





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## Self-Verifying Authentication – A Framework for Safer Integrations of Single-Sign-On Services

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# Motivation

- SSO – the “front door” lock for tens of millions
  - E.g., [Airbnb.com](https://www.airbnb.com) allows Facebook sign in.
- Many companies provide identity services
  - Provide SDKs (i.e., lock products) for different websites
  - Step-by-step instructions to teach programmers
    - E.g., [OpenID Connect 1.0 spec](#), [Azure AD dev guide](#)
- But most website programmers are not experienced “locksmiths”
  - Imagine that you need to read an installation guide, drill holes, and install a lock cylinder, knobs and steel plates on your front door
  - Can every average homeowner do it securely?



# Security-Critical Logic Bugs are Pervasive

- Numerous studies have shown serious bugs
  - Papers in leading academic security conferences
  - Findings from the Black Hat community
    - E.g., in Black Hat USA 2016 and Black Hat Europe 2016
- Consequences:
  - An attacker can sign into a victim's account
  - An attacker can stealthily cause the victim to sign into the attacker's account (commonly known as *login request forgery*)
- Cloud-API integration bugs are the No.4 cloud security top threat
  - SSO logic flaws are the primary example of this bug category


# Attack demos

- Demo 1:
  - [Microsoft Azure AD library for Node.JS](#)
  - Attacker logs into any victim's account
  - [Video](#)
- Demo 2:
  - <https://web.skype.com>
  - Login request forgery: victim unknowingly login into the attacker's account
  - [Video1](#) [video2](#)
- We have reported many SSO issues to various identity providers and websites.
  - Companies, big or small, make these mistakes.

# Example: an SSO bug due to insufficient logic checks using Google ID


## ● A simplified illustration of the Google ID protocol

- In 2012, it was based on Open ID 2.0







# Vulnerability and attack



# Example: unintended usage of OAuth 2.0 access token



# Confusion about authentication and authorization



[demo](#)




# Program verification to prevent logic bugs in SSO

Our verification technology: self-verifying execution (SVX)

## Hurdles of traditional verification approaches


- Why can't I feed my source code  $P$  and a property  $\phi$  into a program verifier, and expect bugs to be found automatically?
- Because program verification is a very challenging task
  - Need to model the runtime system  $R$  – hard to be precise
  - Need to model the unknown attacker  $A$  – hard to be exhaustive
  - Theorem to prove: if attacker  $A$  calls  $P$  for infinitely many times, and each time has multiple public APIs, can  $\phi$  ever be violated?
  - Need to prove by induction (because of the infinite possibilities of executions) – hard to automate.






- Every actual execution is responsible for collecting its own executed code, and proving that it satisfies  $\varphi$ .
- No need to model the attacker
  - Because every execution is driven by a real user.
- No need to model the runtime platform
  - Because execution happens on the actual platform
- No need for inductive proof
  - Because it only proves “this execution satisfies  $\varphi$ ”, not “all possible executions satisfy  $\varphi$ ”.

# Example: comparing integer constants among three websites




# The expected protocol flow






# The system is vulnerable!





# How SVX works


- Attach a field, namely *SymT* (Symbolic Transaction) onto every message.
- #grab, #compare and #finish are a compact representation of the executed code of these methods.



# Verifying an execution

- Method `conclude()` calls a program verifier to prove:  
The final `SymT`  $\rightarrow \varphi$ 
  - `Charlie.com:#finish(Bob.com:#compare(Alice.com::#grab()))  $\rightarrow \varphi$` , the execution is accepted. 
  - `Charlie.com:#finish(Alice.com::#grab())  $\nrightarrow \varphi$` , the execution is rejected. 
- Note that the program verification is symbolic (only about code).  
The concrete values are ignored.
  - A middle ground between offline symbolic verification and runtime concrete checking.
- SVX's performance overhead is near-zero
  - Because the theorems can be cached.
  - All normal executions should hit the cache.

# Theorem cache and verification server




# Our open-source project: SVAuth

Safer SSO integration solutions based on SVX



# The SVAuth framework: SVX with OO

- Defines “login safety” and “login intent” properties at the base class level.
- Every concrete implementations are guaranteed to satisfy the base class level properties!



# A decades-old problem in verification



- Liskov Substitution Principle (LSP) tries to ensure that
  - If a property is true for the base class, then it holds for all derived classes.

```
class Rectangle {  
    int height, width;  
    virtual int GetHeight() {return height;}  
    virtual int GetWidth() {return width;}  
    virtual void SetHeight(int x) {height=x;}  
    virtual void SetWidth(int x) {width=x;}  
}
```

```
void foo(Rectangle r) {  
    int w=r.GetWidth();  
    r.SetHeight(3);  
    Assert(w==r.GetWidth());  
}
```


```
class Square: Rectangle {  
    override void SetHeight(int x)  
        { height=x;  
          width=x; }  
    override void SetWidth(int x)  
        { height=x;  
          width=x; }  
}
```

For SVX, there is not confusion

```
Rectangle r = new Rectangle();  
Assert(foo(r));
```



```
Rectangle r = new Square();  
Assert(foo(r));
```



# Adopting SVAuth on your website -- extremely simple

- SVAuth consists of an **agent** and an **adapter**
  - Agent: public agent, organizational agent or localhost agent
  - Website developer picks an agent, and sets its endpoint in the SVAuth config file
  - Copy the adapter folder onto the website
- Assuming website *foo.com* is in PHP, and wants to do Facebook SSO
  - Simply redirect to  
“<http://foo.com/SVAuth/adaptors/php/start.php?provider=Facebook>”
  - Magically, the user’s identity information is available in these session variables

```
Session["SVAuth_UserID"]=108376550318508459185
Session["SVAuth_FullName"]=John Doe
Session["SVAuth_Email"]=johndoe@gmail.com
Session["SVAuth_Authority"]=Google.com
```
  - Website programmers don’t need to know anything about SSO protocols.

# Our experience

- Current status
  - Support [7 SSO services](#) and 3 languages (ASP.NET, PHP and Python)
  - Will support more.
- Integration with real-world applications
  - [MediaWiki](#) (8 lines of code changes)
    - Used by a Microsoft Research [internal website](#).
  - [HotCRP](#) (21 lines of code changes)
  - [CMT](#) (10 lines of code changes)
- Open source, available on GitHub
  - Project repository: <https://github.com/cs0317/SVAuth>

# SVAuth demo



- Buggy code
  - Remove cache entries
  - Comment out the line `stateGenerator.Verify` in `Facebook.cs`
  - *Login Intent* won't pass.
- Correct code, first execution
  - Program verification is triggered
  - Both *Login Safety* and *Login Intent* pass the verification.
- Correct code, second execution
  - Theorems hit the cache, near-zero runtime overhead

- Most website programmers are not experienced “locksmiths”
  - Installing an SSO lock securely on a website is not easy.
  - SSO security bugs are pervasive. Even big companies make mistakes.
  - The problem is well known in the security community.
- Self-verifying execution (SVX)
  - It is a “locksmith” built into a lock product.
  - The locksmith watches how the lock is opened, and asserts if it is logically sound.
- SVAUTH – Open-source SSO framework based on SVX
  - Please adopt SVAUTH on your websites
  - Or, join the project to improve the code.
  - Let’s fundamentally address the SSO security bugs.