INTEL ME: FLASH FILE SYSTEM EXPLAINED
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1. **Introduction**

The Intel Management Engine (ME) technology was introduced in 2005. Though more than 10 years have passed, it is still very hard to find any official information about ME on the Internet. The purpose of this document is to detail how ME 11.x stores its state on the Flash.

If you need background information, please refer to the following additional materials:

1. Platform Embedded Security Technology Revealed
2. Intel ME Secrets
3. Intel ME: The Way of the Static Analysis
4. Intel ME 11.x Firmware Images Unpacker

The SPI (Serial Peripheral Interface) Flash chip contains BIOS, data related to GbE (Gigabit Ethernet), ME Region, and so on.

If Intel ME 11.x Firmware Images Unpacker parses the ME region, the output directory contains a file named *MFS.part*, which includes the MFS partition.
2. MFS Partition

The MFS partition stores a file system that contains ME-related data between runs. MFS is designed with the view of the following Flash memory features:

- Any byte could be written independently
- Need erase (make all bits=1) before re-writing
- Erasing with the precision of a block (e.g., 8K) only
- Limited number of guaranteed erase cycles
  - Usually between 10,000 and 1,000,000
  - Inerasable block should be marked as “bad”

After extraction of binary resources from fit.exe, it is easy to find three files that represent empty MFS containers:

AFS_region_256K.bin
AFS_region_400K.bin
AFS_region_1272K.bin

The container size is specified in the file name (256, 400, or 1272 KiB). The maximum number of files that can be stored in these containers is 512, 256, and 1024 respectively.

2.1. MFS Pagination

All the cbMFS bytes of MFS could be considered as a set of separate nPages with the size of MFS_PAGE_SIZE == 8192(0x2000) bytes each. The page size is likely to equal the size of Erase Block, which is a Flash memory property.

```c
#define MFS_PAGE_SIZE 0x2000
cbMFS = sizeof(MFS); // Size of MFS partition
nPages = cbMFS / MFS_PAGE_SIZE; // Total number of pages
```

At any specific moment, “nPages/12” pages store System information.
“nPages - nPages/12 - 1” pages contain files Data. One page is always Empty.

```c
nSysPages = nPages / 12; // Number of System pages
nDataPages = nPages - nSysPages - 1; // Number of Data pages
```
Each page starts with an 18-byte header:

```c
typedef struct {
    unsigned __int32 signature; // Page signature == 0xAA557887
    unsigned __int32 USN; // Update Sequence Number
    unsigned __int32 nErase; // How many times page was erased
    unsigned __int16 iNextErase; // Index of Next-to-be-erased page
    unsigned __int16 firstChunk; // Index of first chunk (for Data page)
    unsigned __int8 csum; // Page Header checksum (for first 16 bytes)
    unsigned __int8 b0; // Always 0
} T_MFS_Page_Hdr; // 18 == 0x12 bytes
```

The Empty page has an invalid sign field (!= 0xAA557887). The System page always has 0 in the firstChunk field. All the other pages are Data pages.

### 2.2. Chunks

Each page contains several 66(0x42)-byte chunks. A chunk is an MFS’ primary addressable (and modifiable) unit.

The first 64(0x40) bytes of each chunk are used for payload storing. The next two bytes store CCITT CRC-16 calculated from the chunk data and chunk index.

```c
#define MFS_CHUNK_SIZE 0x40
typedef struct {
    unsigned __int8 data[MFS_CHUNK_SIZE]; // Payload
    unsigned __int16 crc16; // Checksum
} T_MFS_Chunk; // 66 == 0x42 bytes
```

Note. Reversing CRC-16 allows easy calculation of the chunk index.

### 2.3. System Page

There is an array of 16-bit indices axIdx in the System page right after the Page Header. The number of entries in axIdx equals to the number of chunks + 1. Each System page contains 120(0x78) chunks started from the 260(0x104) offset.

```c
#define SYS_PAGE_CHUNKS 120
typedef struct {
    T_MFS_Page_Hdr hdr; // Page header
    unsigned __int16 axIdx[SYS_PAGE_CHUNKS+1]; // Obfuscated indices
    T_MFS_Chunk chunks[SYS_PAGE_CHUNKS]; // System chunks
} T_MFS_System_Page;

nSysPageChunks = (MFS_PAGE_SIZE - sizeof(T_MFS_Page_Hdr) - 2) / (2 + sizeof(T_MFS_Chunk)); // 120(0x78) chunks per System page
```

Initially, each axIdx entry contains the 0xFFFF value. The 0x8000 bit is cleared for the entry that follows the last used entry. The next bit 0x4000 is cleared for the used entries. Indices stored in axIdx are obfuscated by XORing with dynamic secret. The secret value depends on the previous value from
Its calculation involves the modified version of CRC-16 (stripped to 14 bits).

2.4. Data Page

There is the aFree byte array in the Data page immediately after the Page Header. The number of entries in aFree equals to the number of chunks. Each Data page contains 122(0x7A) chunks started from the 140(0x8C) offset.

```c
#define DATA_PAGE_CHUNKS 122
typedef struct {
    T_MFS_Page_Hdr hdr; // Page header
    unsigned __int8 aFree[DATA_PAGE_CHUNKS]; // Free chunks map
    T_MFS_Chunk chunks[DATA_PAGE_CHUNKS]; // Data chunks
} T_MFS_Data_Page;
```

Initially, each entry of aFree contains the 0xFF value. When a chunk is used, a corresponding aFree entry is zeroed.

2.5. Data Area

All the chunks from Data pages build the Data area. Each Data page contains chunks with sequential numbers starting from hdr.firstChunk. Minimal value of the hdr.firstChunk field among all Data pages equals to nSysChunks (logical number of chunks in the System area). Each Data area has only one Data chunk with a specific index.

The total number of nDataChunks is calculated by multiplying the number of Data pages and the number of chunks on a single Data page, which is 122(0x7A).

Data area capacity is calculated by multiplying the number of Data chunks and the chunk payload size, which is 64(0x40) bytes.

```c
nDataChunks = nDataPages * nDataPageChunks; // Number of Data chunks
cbData = nDataChunks * MFS_CHUNK_SIZE; // Data area capacity
```
2.6. System Area

Unlike the Data area, System chunks are stored not sequentially but in accordance with an update order. A Chunk index for the System page is derived from a corresponding value in axIdx. System chunks with a specific index are not unique, but only the last entry can be used. To restore a proper order, we need to handle System pages in accordance with USN growth.

The System area starts with 14-byte Volume Header:

```
typedef struct {
    unsigned __int32 sign; // Volume signature == 0x724F6201
    unsigned __int32 ver;  // Volume version == 1
    unsigned __int32 cbTotal; // Volume capacity (System area+Data area)
    unsigned __int16 nFiles; // Number of file records
} T_MFS_Volume_Hdr; // 14 bytes
```

There is an array of 16-bit values aFAT right after Volume Header. The number of entries in aFAT equals to the number of file records + the number of data chunks.

```
typedef struct {
    T_MFS_Volume_Hdr vol; // Volume header
    unsigned __int16 aFAT[nFiles+nDataChunks];//File Allocation Table
} T_MFS_System_Area;
```

2.7. Data Extraction

Low-level MFS implementation does not support file names. Files are identified by numbers (from 0 to nFiles-1, inclusive). A file size is not stored explicitly either.

To extract a file with the specific iFile number, it is necessary to:

1. Calculate the index in FAT: \( \text{ind} = aFAT[iFile] \). The values 0x0000 (unused) and 0xFFFF (erased) mean that the file does not exist. The value 0xFFFF means that the file is empty (length == 0).
2. Make sure that \( \text{nFiles} \leq \text{ind} < \text{len}(aFAT) \).
3. Extract chunk data: \( \text{data} = \text{dataChunk[\text{ind} - \text{nFiles} + \text{nSysChunks}]}. \)
4. Calculate the next index: \( \text{ind} = aFAT[\text{ind}] \).
5. If \( 0 < \text{ind} \leq \text{MFS_CHUNK_SIZE} \), then output first \( \text{ind} \) bytes of data and stop processing.
6. Output all 64 bytes of data and proceed to step 2.
# 2.8. MFS Templates Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>256K</th>
<th>400K</th>
<th>1272K</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>nPages</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nSysPg</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nDataPg</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nSysChunks</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>586</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>240</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>1560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nDataChunks</td>
<td>3538</td>
<td>5490</td>
<td>17690</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nFiles</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>512</td>
<td>1024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cbSys</td>
<td>7616</td>
<td>12032</td>
<td>37504</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cbData</td>
<td>226432</td>
<td>351360</td>
<td>1132160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cbTotal</td>
<td>234048</td>
<td>363392</td>
<td>1169664</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Total number of pages in MFS
- Number of System pages
- Number of Data pages
- Number of System chunks (logical)
- Number of chunks on System pages (raw)
- Number of Data chunks
- Number of File slots
- System area capacity
- Data area capacity
- Total capacity
3. MFS Usage

3.1. Special Files

MFS file slots with numbers up to 8 are used for special needs.
Slots 2 and 3 are used for the Anti-Replay (AR) table. The AR mechanism is intended to prevent replacement of files with their older copies (a counter value in file metadata should match a value in AR tables).
Slot 4 is used to migrate file system encryption after SVN (Secure Version Number) upgrade.
Slot 5 is used for File System Quota storage (accounting for the amount of FS storage used by a specific ME module and the number of Flash writes issued by the module).
Slot 6 contains the /intel.cfg file that is necessary for ME file system deployment (first run). intel.cfg is provided by Intel and contains a default state of the ME file system. SHA256 of intel.cfg is stored in System Info manifest extension.
Slot 7 contains the /fitc.cfg file that reflects vendor-specific deployment settings. A platform vendor can create a fitc.cfg file using Intel’s Flash Image Tool (fit.exe).
Slot 8 contains the /home/ directory that is a base directory for all files stored in MFS (except /intel.cfg and /fitc.cfg).
3.2. intel.cfg (fitc.cfg) Structure

File system configuration files are used for ME file system deployment. Both intel.cfg and fitc.cfg have an identical structure.

A file system configuration file starts with a 32-bit value nRec representing the number of records in a file. An array of fixed-size records aRec is the following. All the other bytes in the configuration file contain file data.

```c
typedef struct {
    char name[12]; // File name
    unsigned __int16 unused; // Always 0
    unsigned __int16 mode; // Access mode
    unsigned __int16 opt; // Deploy options
    unsigned __int16 cb; // File data length
    unsigned __int16 uid; // Owner User ID
    unsigned __int16 gid; // Owner Group ID
    unsigned __int32 offs; // File data offset
} T_CFG_Record; // 28 bytes

typedef struct {
    unsigned __int32 nRec; // Number of records
    T_CFG_Record aRec[nRec]; // Records
    unsigned __int8 data[]; // Files data
} T_CFG;
```

The **mode** field of T_CFG_Record is a set of bit fields:

- Lowest 9 bits (8..0) represent UNIX-like Read/Write/eXecute permissions (rwx) for an owner, group, and others respectively.
- Bit 9 is set for files that must have Integrity protection enabled.
- Bit 10 is set for files that must have Encryption enabled.
- Bit 11 is set for files that must have Anti-Replay protection enabled.
- Bit 12 reflects a record type. It is set for a directory and cleared for an ordinary file.
- All other bits are always zeroed.

The **opt** field of T_CFG_Record is a set of bit fields too:

- Bit 0 is set for records that can be overridden by a vendor using fitc.cfg.
- Bit 1 is set for files updateable by the mca process.
- Bits 3..2 are unknown up to now.
- All other bits are always zeroed.
### 3.3. MFS Folder (Directory)

An MFS directory is just an array of records describing containing files. MFS file #8 always represents the `/home/` directory.

```c
typedef struct {
    unsigned __int32 fileno; // iFS,salt,iFile
    unsigned __int16 mode; // Access mode
    unsigned __int16 uid; // Owner User ID
    unsigned __int16 gid; // Owner Group ID
    unsigned __int16 salt; // Another salt
    char name[12]; // File name
} T_MFS_Folder_Record; // 24 bytes
```

The `fileno` field of `T_MFS_Folder_Record` is a set of bit fields:

- Lowest 12 bits (11..0) represent a file slot index `iFile` used to identify a specific file.
- Bits 27..12 contain 0 or a randomly generated value used as salt for integrity protection.
- Bits 31-28 represent a FileSystem ID (that is always 1 for MFS stored files).

The `mode` field of `T_MFS_Folder_Record` is a set of bit fields too:

- Lowest 9 bits (8..0) represent UNIX-like Read/Write/eXecute permissions (`rwx`) for an owner, group, and others respectively.
- Bit 9 is set for files that must have Integrity protection enabled.
- Bit 10 is set for files that must have Encryption enabled.
- Bit 11 is set for files that must have Anti-Replay protection enabled.
- Bit 12 is always set to 0.
- Bit 13 is set for files protected with Non-Intel keys (see below).
- Bits 15..14 reflect a record type. It is 1 for a directory and 0 for an ordinary file.
3.4. Integrity, Encryption, Anti-Replay

If bit 9 (Integrity) of the file mode is set, the raw file contains an additional security blob at the end (52 bytes long). The security blob is also obligatorily added to the Anti-Replay tables (iFile == 2, 3) and /home/ directory (iFile == 8).

```c
typedef struct {
    unsigned __int8 hmac[32]; // HMAC value
    unsigned __int32 antiReplay:2; // Anti-Replay
    unsigned __int32 encryption:1; // Encryption
    unsigned __int32 unk7:7;
    unsigned __int32 iAR:10; // Index in AR table
    unsigned __int32 unk12:12;
    union {
        struct ar { // Anti-Replay data
            unsigned __int32 rnd; // AR Random value
            unsigned __int32 ctr; // AR Counter value
        };
        unsigned __int8 nonce[16]; // AES-CTR nonce
    }
} T_FileSecurity; // 52 bytes
```

The first 32 bytes of the security blob contain an HMAC value. To calculate HMAC, it is necessary to set all bytes of T_FileSecurity.hmac to 0 and feed to an HMAC function:

- File data
- File security blob with hmac field zeroed
- T_MFS_Folder_Record.fileno
- T_MFS_Folder_Record.salt (extended to a 32-bit value)

For files that have no T_MFS_Folder_Record (AR tables and /home/ directory, iFile == 2, 3, 8) fileno = 0x10000000+iFile, salt = 0.
4. File System Security Keys

There are up to 10 security keys involved in protecting the MFS content.

4.1. RPMC Keys

Two of these keys (called RPMC HMAC keys) are used for handling RPMC (Replay-Protected Monotonic Counter). RPMC is an optional feature of the SPI Flash chip helpful for Anti-Replay Protection implementation. If this feature is not available, ME implements its own timer-based counter.

4.2. Integrity and Confidentiality Keys

MFS uses separate keys to protect Integrity and Confidentiality.

There are two sets of keys: Intel keys and Non-Intel keys. A proper set is chosen accordingly with bit 13 (Non-Intel) of T_MFS_Folder_Record.mode. Please note that such rare modules as sigma, ptt, dal_iwm, mca use Intel keys. The majority of protected files (including AR tables and all directories) use Non-Intel keys.

Derivation of security keys involves a 1-byte SVN (Secure Version Number) value, which is the property of ME Code Partition Directory Manifest. Keys calculated for current SVN are called “Current keys”.

After SVN update (usually caused by fix of major security vulnerabilities), it must be impossible to install ME firmware with previous SVN (without direct writing SPI Flash with chip programmer). However, alteration of SVN causes alteration of related security keys. Therefore, a previous SVN value is stored in the PSVN partition and used to calculate “Previous keys”. Having access to both “Previous” and “Current” keys allows migration of file system from old to new keys.

4.3. Hardware Security Engines

ME has access to hardware implemented engines intended for AES, RSA, and Hash/HMAC calculation. Another hardware security module used by ME is called SKS (presumably stands for Secure Key Storage).

SKS is able to store keys, provides AES/HMAC engines with access to stored keys, but prevents extraction of the keys. Slots 1..11 can contain 128-bit keys, while slots 12..21 are for 256-bit keys.

Access to hardware security engines is limited. Modules able to use them are limited to ROM, bup, and crypto.

In addition, there is a GEN device that contains source material for keys calculation. GEN data seems to be unique for every computer. ROM accesses GEN at an early execution stage and creates a copy of stored data. ROM uses
such data for keys derivation, but clears both GEN and copied data before passing control to \texttt{rbe} (initial module from ME firmware).

It is interesting that before wiping GEN data and passing control to \texttt{rbe}, ROM searches and executes the \texttt{idlm} module from the DMLP partition (if any exists). Thus, \texttt{idlm} can access GEN data and perform any necessary operation on it (ME 11.8 firmware was seen using that trick). For sure, the DLMP partition must be properly signed with RSA-2048.

### 4.4. Keys Derivation and Usage Practices

Keys are usually derived in several steps:

1. ROM uses GEN data to obtain HMAC Key.
2. ROM derives Wrapping Key using HMAC Key. A resulting key is stored in SKS.
3. ROM derives Root Key (which depends on SVN) using HMAC Key.
4. ROM wraps Root Key (using AES) and stores it in memory.
5. ROM wipes all intermediate keys (except Wrapping Key), GEN, and all data copied from it.
6. ROM passes control to ME firmware.
7. The \texttt{bup} module unwraps Root Key and loads it into SKS (unwrapping result can’t be stored outside SKS).
8. \texttt{bup} derives Integrity/Confidentiality keys using an SKS-stored Root key.
9. \texttt{bup} wraps derived key and stores it in memory (or passes to another module, e.g., \texttt{vfs}, if necessary).
10. \texttt{bup} wipes plaintext key.

To use wrapped key:

11. The \texttt{bup/crypto} module unwraps requested Integrity/Confidentiality key and loads it into SKS.
12. Final HMAC/AES operation is performed using the key from SKS.

It is easy to see that Root Key is available in a non-wrapped form only during step 4, and there is no way to get it after the ROM execution is finished (control is passed to ME firmware).

Final Integrity/Confidentiality keys are available in a non-wrapped form only during step 9. However, anyone having ability to execute code with \texttt{bup} privileges could re-calculate those keys by repeating steps 7 and 8.
5. Conclusion

Our research does not claim to be exhaustive or error-free. Nevertheless, we hope that it could help researchers involved in studying Platform security and ME internals.
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