

Continuous ~~Integration~~ Intrusion: Why CI tools are an attacker's best friends

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As a single withered tree, if set aflame, causes a whole forest to burn, so does a single improperly configured Continuous Integration tool destroys a whole enterprise network. – Chanakya (350-275 BCE)

About me

- Twitter - @nikhil_mitt
- Blog – <http://labofapenetrationtester.com>
- Github - <https://github.com/samratashok/>
- Creator of [Kautilya](#) and [Nishang](#)
- Interested in Offensive Information Security, new attack vectors and methodologies to pwn systems.
- Previous Talks
 - Clubhack'10, Hackfest'11, Clubhack'11, Black hat Abu Dhabi'11, Black Hat Europe'12, Troopers'12, PHDays'12, Black Hat USA'12, RSA China'12, EuSecWest'12, Troopers'13, Defcon'13, Troopers'14, DeepSec'14, HITB'15, Defcon HHV and PCV'15

Agenda

- What are Continuous Integration (CI) tools?
- How do CI tools work?
- Abusing popular CI tools
 - Jenkins/Hudson
 - TeamCity
 - Go
 - CruiseControl
- A 0day vulnerability
- Common Abuse Set
- Defense – Users and CI Tool Developers
- What others are doing
- Conclusion


What are Continuous Integration (CI) Tools?

- “Continuous integration describes a set of software engineering practices that speed up the delivery of software by decreasing integration times. Software that accomplish this practice is called continuous integration software.” - Wikipedia

More about Continuous Integration:

<http://www.martinfowler.com/articles/continuousIntegration.html>

Basic diagram of Continuous Integration



Why CI tools are important for Hackers?

- In a typical industry setup, the build jobs are executed on master build server(s) and/or slave machines.
- If a hacker manages to get access to a CI tool, he effectively owns substantial part of the build process, source code (most of the times) and high privilege access to all the machines running slaves/agents.
- This access could be used for lateral movement to get access to more machines.
- I have not been through a single Pen Test or Red Team engagement where access to a CI tool did not result in Domain Admin access. **Yeah, I am 1337 like that :P**

Abusing popular CI tools.

- I have tested three open source tools (Jenkins, CruiseControl and Go) and two proprietary tools (TeamCity and Hudson*) for this presentation.
- We will mostly have a look at feature abuse and mis-configurations of the above tools, they may or may not be called vulnerabilities.

* Hudson was not evaluated separately. Most of the things which apply on Jenkins should apply on Hudson as well.

Jenkins

- Jenkins (<http://jenkins-ci.org/>) is arguably the most widely used Continuous Integration tool. It is an open source tool which supports distributed agents and build process.
- All the testing has been done on Version 1.633.
- Hudson (<http://hudson-ci.org/>) was not tested separately since Jenkins and Hudson are very similar in code base and operations.

Fun fact: Who forked who is still debated b/w the Jenkins and Hudson fans




Jenkins

Some Security issues

- No authentication in the default installation.
- No protection against brute force attacks.
- No password complexity/policy for user passwords.
- Runs with SYSTEM or high privilege user on Windows (never seen it running with non-admin privileges).
- Prior to version 1.580, all users of Jenkins and console output of builds could be seen without authentication. Still, most Jenkins instances are configured the same way (Read privilege to Anonymous).






Jenkins

Abusing Build Steps

- If a user has the ability to “Add build step” (non-admin users can do that, if configured so) he can execute commands and scripts on the host Operating System.
- Due to the distributed nature of Jenkins, it is possible to execute commands and scripts on large number of slaves/agents.

<http://www.labofapenetrationtester.com/2014/08/script-execution-and-privilege-esc-jenkins.html>

Executing PowerShell/Windows commands using “Add Build Step”



The rights of the user to add or change build configuration are managed using Matrix based security or Project-based Matrix Authorization Strategy.
<https://wiki.jenkins-ci.org/display/JENKINS/Matrix-based+security>

When running commands on a Windows machine we can leverage PowerShell to execute advanced scripts using this method.

Jenkins


Abusing Build Steps on master

- If a user has the ability to “Add build steps” **on master**, he can effectively remove all security by deleting config.xml from the server and can get admin access on Jenkins.
- You need to remove config.xml from \$JENKINS_HOME (read the build log for finding out \$JENKINS_HOME) to remove all security or replace `[useSecurity>true[/useSecurity]` with `[useSecurity>false[/useSecurity]`

The Jenkins service must be restarted after that. During the tests, I was unable to successfully restart the Jenkins service from a build step even on Windows (with SYSTEM privileges). The workaround is to have an interactive reverse shell on the host machine and restart Jenkins service.

Jenkins documentation on Disabling Security

<https://wiki.jenkins-ci.org/display/JENKINS/Disable+security>



<https://imgflip.com/memegenerator/Surprised-Koala>


Jenkins

Stored Credential retrieval in cleartext

- If a user has the ability to “Add build steps” **on master**, it is possible to retrieve all kind of credentials (passwords, SSH private keys and their passphrases etc) stored in Jenkins in clear text.
- Taken from http://thiébaud.fr/jenkins_credentials.html

Taken from http://thiébaud.fr/jenkins_credentials.html

Decrypt credentials stored by Jenkins



The screenshot shows a Jenkins build console for a job named 'Demo Project'. The console output shows a terminal session on a Kali machine. The user runs the command `python decrypt.py master.key hudson.util.Secret credentials.` and receives the output `rootpassword` and `Topsecretpass`. Below the terminal, the 'Build' section shows the configuration for 'Execute Windows batch command' with the following PowerShell commands:

```
powershell -c "cat 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Jenkins\credentials.xml'"
powershell -c "cat -encoding byte 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Jenkins\secrets\master.key'"
powershell -c "cat -encoding byte -path 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Jenkins\secrets\hudson.util.Secret'"
```

The footer of the slide contains the text: BlackHat Europe'15, Continuous Intrusion, and 17.

We need credentials.xml from \$JENKINS_HOME and master.key and hudson.util.secret from \$JENKINS_HOME/secrets/

We are reading the keys master.key and hudson.util.secret in bytes and will convert them back to file on our own machine. On a Windows machine the conversion could be done by using TextToExe.ps1 from Nishang.
<https://github.com/samratashok/nishang/blob/master/Utility/TexttoExe.ps1>

Jenkins

Some bad usage/misconfiguration

- Credentials in clear text found in build parameters and other build configuration.
- Sensitive files shared at [jenkinsurl]/userContent/

Jenkins

- Google Dorks: intitle:"Dashboard [Jenkins]" for Jenkins instances and intitle:"Dashboard [Jenkins]" intext:"Manage Jenkins" for instances providing unauthenticated admin access.
- Sensitive data, database credentials, Git credentials, SSH keys and more could be accessed. Ridiculously simple to abuse.

ENABLE LOGIN ON YOUR JENKINS DASHBOARD, IT CAN BE FOUND WITH DUCKDUCKGO (GOOGLE SUCKS)

The image shows two overlapping browser windows. The top window displays the Jenkins dashboard with a search bar at the top right. A red box highlights the search results for the query "ENABLE LOGIN ON YOUR JENKINS DASHBOARD, IT CAN BE FOUND WITH DUCKDUCKGO (GOOGLE SUCKS)". A red arrow points from this box to the left sidebar of the dashboard. The bottom window shows the Jenkins "Script Console" for a job named "Script Console". The console output shows a successful execution of a Groovy script: `println whoami?execute().text` resulting in `root`. A red box highlights the script input and the resulting output.

S	W	Name	Last Success	Last Failure	Last Duration
		[REDACTED]	1 mo 7 days - #10	5 mo 0 days - #5	13 sec

```
println whoami?execute().text
```

Result
root

**EVERYTIME YOU DON'T GIVE A LIVE
DEMO**



**GOD KILLS A
KITTEN**

memegenerator.net

TeamCity

- TeamCity is a CI server from JetBRAINS “that is easy to set up and free of charge for small and medium teams.”
- It is widely used and supports distributed builds (agents on different Operating Systems).
- All the demos will be done on TeamCity 9 build 37059.

<https://confluence.jetbrains.com/display/TCD9/Getting+Started>


TeamCity

Some Security issues

- Registration of new users is enabled by default. Registered user gets Project Developer privileges.
- No password complexity/policy for user passwords.
- Runs with SYSTEM or high privilege user on Windows (most configs settle with an admin account).

<https://confluence.jetbrains.com/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=54334889#HowTo..-TeamCitySecurityNotes>

SAME OLD SHIT



WHO CARES?

memegenerator.net

TeamCity


Abusing Build Steps

- If a user has the ability to add build steps (a Project Administrator, unless configured otherwise), he can execute commands and scripts on the host operating system of master and all the agents by adding build steps.
- Due to the distributed nature of TeamCity (like Jenkins), it is possible to execute commands and scripts on large number of slaves/agents.

<https://confluence.jetbrains.com/display/TCD9/Role+and+Permission>

Teamcity documentation recommends not to have build agent on master but looks like only few care about that.

Executing commands/scripts using “Build Step” in TeamCity



A Build Step could be added with the Project Administrator or even lower privileges (if configured that way). PowerShell commands and scripts could be executed using the PowerShell runner.

<https://confluence.jetbrains.com/display/TCD9/PowerShell>

On *nix machines, shell commands and scripts could be executed.

TeamCity

Abusing agent on master

- If a user has the ability to configure builds **on master** (a Project Administrator, unless configured otherwise), he can read the token of the SuperUser from the teamcity-server.log (TeamCity 9) file.
- The token could be used to login as SuperUser.

<https://confluence.jetbrains.com/display/TCD9/Super+User>

Fun Fact: You can lock out SuperUser for one minute by clicking Log in button five times without entering a Username and Password. This makes it easy to block it by repeating login requests indefinitely.

Accessing Super User token by abusing agent on master

The screenshot shows a web-based configuration tool for running a PowerShell command. The interface includes a 'Script source' field, a 'Script execution mode' dropdown, and an 'Options' section. A 'Command_Exec_Demo' window is overlaid on the interface, displaying the execution output of the PowerShell command.

Script source:

```
select-string "Super user authentication token" C:\TeamCity\logs\teamcity-server.log
```

Script execution mode: [Dropdown menu]

Options:


- Add Note
- Additional command line parameters:

Command_Exec_Demo - D... x

```
Checking for changes - there are no v.s. roots defined
Creating temporary directory: C:\TeamCity\buildAgent\temp\buildTemp
Flushing internal artifacts
Working directory: C:\TeamCity\buildAgent\work\f93452fdf52dbc98
Step 1/1: PowerShell
Step 1/1: PowerShell Executable: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
Step 1/1: Working directory: C:\TeamCity\buildAgent\work\f93452fdf52dbc98
Step 1/1: PowerShell command: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
Step 1/1: Executable wrapper: C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe
Step 1/1: Wrapper arguments: [/c, C:\TeamCity\buildAgent\temp\buildTemp\powershell1869941
Step 1/1:
Step 1/1: C:\TeamCity\logs\teamcity-server.log:338: [2015-10-10 00:21:18,809] INFO -
Step 1/1: jetbrains.buildServer.SERVER - Super user authentication token:
Step 1/1: "1657952295862261212". To login as Super user use an empty username and this
Step 1/1: token as a password on the login page.
Step 1/1: C:\TeamCity\logs\teamcity-server.log:391: [2015-10-10 02:34:19,010] INFO -
Step 1/1: jetbrains.buildServer.SERVER - Super user authentication token:
Step 1/1: "1657952295862261212". To login as Super user use an empty username and this
Step 1/1: token as a password on the login page.
Step 1/1: C:\TeamCity\logs\teamcity-server.log:391: [2015-10-10 02:34:19,020] INFO -
```

The changes are not yet saved.

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TeamCity

Read SSH keys from master

- If a user has the ability to configure builds **on master** (a Project Administrator, unless configured otherwise), he can read any private SSH key uploaded for all the projects.
- The SSH keys are stored in **clear text** in *<TeamCity Data Directory>\config\projects\<project>\pluginData\ssh_keys* on the master.

<https://confluence.jetbrains.com/display/TCD9/SSH+Keys+Management>

Here is how it could be done:

1. To know the data directory of the master, look for "Data Directory" in the teamcity-server.log. Use a PowerShell runner.
2. Use "cat <TeamCity Data Directory>\config\projects\<project>\pluginData\ssh_keys\ *" to list contents of all the keys.

Accessing SSH Keys by abusing agent on master

192.168.230.125:8888/viewLog.html?buildId=18&buildTypeId=CommandExecDemo_DemoBuild&tab=buildLog#focus:140tab: C Search

Projects Changes Agents Build Queue configurer Administration

Command_Exec_Demo DemoBuild #9 (11 Oct 15 01:38) Run Actions Edit Configuration Settings

Overview Changes Build Log Parameters Artifacts #8 All history Last recorded build

Tree view Tail Download full build log (~5.44 KB) Repeat block name

```
[01:38:35] Skip checking for changes - there are no VCS roots defined
[01:38:35] Clearing temporary directory: C:\TeamCity\buildAgent\temp\buildTmp
[01:38:35] Publishing internal artifacts
[01:38:35] Checkout directory: C:\TeamCity\buildAgent\work\f93452df52dbc98
[01:38:35] Step 1/1: PowerShell
[01:38:35] [Step 1/1] PowerShell Executable: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
[01:38:35] [Step 1/1] Working directory: C:\TeamCity\buildAgent\work\f93452df52dbc98
[01:38:35] [Step 1/1] PowerShell command: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe -NonInteractive -ExecutionPolicy ByPass -Command - < C:\TeamCity\buildAgent\temp\buildTmp\powershell1164361905566626631.bat
[01:38:35] [Step 1/1] Executable wrapper: C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe
[01:38:35] [Step 1/1] Wrapper arguments: /c, C:\TeamCity\buildAgent\temp\buildTmp\powershell1164361905566626631.bat
[01:38:36] [Step 1/1] PuTTY-User-Key-File-2: ssh-rsa
[01:38:36] [Step 1/1] Encryption: none
[01:38:36] [Step 1/1] Comment: imported-openssh-key
[01:38:36] [Step 1/1] Public-Lines: 4
[01:38:36] [Step 1/1] AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAQCTpIrdgUP82hsUD8v8RUFf4u4nIcxfy1B
[01:38:36] [Step 1/1] jnqKzI4fa2IULFK0D8a/A3cMyrna088havi2y9eA41ePzPCWtubRD4q5f4y
[01:38:36] [Step 1/1] QnqKzI4fa2IULFK0D8a/A3cMyrna088havi2y9eA41ePzPCWtubRD4q5f4y
[01:38:36] [Step 1/1] U21a0w41CqjLX1/g88Bj2C4dax3WcrrvmsR56/d0aAduj1V1nGv1nQjy/88m
[01:38:36] [Step 1/1] na8c4tlvq8v8781y/88198jC7fHf8tugon3h8v8841L8w8Cuo7QP2t661B
[01:38:36] [Step 1/1] 4y5D/Co01/g8V9KpdlqfajcfeRz/088uzjch0K6289wQe8dfQy
[01:38:36] [Step 1/1] Private-Lines: 14
[01:38:36] [Step 1/1] AAAAFgYv2.../Bakjfg7y
[01:38:36] [Step 1/1] Wf0qCwo82.../8880Tg9K
[01:38:36] [Step 1/1] rpxw.../8880Tg9K
```

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TeamCity

Some interesting points/bad usage


- Guest login could be enabled. In fact, so many public instances has it enabled.
- Users tend to use Passwords in Build Parameters. If the Type of parameter is “Text”, the Password is visible even with a Project Developer privilege.

Teamcity supports using the Password type Parameter for passwords but I have seen so many users using Text Parameter for passwords.

See: <https://confluence.jetbrains.com/display/TCD9/Typed+Parameters>

TeamCity

- Google Dork(s) intitle:"Projects - TeamCity" for public instances, intitle:Register a new account – TeamCity for instances which provide user registration and more ;)
- The information that can be collected from public instances of TeamCity with Guest privileges is mind boggling! I saw web portal credentials, database credentials, hidden services and code repositories, employee data and much more on some public instances.



Couple of examples of credentials in Build Logs. In both the above screenshots, access to public instances and the Build Logs is with Guest privileges.



Go

- Go is an open source CI server from ThoughtWorks. They also created CruiseControl.
- All the demos will be done on Go 15.2.0.

<http://www.go.cd/>


<http://www.thoughtworks.com/products/go-continuous-delivery>

Go

Some Security issues

- No authentication in the default installation.
- No protection against brute force attacks.
- No password complexity/policy for user passwords.
- Runs with SYSTEM or high privilege user on Windows (most configs settle with an admin account).

<http://support.thoughtworks.com/entries/22299328-Go-Security-Questions>



Go

Abusing Build Steps

- If a user has the ability to add/edit Jobs (Pipeline group administrators can do that), he can execute commands and scripts on the host Operating System.
- Due to the distributed nature of Go, it is possible to execute commands and scripts on large number of slaves/agents.

<http://support.thoughtworks.com/entries/22873043-go-s-custom-command>
http://www.go.cd/documentation/user/current/advanced_usage/command_repository.html

Executing PowerShell commands/scripts using "Jobs" in Go

The screenshot displays the Go web interface. The main window shows a log for a job named 'DefaultJob'. The log contains the following entries:

```
06:38:06.537 [go] Start to prepare CmdExec/6/defaultStage/1/defaultJob on CISlave [C:\Program Files (x86)\Go Agent]
06:38:06.552 [go] Skipping material update since stage is configured not
06:38:06.584 [go] Start to build CmdExec/6/defaultStage/1/defaultJob on CISlave [C:\Program Files (x86)\Go Agent]
06:38:06.584 [go] current job status: passed.
06:38:06.584 [go] Start to execute task: <exec command="cmd" >
<arg>/c/arg>
<arg>%hoam1/c/arg>
</exec>.
06:38:06.584 [go] setting environment variable 'GO_ENVIRONMENT_NAME' to value 'defaultStage/1/defaultJob'
06:38:06.584 [go] setting environment variable 'GO_SERVER_URL' to value 'http://192.168.1.100:8080'
06:38:06.584 [go] setting environment variable 'GO_TRIGGER_USER' to value 'nt authority\system'
06:38:06.599 [go] setting environment variable 'GO_PIPELINE_NAME' to value 'defaultStage'
06:38:06.599 [go] setting environment variable 'GO_PIPELINE_COUNTER' to value '1'
06:38:06.599 [go] setting environment variable 'GO_PIPELINE_LABEL' to value 'defaultStage-1'
06:38:06.599 [go] setting environment variable 'GO_STAGE_NAME' to value 'defaultStage'
06:38:06.599 [go] setting environment variable 'GO_STAGE_COUNTER' to value '1'
06:38:06.974 [go] setting environment variable 'GO_JOB_NAME' to value 'defaultStage-1'
06:38:06.974 [go] setting environment variable 'GO_TO_REVISION' to value 'e'
06:38:06.974 [go] setting environment variable 'GO_FROM_REVISION' to value 'e'
06:38:19.286 [go] nt authority\system
06:38:19.407 [go] current job status: passed.
06:38:19.483 [go] Start to create properties CmdExec/6/defaultStage/1/defaultJob on CISlave [C:\Program Files (x86)\Go Agent]
06:38:19.483 [go] Start to upload CmdExec/6/defaultStage/1/defaultJob on CISlave [C:\Program Files (x86)\Go Agent]
06:38:19.576 [go] Job completed CmdExec/6/defaultStage/1/defaultJob on CISlave [C:\Program Files (x86)\Go Agent]
```

An 'Edit Custom Command task' dialog box is overlaid on the right side of the screen. It contains the following fields and options:

- Command:** cmd
- Arguments:** /c/arg, %hoam1/c/arg
- Working Directory:** (empty)
- Run If Conditions:** Passed Failed Any

The footer of the page contains the following text: Copyright © 2015 ThoughtWorks, Inc. Licensed under Apache License, Version 2.0. Go includes third-party software. | Go Version: 15.2.0(2248-c190afaa3192a) (cc) CCTray Feed | APIs | Plugins | C


We need Pipeline Group Administrator rights to be able to configure Jobs which can run custom commands.

Go

Abusing agent on master

- If a user has the ability to add/edit Jobs (Pipeline group administrators can do that) **on master**, he can remove all security and become administrator.
- Cruise-config.xml needs to be removed from the config directory in the Go installation and the Go Server service must be restarted.
- Go has no agent/executor on master by default.

Removing Security by abusing agent on master




In above, the command `cmd /c powershell -c del 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Go Server\config\cruise-config.xml'` will remove the configuration file of Go. The command `cmd /c powershell -c Restart-Service 'Go Server'` will restart the Go Server service.

After this, all security will be removed from the Go dashboard and anyone who knows the URL will have admin rights.

Instead of removing the `cruise-config.xml` file, we can also remove only the `<security></security>` part of it and restart the Go Server service for same effect.

Or we can add the current user to `<admins>` in the `<security>` part of `cruise-config.xml`



Go

Credentials Storage

- The password file option for creating users need the passwords to be Base64 encoded SHA-1 (no salt). These could be successfully computed in plaintext using brute force/rainbow tables.
- SSH keys are stored in cleartext on the disk. A user with ability to configure jobs on master can read the keys.

Documentation on using password files:

http://www.go.cd/documentation/user/current/configuration/dev_authentication.html

https://github.com/gocd/gocd/blob/master/manual-testing/ant_hg/password.properties

Location of SSH keys is:

C:/Program Files (x86)/Go Server/%HOMEDRIVE%%HOMEPATH%/.ssh
/var/go/.ssh on Linux

Go

Some interesting points/bad usage

- Credentials of the form <https://user:password@github.com/me/myrepo> are seen in cleartext in Go console to Pipeline group administrators.
- Like other CI tools, build parameters and environment variables are also good places to look at.

Go

- Google Dork(s) intitle:"Administration - Go"
inurl:/go/admin, intitle:"Go - Login"
inurl:go/auth/ and more.
- Not many public unauthenticated instances of Go, yet.



ON YOUR FEET MAGGOT

ITS DEMO TIME

CruiseControl

- CruiseControl is an earlier CI solution from ThoughtWorks.
- It is no more developed actively but it is still used. There are many public instances as well.
- Lets have a look at command exec only.

CruiseControl

- CruiseControl has no authentication by default.
- The interesting URLs are /dashboard and /cruisecontrol.
- Commands could be executed by adding an “exec” builder in the Schedule category.
- intitle:"CruiseControl - Dashboard" shows there are still many interesting public instances of it out there.

Documentation for the exec builder:

<http://cruisecontrol.sourceforge.net/main/configxml.html#exec>

OLD, BUT NOT OBSOLETE



Demo of a Penetration Test Scenario

- A Jenkins (or any other CI tool) agent running on a Windows machine.
- Execute PowerShell scripts on it to enumerate available tokens.
- Reuse token of a Domain Administrator.
- Too easy? You will be surprised how often it works ;)



Err..wait a minute..lets talk a Oday (not my work)

- Unserialize vulnerability in common-collections Java library.
(Released on 28th January 2015)
<http://www.slideshare.net/frohoff1/appseccali-2015-marshalling-pickles>
- Pre-Auth Remote Code Execution in Jenkins (and many more) !!
- More details here:
<http://foxglovesecurity.com/2015/11/06/what-do-weblogic-websphere-jboss-jenkins-opennms-and-your-application-have-in-common-this-vulnerability/>
- Jenkins has an emergency mitigation (no fix) (November 6, 2015)
<https://jenkins-ci.org/content/mitigating-unauthenticated-remote-code-execution-0-day-jenkins-cli>

Also see: <https://github.com/foxglovesec/JavaUnserializeExploits>
<https://github.com/frohoff/ysoserial>


The Pre-Auth RCE Demo on Jenkins



Common Abuse Set

- Minimal security by default. Security controls which are common for other tools are missing.
- Ability to run commands and scripts on OS from non-admin users of the CI tool. In many cases , this provides Administrative privileges on OS across platforms.
- If an agent is running on the master, all security is effectively useless.
- Insecure storage of credentials and SSH keys.
- So many public instances of these tools.

Lets Talk Defense



Defense (Users)

- No build agent/executor should run on the master EVER.
- Restrict privileges which allow configuration of build steps.
- Pool agents together for specific projects.
- Secure the administrators dashboard.
- Expose a CI tool to the internet only if really required.
- Do not provide read privileges to Anonymous users.
- Ask users at least not to use username as password.

Defense (CI Tools Developers)

- Enforce password policies (complexity, expiry, captcha on login failures etc.)
- A user must install agent/slave explicitly on the master. Do not include it in the install package. Show a warning if an agent/slave is installed on the master.
- Do not store credentials and keys in cleartext on master.
- Assume that your users don't know a thing about security.

What others are doing?

- “The Jenkins project has received multiple credible reports indicating that unsecured, publicly accessible instances of Jenkins are being targeted and infected with malware”
<https://wiki.jenkins-ci.org/display/SECURITY/Jenkins+Security+Advisory+2015-10-01>
- Facebook used to run an unauthenticated Jenkins instance
<http://blog.dewhurstsecurity.com/2014/12/09/how-i-hacked-facebook.html>
- “We got hacked. We were running a (unauthenticated) Jenkins instance in this machine.” – plumber.eu
<https://plumbr.eu/blog/plumbr-blog/we-got-hacked>

Previous Work

- Is this your pipe? Hijacking the build pipeline. (Defcon 22): <https://goo.gl/9iTHmz>
- <https://www.pentestgeek.com/penetration-testing/hacking-jenkins-servers-with-no-password/>
- <http://www.labofapenetrationtester.com/2014/06/hacking-jenkins-servers.html>
- <http://www.labofapenetrationtester.com/2014/08/script-execution-and-privilege-esc-jenkins.html>
- <http://zeroknock.blogspot.in/2013/08/protect-your-software-development-web.html>

What was not covered/ Future research

- Master<->agent communication and MITM attacks.
- Compromising integrity of the source code and the build process.
- Web application related vulnerabilities of web consoles.
- Memory corruption bugs.

Black Hat Sound Bytes

- CI tools lack many basic security controls. Still, paying attention to them and configuring them properly will reduce the attack surface.
- Due to the distributed nature of their working, compromise of UI/dashboard even with non-admin privs may result in access to all slave machines.
- Running a poorly configured CI tool is like providing a ready-to-use botnet for anyone to exploit.

As a single withered tree, if set aflame, causes a whole forest to burn, so does a single improperly configured Continuous Integration tool destroys a whole enterprise network. – Chanakya (350-275 BCE)

Thank you

- Questions?
- Please provide feedback.
- Follow me @nikhil_mitt
- nikhil.uitrgpv@gmail.com
- <http://labofapenetrationtester.com/>
- <https://github.com/samratashok/ContinuousIntrusion>