Dynamic Malware Analysis Workshop Counterfeiting the Pipes with FakeNet



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Outline

- Malware on the Network
- Faking the Network
- FakeNet
 - Features
 - Setup
 - Configuration
 - Implementation
 - Fame
 - New Features
- Conclusion

Background

Hiding in Plain Sight

- Attacker Goal: avoid being detected
 - Lose access to the victim machine
 - Risk of being detected in the future
- To blend in attackers often use many tactics
 - Mimic existing protocols
 - Use existing infrastructure
 - Using client-initiated beaconing
 - Dynamically changing destination address
- Still see many custom binary protocols

Mimicking Existing Protocols

- Attackers like popular protocols, such as HTTP, HTTPS, DNS etc...
 - This gives them a chance to blend in given the volume of legitimate traffic
 - IRC used to be a popular protocol
- HTTP or HTTPS are very popular
 - Commands and other communication can be passed through GET or POST requests
 - Most organizations see a very large volume of both protocols

Using Existing Infrastructure

- Attackers like to use existing, legitimate resources
 - Servers used for malware only stick out
 - Reduces the changes of being caught
 - Legitimate use helps mask malicious use
 - Investigation of the IP address reveals a legitimate address

Client-initiated Beaconing

NATs and Proxies

- All outbound connections appear to come from the same IP address
- This can make it difficult for an attacker to know which machine is communicating
 - System survey in beacon
 - Understanding how the profile is passed on the network gives the defenders an opportunity for detection (Reversing)

Why Fake the Network?

- Trick the malware
- Malware often requires
 - IP address
 - Downloads a webpage or image
- More running = more indicators
 - Code Coverage

Existing Tools

Tools for Malware on the Network

•When writing Chapter 3

- Nothing easy to use
- Seemed to be a huge gap in the field
- Surveyed all the tools

FakeDNS

- Included with iDefense Malcode Analysis Pack
 - Installed on the local machine
 - Responds to DNS requests from the malware
 - Displays the hex and ASCII results of all requests / responses
 - Unreliable
- To use
 - Install FakeDNS
 - Set the local DNS server to 127.0.0.1 (takes effort)
 - Start FakeDNS

FakeDNS Example

1	Fak	œ C	DNS	;														1>	<
Re	ques	st:																	
89 6C 00	F2 07 01	01 6D	00 61	00 60	01 77	00 61	00 72	00 33	00 03	00 63	00 6F	04 6D	65 00	76 00	69 01	[evi] [l.malwar3.com] [_	
Re	spon	ise:																	
89 6C 00	F2 07 01 01	81 6D CØ	80 61 0C	00 6C 00	01 77 01	00 61 00	01 72 01	00 33 00	00 03 00	00 63 51	00 6F 81	04 6D 00	65 00 04	76 00 7F	69 01 00	[evi] [l.malwar3.com] [
																		7	
Re	direc	t all	DN	SQ	ueri	es ti	o IP	. @) 12	27.0	.0.1	0	ο ι	lser	defir	ned 10.10.10.7	Close		

Other options for faking DNS

- ApateDNS
 - Mandiant GUI tool

ſ	🛃 ApateDNS					
	Capture Wind	ow	DNS Hex View			
	Time	Domain Requested				
	12:18:45	ma	alware.example.com			
J			and the second second second			

remnux@remnux: ~

- fakeDNS.py
 - Linux tool
 - With REMnux

remnox@remnox:~\$ fakedns pyminifakeDNS:: dom.query. 60 IN A 192.168.86.129 Respuesta: malware.example.com. -> 192.168.86.129

NetCat

- Redirect traffic by manipulating DNS
- Set NC in listen mode to accept the connection
- Usage:
 - nc -l -p 80
- Raw and difficult to customize

INetSim

- Free, Linux-based VM
- Emulates common services
- HTTP, HTTPS, FTP, IRC, DNS and so on
- Serves up what it can
- Fully configurable
- Some assembly required
- Available at:
 - http://www.inetsim.org/

INetSim



FakeNet

FakeNet

- Simple to run
- Easy to configure
- Covers the most popular protocols
- Runs on Windows
- Allows you to completely trick the malware networking operations
 Most popular malware protocols
- Layered Service Provider (LSP)
- Supports pcap based capturing
- Extensions
- Easy Fake Web Servers

FakeNet Usage

Available at: fakenet.info

Bleeding Edge distributed in this workshop

```
[DNS Query Received.]
Domain name: www.evilmalware.com
[DNS Response sent.]
[Received new connection on port: 80.]
[New request on port 80.]
GET /iexplore.exe HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 2
.0.50727; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 3.0.04506.30; .NET CLR 3.0.04506.648)
Host: www.evilmalware.com
Connection: Keep-Alive
[Sent http response to client.]
```

File download example





🔤 C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe - FakeNet.exe

[DNS Query Received.] Domain name: www.evil.com [DNS Response sent.]

[Received new connection on port: 80.] [New request on port 80.] GET /malicious.pdf HTTP/1.1 Accept: image/gif, image/x-xbitmap, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, applicati ckwave-flash, */* Accept-Language: fr Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .N .0.50727) Host: www.evil.com Connection: Keep-Alive

[Sent http response to client.] Bind call failed on UDP port 1042: 10048.

🥝 Zone inconnue

[DNS Query Received.] Domain name: acroipm2.adobe.com [DNS Response sent.]

Downloaders



Implementation

LSPs & Listeners

- Layered Service Providers (LSP)
 - Malware uses LSP
 - Injection
 - Manipulate packets
 - Security product uses LSP
 - Quality of service (QOS)
 - URL filtering software
 - Why can't we use it?
- Listeners
 - Other tools
 - Servers

LSP

- WSPdII.dll
 - Loaded into all Winsock processes
 - Configured by FakeNet in the Winsock system configuration database
 - WSCInstallProvider
 - SOFTWARE\\WinSock2\\FakeNet Layered Provider
 - GUID = 5a21f160-df30-11cf-8927-00aa00539f1c
 - Install in the chain
 - Gets the DLL loaded for hooking
 - WSPSocket, WSPCloseSocket
 - WSPAccept, WSPAcceptEx, WSPConnect, WSPRecv, WSPRecvFrom, WSPSend, and WSPSendTo

Listeners

- Listening on the ports you configure
 - Happens with or without the LSP
- TCP and UDP Listeners
 - HTTP
 - ICMP
 - Dummy
 - DNS
 - Special Listeners
 - HTTPS
 - Python

Setup

Files

- defaultFiles directory
- extensions directory
- FakeNet.cfg
- FakeNet.exe
- *.pem
- _WSPDII.dll



Running

- Double-click FakeNet.exe
- Recommended
 - Get an IP address
 - Reboot if you install a new version
 - FakeNet warns you

Configuration

PacketDumpOptions

- FakeNet reconstructs a packet capture that can be opened in Wireshark
- This is not a standard packet capture.
- · Windows does not have a local network adapter for capturing packets
 - Wireshark can't listen on localhost
- Useful when dealing with binary data that is not well displayed by FakeNet text output
 - Developing Network Decoders when you don't have full pcap of all features
- PacketDumpOptions DumpPackets:XXX Fileprefix:XXXX

InvasiveOptions

- Supports
 - DummyService
 - Direct to IP
 - ConnectionBreak NEW
- InvasiveOptions EnableDummyService:XXX RedirectAllTraffic:XXX ConnectionBreak:XXX MaxListeners:##

DNSOptions

- Options for DNS success
 - ModifyLocalDNS
 - StopDNSClientService NEW
 - DNSOptions ModifyLocalDNS:XXX StopDNSClientService:XXX

OutputOptions

• OutputOptions DumpHTTPPosts:Yes DumpOutput:Yes Fileprefix:output ProcessLogging:No POSTresponse:No

Listeners

- Listener lines must start with a listener type from the following options:
 - DNSListener
 - DNSListener Port:53 DNSResponse:127.0.0.1 NXDomains:0
 - HTTPListener
 - HTTPListener Port:80 UseSSL:No Webroot:None
 - RawListener
 - RawListener Port:1337 UseSSL:No
 - ICMPListener
 - PythonListener
 - SMTP Listener option

Custom Python Listeners

- Required functions
 - FN_Init
 - FN_NewConnection
 - Must call recvData and sendData (imported from FakeNet) as necessary to send and receive data:
 - sendData takes two parameters
 - Context of the connection
 - String to send
 - · Returns the number of bytes successfully sent.
 - recvData also takes two parameters
 - Context of the connection
 - · Size to use for the internal buffer
- Useful for developing network decoders

Fame

Malware looks for us!

Pushdo Botnet

https://www.bluecoat.com/security-blog/2013-09-11/look-evasion-techniques-pushdo-botnet

Spams us if FakeNet is running!

TCP	40 28682 > smtp [SYN] Seq=0 Win=1024 Len=0
TCP	40 smtp > 28682 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=1024 Len=0
TCP	40 28682 > smtp [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=1024 Len=0
SMTP	93 S: 220 PracticalMalwareAnalysis.COM STMP Service Ready

DNS	86 Standard query response 0xe21a A 127.0.0.1
DNS	58 Standard query 0x0169 A janpalduv.kz
DNS	86 Standard query response 0x0169 A 127.0.0.1
DNS	59 Standard query Oxcd1e A geojoglunu.kz
DNS	88 Standard query response 0xcd1e A 127.0.0.1
DNS	61 Standard query 0x943e A repadzeovuzf.kz
DNS	92 Standard query response 0x943e A 127.0.0.1
DNS	58 Standard query 0xcfd1 A zoswecboh.kz
DNS	86 Standard query response 0xcfd1 A 127.0.0.1
DNS	58 Standard query 0x760a A palralnos.kz
DNS	86 Standard query response 0x760a A 127.0.0.1
DNS	60 Standard query 0x9d85 A seojuvomojo.kz
DNS	90 Standard query response 0x9d85 A 127.0.0.1
DNS	58 Standard query 0x23d7 A nimziluff.kz
DNS	86 Standard query response 0x23d7 A 127.0.0.1
DNS	61 Standard query 0x9f46 A farurheoxuff.kz

Pushdo Botnet

Changes when "FakeNet.exe" isn't running:

UNS	og skandard query	response 0x044C A 184.107.250.2
DNS	97 Standard query	response 0x50c4 A 64.99.80.30
DNS	79 Standard query	0x629b A www.acicinvestor.ca
DNS	109 Standard query	response 0x629b CNAME acicinvestor.ca A 207.150.203.191
DNS	71 Standard query	0x0fc1 A biurimex.pl
DNS	87 Standard query	response 0x0fc1 A 89.161.181.123
DNS	158 Standard query	response 0x7413
DNS	95 Standard query	0x6e8f A x-cellcommunications.de.localdomain
DNS	78 Standard query	0xedd9 A orion-networks.net
DNS	84 Standard query	0x0c3a A bapasitaramsevatrust.org
DNS	100 Standard query	response 0x0c3a A 68.67.76.41
DNS	80 Standard query	0xa17e A sortedorganizing.com
DNS	96 Standard query	response 0xal7e A 69.195.124.64
DNS	86 Standard query	response 0x9b33 A 218.150.78.243
DNS	78 Standard query	0x79e2 A hartmultimedia.com

New Features

Process Logging

- Logs the following:
 - Process name, PID, IP, Port to be displayed in the output to the user

[iexplore.exe (936) is connecting to 154.34.222.22:80]

Allows you to pin point the process is responsible for the network traffic

- OutputOption
 - ProcessLogging:"Yes" or "No"
- Logs
 - SendTo
 - Connect
 - Socket
 - Close Socket
- Demo

Debug Breakpoint

- Enables the user to cause an exception upon a connection
- Can trace the source of the malicious connection
- Pauses upon WSAConnect in LSP
- Set up a JIT debugger (i.e. OllyDbg)!!!!!
- Trace the call stack in the debugger
- Quickly locate the code that performed the connection
 - "The Source"
 - Find injected shellcode
- InvasiveOption
 - ConnectionBreak: Yes" or "No"
- Demo

Stop DNS Service

- Stops the DNScache service
 - "DNS Client"
 - "Resolves and caches Domain Name System (DNS) names for this computer."
- DNS requests more easily caught by FakeNet
- LSP won't see the request to port 53
 - · Even if you restart the service!
- Stopping the service forces the browser to make the request themselves
 - Lazy IE and Mozilla can do their own requests
- InvasiveOption
 - StopDNSClientService:"Yes" or "No"
- Demo

POST Response

- Enables a response to an HTTP POST request
- Malware performs POST requests
 - · Looks for data to be returned to it
- Option allows the user to specify if/when they want the POST to get data back
- OutputOption
 - POSTresponse: "Yes" or "No"

No IP

- Detects when there is no IP address
- Suggests to the user that they restart FakeNet
- Get an IP!!!
 - FakeNet doesn't work as well without an IP
 - Malware Analysis doesn't work as well without an IP

Additional (not useful) Changes

- Sexy new icon
- Bug fixes
 - Many user issues fixed
- fakenet.info
- Additional default files
 - bmp
 - ico



What's next?

WFP support

- LSP deprecated since Windows Server 2012
- Windows Filtering Platform is the new way to perform this same technique
- Needed for Windows 8

Thanks

- People
 - Sébastien Damaye http://www.aldeid.com/wiki/FakeNet
 - Willi Ballenthin
 - Richard Wartell
- Code
 - Bleeding Edge

Hands-on Section After Lunch

- Using FakeNet features
- Follow the lab steps
- Solve the challenge and win beer!

Questions



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