

Breaking Bad: Stealing Patient Data Through Medical Devices

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tl;dr



- Introduction to Internet-connected healthcare devices
- Architecture & Workflow
- Good, Bad & Ugly
- Medical records vs Financial data
- Threat surface of Connected healthcare devices A pentester's perspective
- Real-world attacks against connected healthcare devices
- Case Study #1
- Case Study #2
- Closing Remarks




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Connected Healthcare Devices





Medical Devices Classification



Consumer Wearables

- Fitness /Activity trackers
- Sleep pattern monitors

Patient Monitoring

- Insulin pumps
- BP Monitors
- Heart Rate Monitors
- ECG
- Glucose Meters
- Hemodialysis devices

IVD

- HIV Detection Systems
- Blood Analyzers


Embedded Devices

- Pacemakers
- Implants

In-house Equipments


- Medicine dispensing systems
- MR
- CT Scanners
- Telemetry Systems
- X-RayMachines
- Ultrasound Machines

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
The Ecosystem





The Architecture





The Good



- 1. Remote health monitoring
- 2. Less expenditure, better quality care
- 3. Faster response time
- 4. Global health care
- 5. Efficient Asset Management & Maintenance
- 6. Alerts Early Detection & Prevention
- 7. EHR (Electronic Healthcare Records)
- 8. RTHS (Real-Time Health Systems)


The Nightmare



- 1. Tons of new "connected" medical devices
- 2. Numerous communication protocols
- 3. "Legacy" devices
- 4. Network Segregation
- 5. Robust WiFi infrastructure???
- 6. Interoperability
- 7. Monitoring, Automation & Analytics
- 8. Rogue Medical Devices
- 9. Operating Systems??? Think MedJack

Serial To Ethernet Converters





The Attack Surface



IOT Security

Network - Services, firewall

Application - Authentication, Authorization, Input Validation

Device Hardware - physical security

Mobile - Client Data Storage, Data Transport, API

Cloud - Backend Server, Authorization, Update security

The Horror Stories – MEDJACK / MEDJACK.2



- 1. Medical Device Hijack
- 2. MEDJACK 2015/2016
- 3. MEDJACK.2 2017
- 4. Attacked older operating systems
- Affected devices: X-Ray machines,
 CT Scanners, Blood Gas analyzer,
 MRI systems etc.
- 6. Undetected by Endpoint security solutions



Financial vs Medical Data







	Financial Data	Medical Records
Attacks		
Market Value		
Detection Rate		



About the Device

black hat

- 1. Digital Pen
- 2. Used for prescriptions
- 3. Electronic transmission to pharmacies
- 4. Many manufacturers
- 5. Random images, no point zooming in.




NOT THIS ONE!!!

Workflow



Database



Let's Break It Down



- 1. OS \rightarrow Windows 10
 - a) Nurse / Physician
 - b) Administrator
- 2. USB
- 3. 802.11 b/g/n Integrated Wireless Network
- 4. 10/100M RJ45 Ethernet
- 5. HDMI, VGA
- 6. Digital Display
- 7. 3.5mm Audio Port
- 8. Windows Defender
- 9. Docking Station
- 10. Software Layer



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Use Case Scenario

Initial Observations



- 1. Can connect a monitor, keyboard, mouse
- 2. Auto-login as Nurse (Total locked down mode)
- 3. Manufacturer software and services
- 4. Data capture via USB
- 5. Internet → Real-time data transfer
- 6. Offline → Stored encrypted
- 7. Over the wire → HTTPS (AES256)
- 8. Remote Access Component



Privilege Escalation

Services (Local)

black hat

Name Description Status Startup Type Loa On As Secondary Logon Enables star... Manual Local System Secure Socket Tunneling Protocol Service Provides su... Manual Local Service Security Accounts Manager The startup ... Running Automatic Local System Security Center The WSCSV... Running Automatic (D... Local Service Sensor Data Service Delivers dat... Manual (Trig... Local System Sensor Monitoring Service Monitors va... Manual (Trig., Local Service Sensor Service A service fo... Manual (Trig... Local System Server Supports fil... Running Automatic Local System Shell Hardware Detection Provides no... Running Automatic Local System Smart Card Manages ac... Disabled Local Service Smart Card Device Enumeration Service Local System Creates soft... Manual (Trig... Smart Card Removal Policy Allows the s... Manual Local System Running Service Automatic Local System Local Service Receives tra... Manual Properties (Local Computer) Enables the ... Automatic (D... Network Service General Log On Recovery Dependencies Verifies pote... Manual (Trig... Local System Running Manual Local Service Discovers n... Service name: Service Provides re... Running Local System Manual Local System Launches a... Manual Display name: Service Provides en... Local System Manual (Trig... Description: Optimizes t... Manual Local System Maintains a... Running Automatic Local System Path to executable Monitors sy... Running Automatic Local System Coordinates... Running Automatic (T... Local System Enables a us... Automatic Local System Startup type: Automatic Provides su... Manual (Trig. Local Service TeamViewer... Local System Automatic Provides Tel... Manual Network Service Running Service status: Provides us... Automatic Local System Tile Server f... Running Automatic Local System Coordinates... Running Manual (Trig., Local Service You can specify the start parameters that apply when you start the service Enables Tou... Manual (Trig... Local System from here. UsoSvc Manual Local System Allows UPn... Local Service Start parameters: Manual User Manag... Running Automatic (T... Local System Local System This service ... Automatic

Cancel

Provides m...

Manages an...

Local System


Local System

Manual

Manual

Privilege Escalation





Privilege Escalation



C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe	-		×		
Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.10586] (c) 2016 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.					
C:\Users\ >net user					
User accounts for \\DESKTOP					
Administrator Guest admin The command completed successfully.					
C:\Users\ >net localgroup Administrators Alias name Administrators Comment Administrators have complete and unrestricted access to the computer/domain					
Members					
Administrator admin The command completed successfully.					


The Encrypted File



_										
Proce	ess Monitor - Sysinternals: ww	w.sysinternals.com								
File Ed	File Edit Event Filter Tools Options Help									
📕 😅 🖫										
Tim	Process Name	PID Operation	Path	Result	Detail					
12:5 12:5 12:5 12:5 12:5 12:5 12:5 12:5 12:5 12:5 12:5 12:5	Lexe Lexe Lexe Lexe Lexe Lexe Lexe Lexe	39 ReadFile	C:\Program Files\	in SUCCESS	Offset: 268, Lenath: 20 Offset: 512, Lenath: 40 Offset: 552, Lenath: 40 Offset: 552, Lenath: 40 Offset: 592, Lenath: 40 Offset: 392, Lenath: 40 Offset: 390, 144, Lenath: 16 Offset: 390, 160, Lenath: 8 Offset: 391, 264, Lenath: 2 Offset: 390, 168, Lenath: 2 Offset: 391, 274, Lenath: 2 Offset: 390, 176, Lenath: 8 Offset: 391, 284, Lenath: 2 Offset: 390, 184, Lenath: 2					
12:5	exe	39 ReadFile	C:\Program Files\	in SUCCESS	Offset: 391,304, Length:					
12:5 12:5 12:5 12:5 12:5	.exe l.exe l.exe l.exe l.exe	39 Readrile 39 ReadFile 39 ReadFile 39 ReadFile 39 ReadFile	C:\Program Files\ C:\Program Files\ C:\Program Files\ C:\Program Files\ C:\Program Files\	in SUCCESS in SUCCESS	Offset: 390,368, Length: 16 Offset: 390,384, Length: 8 Offset: 390,792, Length: 16 Offset: 390,808, Length: 8 Offset: 391,152, Length: 16					


The Encrypted File





The Encrypted File – Win!!!






Another Crime



```
■ $ nrap -Pn -n
Starting Nmap 6.47 (http://nmap.org) at
                                                 EST
Nmap scan report for
Host is up
Not shown: closed ports
       STATE SERVICE
PORT
3306/tcp open mysql
```


Access to Patient Data





Access to Patient Data





Access to Patient Data



1	Resident Name	Unit	Home	Room No	#HCN
	At			2	369
	At			2	639
-	Ва			-8	978
	B€			3	595
	B€			3	230
	Ca			2	247
4	Ch			0	293
1	D€			1	452
1/	Elv			0	682
	Mc			2	391
1	Mi			1	985

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Prescriptions



		D	IGITAL PRESCR	IBER'S ORDERS			-	
01010	Reside Health	y: Pa ory ord#: E22 ors No Known Allergies	Unit: _Ma		- 1	7	4	
0001	01018 nnn	Date/Time Word INR You form y	nem	my for 2de ne ween start Today		Clinica	l Indicat	or
	Resolber's Sign	gnature / Registration#	Nurse 1	Nurse 2		Initial TheDo Consent	cumentation / Mar/Tar	Lab
010	7) 10001011010	Date/Time 1/4 17.30h T. 6 from Hold Ch order taken Smu		Date Amms Adays Start Today Start With Next Weekly S		Clinica	l Indicat	or
010100	10 01000101	gnature / Registration#	Nurse 1	Nurse 2 Date / Time		Initial TheDo Consent	Currientation / Mar/Tar	Lab

Let's Sum it Up



- Access to digital pen
- Privilege escalation
- A bit of reverse engineering
- Steal credentials
- Remote database and portal access from your basement

- 01010010 010001**01 01001110**



Case Study #2

01010 10101011010 101010101010

About the Device

black hat

- 1. IV Infusion Pump
- 2. Injects nutrients & medication
- 3. Controlled dosage
- 4. Safety features
- 5. External or Implanted
- 6. Used to be standalone, not anymore
- 7. Once again, random images, no point zooming in.




NOT THIS ONE EITHER!!!

-01010010 010001**01 01001110**

Workflow



Hospital Network



Initial Lab Setup



Standalone Infusion Pump

0001

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Initial Observations




- 1. Ethernet (RS-232)
- 2. 802.11 b/g/a Integrated Wireless Network
- 3. USB Enabled
- 4. IrDA Port
- 5. Display Touch Screen
- 6. Keypad
- 7. Maintenance Mode Password Protected \o/



First Blood


black hat

- Default Password
- Access to Network Config
- Change (some) Network Configs
- Upgrade/Downgrade Software



We Bought a PDA





Handspring

Handspring Visor Platinum (Silver)



78 customer reviews

Available from these sellers.

- 50 percent faster than Handspring Visor Deluxe
- 8 MB RAM stores thousands of addresses, appointments, to-do items, and more
- Features address book, to-do list, memo pad, date book, advanced calculator, and world clock
- Fully compatible with thousands of Palm OS applications
- What's in the box: Visor Platinum, Graphite HotSync cradle, 8 MB RAM, AAA batteries, Graphite snap cover, Leather case

Overwriting Wireless Settings







Additional Observations




- Telnet
- FTP
- SSH
- Connection attempt to pump server (****PUMP**)

The Initial Traffic



- Plain-text protocol loosely based on XML
- Contained pump description:
 - Pump Serial Number
 - Current Time
 - Wireless Access Point Data
 - IP/MAC Information
 - Maintenance Due Date
 - XMODEM checksum



Time to Fuzz



- Communication with pump, both as client (tcp/11111) & server (tcp/22222)
- Created custom Python library to interact with pump
- Observed numeric header specifying Message types
 - Message Type 2 Confirms pump to pump server connection
 - Message Type 7 & 31 Not sure
 - Message Type 8 Followed by Message Type 2. Updates pump status.
 - Message Type 20 Network commands
 - Message Type 208 & 238 Not sure

Winning Packet



130<

01010

🚄 Wireshark · Follow TCP Stream (tcp.stream eq 7) 🗟

HEADER>201 30,0,5,0,0,0,0,00:00,00:00,<EVENT>000041TTT55121000,4 9,Pump ON; - Pwr Stat: AC</EVENT><POWERON>201

POWERON><DRUG>1,,,255,0,0</DRUG><DOSE>1,0,0,0,0,0</DOSE><CAREAREA></CAREAREA><ENCOUNTER></ENCOUNTER><CAREGIVER></

CAREGIVER><PATIENT></PATIENT><LOCATION></LOCATION><ROUTE></ROUTE></SITE></POWER>1,-1</POWER></XML>F.


01010 (2)010011 01010000 01001001

01010010 01000101 01001110

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Master Drug List

- Used for drug administration
- Nutrients, Drugs, Blood etc.
- Maintains dosage, proportions
- Soft / Hard Limits





Closing Remarks


black hat

- Built-in, not bolted on
- Trust no-one
- Better standards and regulations
- Beyond standards and regulations
- Learn from past mistakes
- Security Assessments

Thank You



- •Questions Anyone???
- Contact Info:
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 SecurityLabs@spirent.com
 - Twitter: Oxsauby



References



- Google Image Cache
- https://www.cognizant.com/whitepapers/how-the-internet-ofthings-is-transforming-medical-devices-codex1945.pdf