misconfigurations and errors?

- Manufacturers
- Providers who manage configs

The incentives must be arranged so that those responsible can and will fix the issues.
Responsibility – proper incentives

Short-term individual costs are trumping long-term community gains

- This is predicted by game theory.
- Well, predicted for irrational agents under certain conditions

These public Internet health risks are treated as externalities and “not my problem”
These risks need to be internalized and shared evenly somehow
Thanks for Listening!

Questions?
Comments?