



Ultimate DOM Based XSS Detection Scanner On Cloud

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Agenda

- DOM XSS
- Our solution
- DEMO!

Who are we

What people think we are?



What we think we are?



What we actually are?



DO[r]M XSS



“XSS of the 3rd Kind”

```
1 <HTML>
2 <TITLE>Welcome!</TITLE>
3 Hi
4 <SCRIPT>
5 var pos=document.URL.indexOf("name")+5;
6 document.write(document.URL.substring(pos,document.URL.length));
7 </SCRIPT>
8 <BR>
9 Welcome to our system
10 </HTML>
```

- Does not rely on flaws in application containers
- Easier target for attacker
- Harder for defender to detect

See “DOM Based Cross Site Scripting or XSS of the Third Kind”. Amit Klein. 2005. <http://www.webappsec.org/projects/articles/071105.shtml>

<http://www.vulnerable.site/welcome.html#foo<script>



Static Analysis



If that's not enough

- Anonymous functions

```
> (function(){}
  window.onload = function(){alert(document.location)}
})()
undefined
window.onload
function (){alert(document.location)}
|
```

- Dynamic loading


```
<script async src="https://s.yimg.com/lq/lib/3pm/cs_0.2.js"></script>
► <script type="text/javascript">...</script>
► <script type="text/javascript">...</script>
► <script>...</script>
► <script>...</script>
► <script type="text/javascript">...</script>
<style type="text/css">
</style>
<style id="tmp-css"></style>
<style type="text/css">.jsenabled .lzbglbackground:none!important</style>
► <script>...</script>
```

The Chemistry of DOM what is executable?



The Chemistry of DOM what is executable?

```
<body class="hp vasq" onload="try{if(!google.j.b){document.images)new Image().src='/images/nav_logo170.png'" alink="#"><div id="nocs" style="display:none;position:absolute"><div>{'n':'pc','i':'cst','h':document.getElementById('cst').innerHTML,'is':'','r':true,'sc':true};});};</script><script data-url="/extern_chrome/ce4147df7c7403f4.js?bav=or.r_qf" id="ecs"><script>if(google.y)google.y.first=[];(function(){function b(a){window.setTimeout(function(){c=document.createElement("script");c.src=a;document.getElementById("xjsd").appendChild(c);if(!google.xjs){window._=window._||{};window._.DumpException=function(e){throw e};if(google.Date().getTime());}google.dljp('/xjs/_/js/k\x3dxjs.s.en_US.Qb9R7Hu1644.0/m\x3dc,fb,cr,jp,jsp,ORt79TCTH70y_fIAAKw');google.xjs=1;}google.pmc={"c":{"mcr":5}, "sb": {"agen":false, "cgen":true, "client":"hp", "dh":true, "ds":"","eqch":true, "fl":true, "fpol":true, "isett":true, "jsaction": "root.cst >settings"}, "fg":1}>Search settings</a> <span data-jibp="/history?hl=en&fg=1">Web History</a> <a href="javascript:void(0)" data-bucket id="fs1"> <a class="_Di" href="/intl/en/ad/> </span> </div> </div> </div> </div></div><div data-bbox="154 568 860 868" style="background-color: black; width: 700px; height: 300px; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; position: absolute; top: 0; left: 0; right: 0; bottom: 0; z-index: -1; background-image: url('https://www.google.com/images/nav_logo170.png'); background-size: cover; opacity: 0.5; filter: blur(10px);">
```




```
isett: true, jsaction: "root.cst >settings", fg: 1}>Search settings</a> <span data-jibp="/history?hl=en&fg=1">Web History</a> <a href="javascript:void(0)" data-bucket id="fs1"> <a class="_Di" href="/intl/en/ad/> </span> </div> </div> </div> </div></div><div data-bbox="154 568 860 868" style="background-color: black; width: 700px; height: 300px; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; position: absolute; top: 0; left: 0; right: 0; bottom: 0; z-index: -1; background-image: url('https://www.google.com/images/nav_logo170.png'); background-size: cover; opacity: 0.5; filter: blur(10px);">
```



DOM XSS DETECTION

What we want to do

- Analysis how “antigen” (untrusted data) get into our “body” (DOM)



char*


```
1 apple = "yummy";
2 apple.tainted = True;
3 apple_pie = apple + "pie";
4 console.log(apple_pie.tainted);
```

- All arithmetic operations need to be overridden
- Enable to propagate through different context (HTML/CSS/JS)



Tainted Phantomjs

- Hacking the JavaScriptCore and WebKit engine by propagating the tainted signal during the javascript execution.



Source code of Tainted PhantomJS

Source – location.href

```
JSValue jsLocationHref(ExecState* exec, JSValue slotBase, const Identifier&)
{
    JSLocation* castedThis = static_cast<JSLocation*>(asObject(slotBase));
    UNUSED_PARAM(exec);
    Location* imp = static_cast<Location*>(castedThis);
    JSValue result = jsString(exec, imp->href);
    #ifdef JSC_TAINTED
        TaintedCounter* counter = TaintedCounter::create();
        unsigned int tainted = counter->getTaintedCount();
        result.setTainted(tainted);
    #endif
}
```

Propagation – String.concat

```
EncodedJSValue JSC_HOST_CALL stringProtoFuncConcat(ExecState* exec)
{
    JSValue thisValue = exec->hostThisValue();

    #ifdef JSC_TAINTED
        unsigned int tainted = 0;
        // https://git.corp.yahoo.com/heraliu/phantomjs-tainted/issues/35
        if (thisValue.isString() && thisValue.isTainted()) tainted = thisValue.isTainted();
        if (thisValue.inherits(&StringObject::s_info) && asStringObject(thisValue)->isTainted()) tainted = asStringObject(thisValue)->isTainted();
        if (thisValue.isObject()) {
            UString s = thisValue.toString(exec);
            if (s.isTainted()) tainted = s.isTainted();
        }
    #endif
}

EncodedJSValue JSC_HOST_CALL jsHTMLDocumentPrototypeFunctionWriteLn(ExecState* exec)
{
    JSValue thisValue = exec->hostThisValue();
    if (!thisValue.inherits(&JSHTMLDocument::s_info))
        return throwVMTypeError(exec);
    JSHTMLDocument* castedThis = static_cast<JSHTMLDocument*>(asObject(thisValue));
    #ifdef JSC_TAINTED
        // https://git.corp.yahoo.com/heraliu/phantomjs-tainted/issues/35
        JSValue s = exec->argument(0);
        if (s.isString() && s.isTainted() > 0) {
            HTMLDocument* d1 = static_cast<HTMLDocument*>(castedThis->impl());
            d1->setTainted(s.isTainted());
        }

        TaintedStructure trace_struct;
        trace_struct.taintedno = s.isTainted();
        trace_struct.internalfunc = "jsHTMLDocumentPrototypeFunctionWriteLn";
        trace_struct.jsfunc = "document.writeln";
        trace_struct.action = "sink";
    #endif
}
```

Flow Analysis



Flow Analysis

```
5 <div id="o"></div>
6 <script>
7 var x = location.search;
8 var o = document.getElementById("o");
9 o.innerHTML = unescape(x.substring(7));
10 </script>
11
```

```
[Fri, 07 Mar 2014 08:55:56 GMT] [TPJS] [CONSOLE] [TRACE] [object HTMLDivElement] id:o tainted:2
[Fri, 07 Mar 2014 08:55:56 GMT] [TPJS] [CONSOLE] [TRACE] =====
[Fri, 07 Mar 2014 08:55:56 GMT] [TPJS] [CONSOLE] [TRACE] source,1,jsLocationHref,location.href,about:blank
[Fri, 07 Mar 2014 08:55:56 GMT] [TPJS] [CONSOLE] [TRACE] source,2,jsLocationSearch,location.search,?1394182556085&
[Fri, 07 Mar 2014 08:55:56 GMT] [TPJS] [CONSOLE] [TRACE] source,3,jsLocationHref,location.href,http://tinyknight.c
[Fri, 07 Mar 2014 08:55:56 GMT] [TPJS] [CONSOLE] [TRACE] =====
[Fri, 07 Mar 2014 08:55:56 GMT] [TPJS] [CONSOLE] [TRACE] sink,2,setJSHTMLElementInnerHTML,HTMLElement.innerHTML,2556085&
[Fri, 07 Mar 2014 08:55:56 GMT] [TPJS] [CONSOLE] [TRACE] =====
[Fri, 07 Mar 2014 08:55:56 GMT] [TPJS] [CONSOLE] [TRACE] propagate,2,stringProtoFuncSubstring,String.substring,?1394182556085&
[Fri, 07 Mar 2014 08:55:56 GMT] [TPJS] [CONSOLE] [TRACE] propagate,2,globalFuncUnescape,unescape,2556085&
[Fri, 07 Mar 2014 08:55:56 GMT] [TPJS] [CONSOLE] [TRACE] propagate,3,stringProtoFuncToLowerCase,String.LowerCase,http://tinyknight.c
[Fri, 07 Mar 2014 08:55:56 GMT] [TPJS] [CONSOLE] [TRACE] propagate,3,stringProtoFuncReplace::exec,RegExp.exec,http://tinyknight.c
[Fri, 07 Mar 2014 08:55:56 GMT] [TPJS] [CONSOLE] [TRACE] propagate,3,re
[Fri, 07 Mar 2014 08:55:56 GMT] [TPJS] [CONSOLE] [TRACE] propagate,3,JS
```

Sources	Propagate	Sinks
<ul style="list-style-type: none">source id: 1source internal func: jsLocationHrefsource js func: location.href		
<ul style="list-style-type: none">source id: 2source internal func: jsLocationSearchsource js func: location.search	<ul style="list-style-type: none">propagate id: 2propagate internal func: stringProtoFuncSubstringpropagate js func: String.substring <ul style="list-style-type: none">propagate id: 2propagate internal func: globalFuncUnescapepropagate js func: unescape	<ul style="list-style-type: none">sink id: 2sink internal func: setJSHTMLElementInnerHTMLsink js func: HTMLElement.innerHTML
<ul style="list-style-type: none">source id: 3source internal func: jsLocationHrefsource js func: location.href	<ul style="list-style-type: none">propagate id: 3propagate internal func: stringProtoFuncToLowerCasepropagate js func: String.lowercase <ul style="list-style-type: none">propagate id: 3propagate internal func: stringProtoFuncReplace::execpropagate js func: RegExp.exec <ul style="list-style-type: none">propagate id: 3propagate internal func: regExpProtoFuncExecpropagate js func: RegExp.exec <ul style="list-style-type: none">propagate id: 3propagate internal func: JStringpropagate js func: String._manipulation	

Usable Security

False alarm rate

= non-issues / issues reported


More you fix, the higher the
false alarm rate

Our ultimate goal:

0 false alarm = 0% rate!


```
[TPJS] [RESULT] document.tainted? true
[TPJS] [RESULT] document.onAlert? false
[TPJS] [RESULT] document.domxss.vulnerable?
```

```
[TPJS] [RESULT] document.tainted? true
[TPJS] [RESULT] document.onAlert? true
[TPJS] [RESULT] document.domxss.vulnerable? true
```



Benchmark and Comparisons

peak memory usage





DEMO

<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VU3YnAwc2Ag>

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- http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Angiome_annulaire.JPG
- <http://www.flickr.com/photos/free-stock/4817475664/>
- <http://www.flickr.com/photos/78428166@N00/9604922912/>



THANK YOU!

