

Next Level Cheating and Leveling Up Mitigations

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Agenda

- A brief history of cheating in video games
- Current state of the arms race (cheating vs anti-cheat)
- The future of cheating
- Attacking anti-cheat software
- Solutions and conclusions



The Money Aspect

- Multi-billion dollar industry
- Subscription models
- Streaming/Sponsorship
- Virtual grey market



What is Cheating?

- Unfair advantage
 - Abusing game logic
 - Multi-accounts
 - Botting/Scripting
 - Manipulating extraneous client-side data
 - Exploiting client / server code bugs
 - Abusing bugs/glitches
 - Attacking other players or the game server



A History of Cheating

- Early computer games
- Early multiplayer games
- Modern multiplayer games
- Examples!



Common Cheating Vectors

- Speed/Movement hacks
- Botting
- Scripting





Common Cheating Vectors

- Speed/Movement hacks
- Botting
- Scripting
- Player/item finding hacks





Charcoal Tabs

Baseball Bat

Rotten Orange

7.62mm Round Wrench

Map of St. Stanislaus

Green Pen

Zluta Kolaloka Soda

7.62mm 20 Rounds

Rotten Banana

Blue Pen

Black Hooded

First Aid Kit

Dallas mask

Common Cheating Vectors

- Speed/Movement hacks
- Botting
- Scripting
- Player/item finding hacks
- Wall hacks/x-ray mods





138
68
267



The Rise of Anti-Cheat

- Warden (~2004)
 - World of Warcraft
 - Starcraft 2
- Valve Anti-Cheat (VAC, 2002)
 - Counter-Strike
 - Team Fortress 2
- BattlEye (2004)
 - Arma 2/3
 - Day-Z
- User-land
- Reactive
- Only a mitigation



The Current State of Cheating in Games

- DLL injection (internal cheating)
 - Loader
 - DLL implementing cheat logic
 - Hook Direct3D calls
 - Read/Write memory
- Network packet manipulation
 - Modify packets in-transit
 - Repeat packets
 - Introduce artificial lag
- External cheating
 - ReadProcessMemory / WriteProcessMemory
 - Transparent window



Current State of Anti-Cheat


- In process
 - Signature checks
 - Game specific checks
 - Hook detection
 - Pointer chain checks
 - Call stacks periodic checks
 - Debug related detections
- Out of process
 - Signature based detection
 - Pattern searching in all processes address space
- Various
 - Scanning for game process handles
 - Scanning files for signatures (offline)
 - Send suspected programs to server for analysis
 - Check DNS history for cheat update servers
 - Etc.




The Future of Cheating

- Architecture
 - Rootkit-like functionality to hide activity
 - Kernel driver
 - Makes the UM portion a protected process (DRM)
 - Maps pages from game memory into the cheat process
 - Install a filter device on the FS stack (TBD)
 - User mode executable
 - Keeps track of game/cheat mappings
 - Implements the cheat logic







Dual mapping snippet

```
status = PsLookupProcessByProcessId((PVOID)ncmmap->process, (PEPROCESS*)&epb);
if(NT_SUCCESS(status)) {
    ncmdl = NcAllocateMDL((PVOID)ncmmap->baseAddress, ncmmap->len);
    if(ncmdl) {
        KeStackAttachProcess(epb, &kapcstate);
        MmInitializeMdl(&ncmdl->mdl, (PVOID)ncmmap->baseAddress, (SIZE_T)ncmmap->len);
        _try {
            MmProbeAndLockPages(&ncmdl->mdl, UserMode, IoWriteAccess);
        }
        _except(EXCEPTION_EXECUTE_HANDLER) {
            getout=TRUE;
        }
        KeUnstackDetachProcess(&kapcstate);
        if(!getout) {
            _try {
                userva = (DWORD64)MmMapLockedPagesSpecifyCache(&ncmdl->mdl, UserMode, MmCached, NULL, FALSE, NormalPagePriority);
            }
            _except(EXCEPTION_EXECUTE_HANDLER) {
                userva = 0;
            }
            if(userva) {
                ncmdl->mdl.StartVa=(PVOID)userva;
            }
            MmUnlockPages(&ncmdl->mdl);
        } // if !getout
        else {
            ExFreePoolWithTag(ncmdl, NCDRIVER_TAG);
        }
    } // if ncmdl
    ObDereferenceObject((PVOID)epb);
} // if process
```

Dual-mapping demo



Pros / Cons

- Strengths
 - Generic
 - Virtually undetectable from user-mode
 - Straightforward conversion from publicly available cheat sources
 - Good performance
- Weaknesses
 - Can be challenged by KM anti-cheat
 - Run in debug mode or use signed driver




Attacking Anti-Cheat Software

- Anti-cheat libraries create additional attack surface
 - On client
 - On server
- This attack surface is common to multiple games
- What happens if there is a flaw?




BattlEye

- General architecture
 - On the client
 - DLL in game process
 - System service
 - On the server
 - DLL in game server process
 - Master server
- Hooks game recv() call



BE Packet structure


- Packet structure



- 2 bytes signature
- Hash
- Len /code
- data



Sign extension



Integer overflow -> heap overwrite

```
mov     ecx, [ebp+4]
sub     ecx, 7
push    ecx           ; size_t
lea     edx, [ebx+3]
push    edx           ; void *
add     eax, 7
push    eax           ; void *
call    _memcpy_0
xor     eax, eax
add     esp, 0Ch
mov     [ebp+8], eax
mov     [ebp+0Ch], eax
mov     [ebp+14h], eax
mov     [ebp+18h], eax
cmp     dword_10035890[esi], eax
jz      short loc_10005A1C
```


```
lea     eax, [edi+4]
push    eax           ; size_t
mov     [ebp+4], eax
call    ???@YAPAXIQZ   ; operator new(uint)
add     esp, 4
test    eax, eax
mov     [ebp+0], eax
jz      short loc_10005A2D
```

Exploitability

- Denial of Service is trivial
- Remote code execution possible
 - Overwriting heap data
 - Attacker-controlled data
- Very difficult
 - Separate heap limits attack surface
 - Tool: <https://github.com/iSECPartners/vtfinder>
 - Race condition
 - Code execution must be achieved before thread crashes
 - Must then prevent crash from happening



BattlEye console timing attack



- Length check
- String comparison



BattlEye timing attack demo



Disclosure timeline

- Both vulnerabilities
 - Verified 08/2014
 - Disclosed to vendor 08/2014
 - Bugs
 - Memory corruption | fixed
 - Login vulnerability | unpatched (to date)



The Future of Anti-Cheat

- Mitigations
 - Move the arms race to the kernel
 - Human factor
- Solutions
 - Full streaming of games
 - Closed platform




Conclusion

- Anti-cheat is a mitigation at best
- Anti-cheat creates additional attack surface
- Current anti-cheat can be completely bypassed
- Fundamental design changes are needed



Questions

- Thank you
 - Rachel Engel & Jason Bubolz
 - Rohit Shambhuni (iSEC 2014 Intern, Arizona State)
 - Taylor Trabun (iSEC 2014 Intern, University of Idaho)
 - Too many iSECers to list



Interns are people too!



References

- Boneh, D. and Brumley, D (2003). Remote timing attacks are practical. 12th Usenix Security Symposium.
<http://crypto.stanford.edu/~dabo/pubs/papers/ssl-timing.pdf>
- Vtfinder. <https://github.com/iSECPartners/vtfinder>





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