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# ENTERPRISE APPS: BYPASSING THE IOS GATEKEEPER

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# AGENDA

- iOS Ecosystem overview
- Enterprise Apps in the iOS Ecosystem
- Bypassing the Gatekeeper
- Conclusions
- Q&A

# ABOUT US

## OHAD BOBROV

- Over a decade of experience researching and working in the mobile security space
- Former Founder & CTO @Lacoon Mobile Security
- Mobile Threat Prevention Area Manager @Check Point

## AVI BASHAN

- Security researcher for over a decade in the PC and mobile areas
- Former CISO & Security Researcher @Lacoon
- Mobile Dynamic Analysis Team Leader @Check Point




# THE iOS ECOSYSTEM

## IOS IS A MODERN OPERATING SYSTEM

- Sandboxing capabilities
- Resources access requires permission
- Signed code verification

## MANAGED APP PUBLISHING PROCESS

- Central App Store
- Developer registration is required to publish apps
- Anonymous development is not allowed



# APPLE'S APP REVIEW PROCESS

## EVERY APP PUBLISHED TO THE APP STORE IS REVIEWED

- Automatic process
- Manual Process


## APP STORE REVIEW GUIDELINES INCLUDES

- App content
- App behavior
- Bugs
- API abuse
- And more

# APPLE DEVELOPER ENTERPRISE PROGRAM

## MOTIVATION


- Exposure of proprietary In-House Apps
- Slow review process





# APPLE DEVELOPER ENTERPRISE PROGRAM

- Requires **signing** with a special **enterprise certificate**
- An enterprise needs to **acquire** a certificate
- Program is for **internal** enterprise use only
- Apps can be published **directly** to Any iOS device from corporate server
- App is **not reviewed** by Apple




# CASE SCENARIO

## FORTUNE 100 COMPANY

~5,000 BYOD  
devices analyzed

### RESULT WERE SURPRISING:

- 318 unique enterprise apps found
- 116 unique enterprise certificates were used







# CASE SCENARIO - FORTUNE 100 COMPANY

GOAPP SRL	Mobvantage Marketing Ltd.
MCE SYS LTD	GF Securities Co., Ltd.
Miracle Intelligent Network Co., Ltd.	Qingdao Qingqi Industry Co., Ltd.
QIAO BANG LIMITED	FitnessKeeper, Inc.
National Public Radio, Inc.	Dentsu McGarry Bowen LLC
Operator, Inc.	eVigilo Ltd.
Phind Corp.	Shanghai Yike Automation Technology Co., Ltd.
Proving Ground, LLC.	Humin Inc
Dropbox, Inc.	Hundsun Technologies Inc.,
Quoord Systems Limited	Shenzhen Sunline Tech Co., Ltd.
Huatai Securities Co.,Ltd.	Shenzhen Baite Gifts Co., Ltd.
R/GA Media Group Inc.	Dongguan Chiting Trading Co., Ltd.
Readdle Inc.	Gameview sdn bhd
Reserve Media, Inc	Hangzhou HR Software Co., Ltd.
S.F. EXPRESS GROUP CO., LTD.	Fuzhou Yewen Advertising Co., Ltd.
Seasonal Spring LLC	Shanghai Soco Software Co., Ltd.
Shanghai Column Fashion Co., Ltd.	Shanghai 37 Degree Technology Co., Ltd.

Who can tell  
right from wrong?

# NON APPSTORE CERTIFICATES





# WHAT CAN ENTERPRISE APPS DO?

## ABUSE PUBLIC APIs




Microphone



Location



Address Book




Calendar



Pictures

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## ABUSE PUBLIC APIs



Take  
Screenshot



List  
Apps

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## EXPLOIT



Jailbreak



Masque

What **LIMITS** the enterprise app developer from doing all of those actions?



# Trust\*

\* And a user agreement






# ENTERPRISE CERTIFICATE ABUSE 3<sup>RD</sup> MARKET

- Third party App Stores use enterprise certificates to distribute apps.
- They often re-pack applications and distribute them.
- This is not a minor phenomenon




**25PP** – more than **40M** users,  
**8M** downloads a day in 2013



**vShare** – **40M** users, 25% iOS.  
**15,000** iOS apps.

# ENTERPRISE CERTIFICATE ABUSE (2)







# HACKING TEAM (1)

- Hacking Team got breached in July 2015
- iOS RAT source code was exposed
- Used an enterprise certificate to install malware
- Disguised as a newspaper in native Newsstand app
- Asks for extensive permissions
- Installs a key logger
- Leveraging masque attack

]HackingTeam[



# HACKING TEAM (2)



# HACKING TEAM (3)

```
- (void)startBackgroundSynch
{
    NSLog(@"Synch restarted!");

    dispatch_async(dispatch_get_global_queue(DISPATCH_QUEUE_PRIORITY_DEFAULT, 0), ^{
        while (self.jobExpired == NO)
        {
            [NSThread sleepForTimeInterval:gSynchDelay];

            gMainView = (ViewController*)[UIApplication sharedApplication].keyWindow.rootViewController;

            // Grab New Calendar and Contacts
            [gMainView getABContatcs];
            [gMainView getCalendars];

            [NSThread sleepForTimeInterval:1];

            // Synch to server
            [self performSync];
        }

        @synchronized(self)
        {
            self.jobExpired = NO;
        }
    });
}
```



# LET'S TALK ABOUT MDMS







# MOBILE DEVICE MANAGEMENT

Used by enterprises to support BYOD

- Deploy security policy
- Remote wipe
- Install applications
- Etc..




# MOBILE DEVICE MANAGEMENT (2)





# MOBILE DEVICE MANAGEMENT (2)






# MiTM MDM

Install an iOS configuration profile:

- Can be used to route traffic through VPN/Proxy
- Can install root CA certificates
- Easy to deploy through phishing attacks





# GOING BACK TO ENTERPRISE APPS







# SECURITY FEATURES INTRODUCED IN iOS 9

- Apple understood the problem which lies in enterprise apps
- However, Enterprise apps cannot be eliminated
- Increase the complexity of executing enterprise apps
- Apps are cannot execute without explicit user trust









# iOS =< 8




iOS >= 9





# WWDC 15








# BYPASSING THE GATEKEEPER

- Set up a remote enterprise app server
  - Serves the malicious enterprise app
- Initiate an MiTM attack
  - Wait for a command sent by the MDM server
  - Replace the command with an app install request
  - iOS device will fetch and install the enterprise app
- Enterprise app can now execute without explicit trust
  - User cannot tell the difference between enterprise and App Store app





# ATTACK ANATOMY



# DEMO





# CONCLUSIONS

- Unverified code can be introduced to iOS ecosystem through Enterprise apps
- Non-jailbroken devices are exposed to attacks
- Enterprises cannot trust the end user judgment in BYOD environments
- Enterprises should have a clear way to view and assess the enterprise app in their organizations
- MiTM attacks can be leveraged to gain access to a device

# QUESTIONS?

