Windows Server Virtualization &
The Windows Hypervisor

Background and Architecture
Reference

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Agenda - Windows Server Virtualization (WSV)

- Background
- Architecture
  - Hypervisor
  - Virtualization Stack
  - Device Virtualization
- Security Goals and Characteristics
- Deployment Considerations
- Future Directions
Background

- Project code name “Viridian”
- Full machine virtualization for guest operating systems
- Component of Windows Server 2008
- Final version available within 180 days of Windows Server 2008 RTM
- Installs as a role on Server Core
- Hypervisor Based
  - Takes advantage of (and requires) processor virtualization extensions
  - Supported on x64 hosts only, 32/64bit guest support
- Has three major components:
  - Hypervisor
  - Virtualization Stack
  - Virtual Devices
**WSV Targeted Use Scenarios**

- **Server consolidation**
  - Lower total cost of ownership (TCO)
  - Maximize hardware utilization
  - Reduce datacenter heat, space, power

- **Dynamic datacenter management**
  - Decouple workloads from hardware
  - Simplify management of complex systems

- **Business continuity**
  - Disaster recovery
  - Reduce service interruptions

- **Software development and testing**
  - Multi-tier applications (enterprise-in-a-box)
  - Snapshots allow easy rollback, provisioning, and sharing
WSV Features

- 32-bit and 64-bit guests
- Guest multiprocessing
- WMI management and control API
- Save & restore
- Snapshotting
- CPU and I/O resource controls
- Dynamic virtual resource addition & removal
- Authorization model for administration
System Virtualization

- At hardware machine interface level
- Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM) virtualizes underlying hardware resources
- Multiple OSes execute concurrently
- Individual OSes manage virtualized resources like
  - Processors
  - Memory
  - IO Devices

Resource virtualization techniques
- Partitioning
- Time sharing
- Emulating
VMM Arrangements

Type-2 VMM
- Guest 1
- Guest 2
- VMM
- Host OS
- Hardware

Examples:
- JVM
- CLR

Hybrid VMM
- Guest 1
- Guest 2
- Host OS
- VMM
- Hardware

Examples:
- Microsoft Virtual PC
- and Virtual Server

Type-1 VMM (Hypervisor)
- Guest 1
- Guest 2
- VMM
- Hardware

Examples:
- Windows
- Server Virtualization

What we have today

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Virtual Server Architecture

Host

- Virtual Server WebApp
- IIS

User Mode

Guests

- Guest Applications

Guests Mode

- Ring 3: User Mode
- Ring 1: Guest Kernel Mode

- Windows (NT4, 2000, 2003)

- VM Additions

- VMM Kernel

Server Hardware

- Provided by:
  - Microsoft
  - Virtual Server
  - ISV
  - OEM

- Kernel
- Device Drivers
Windows Server Virtualization Architecture

Parent Partition (Root)

- Virtualization Stack
- WMI Provider
- VM Service
- VM Worker Processes
- Server Core
- Windows Kernel
- Device Drivers

Child Partitions (Guests)

- Guest Applications
- Virtualization Service Clients (VSCs)
- VMBus
- Virtualization Service Providers (VSPs)
- Windows Kernel
- Enlightenments

Provided by:
- Microsoft
- Virtual Server
- ISV
- OEM

Windows hypervisor

Server Hardware
**WSV Architecture**

**Partition hierarchies**

- Partitions are arranged in a tree
  - Parents manage children
- Each parent contains a Virtualization stack
  - Manages child’s memory
  - Manages virtual devices
- In WSV, there is only one parent
  - We are considering deeper hierarchies for future versions
Hardware Innovations

- Processor virtualization extensions
  - Intel VT / AMD-V
  - Widely available today
  - Provides a new “monitor mode” (effectively, ring minus 1)
  - Decreases complexity and increases efficiency of VMMs

- Processor/Chipset security extensions
  - Intel TXT / AMD SVM
  - Coming soon / Available today
  - Provides a way to securely launch a VMM / hypervisor
  - Working on ways to allow for policy enforcement

- DMA remapping (IOMMU)
  - Intel, AMD & other chipset vendors
  - Coming soon
  - Provides support for “device assignment”
  - Provides protections against malicious DMA transfers
Hypervisor

- Partitioning Kernel
  - “Partition” is isolation boundary
  - Few virtualization functions; relies on virtualization stack
- Very thin layer of software
  - Microkernel
  - Highly reliable
  - Basis for smaller Trusted Computing Base (TCB)
- No device drivers
  - Two versions, one for Intel and one for AMD
  - Drivers run in a partition
  - Leverage the large base of Windows drivers
- Well-defined interface
  - Allow others to create support for their OSes as guests
Monolithic versus Microkernelized

- **Monolithic hypervisor**
  - Simpler than a modern kernel, but still complex
  - Contains its own drivers model

- **Microkernelized hypervisor**
  - Simple partitioning functionality
  - Increase reliability and minimize lowest level of the TCB
  - No third-party code
  - Drivers run within guests
Hypervisor Design Goals

- **Isolation**
  - Security isolation
  - Fault isolation
  - Resource isolation

- **Reliability**
  - Minimal code base
  - Strictly layered design
  - Not extensible

- **Scalability**
  - Scale to large number of cores
  - Large memory systems
Hypervisor Design Details

- Modules strictly layered
- Resource accounting
  - Most CPU cycles and memory associated with a partition
- Hypercalls have must-complete semantics
  - Time bounded
- Designed for concurrency but not preemptible
- Cooperative deadline scheduler
- Shadow page tables for GPA (guest physical address) virtualization
- Intercept routing for virtual machine monitor extension
Hypercalls
Low level API

- Guests communicate with the hypervisor via hypercalls
  - Hypervisor equivalent of a syscall
  - Detected via CpuId
  - Configured via MSR (Model Specific Register)
- Simple format
  - One input page, one output page
  - Specify pages by physical address, then jump to known address
**Physical World**

**Processors**

- Physically
  - Customers plug processors into sockets
  - There are one or more cores per socket
  - There are one or more threads/logical processors per core
- OSes typically schedule logical processors
  - Cache pollution if multiple threads per core
  - Secrets recoverable from cache access patterns (inference attacks)
- The hypervisor schedules cores
Virtual World
Mapping to the physical world

- **Partitions** are the unit of containment
  - **Virtual Machine** refers to the partition and its state
- **Guests** are software that run in a partition
  - Such as a “Guest OS”
- **Virtual processors** correspond to logical processors
  - Abbreviated as “VP”
Most guests expect physically contiguous memory starting at zero
- Not everybody can start at zero
- Contiguous memory hard to find after boot

**Solution: another layer of indirection**

**SPAs:** System physical addresses
- What the CPU, hardware* sees

**GPAs:** Guest physical addresses
- What the guest OS sees
- Can start at zero, appear contiguous

* modulo device apertures
Address Space Concepts (2/5)

GPAs and SPAs

- Address translation converts
  - GVAs (Guest Virtual Addresses) to GPAs to SPAs

- GPA → SPA translation via 2nd set of page tables
  - Software today
  - Hardware assisted in the future
  - R/W/X access bits in GPA page table entries as well
Address Space Concepts (3/5)
Shadow Page Tables (SPT)

- Viridian’s GVA → SPA software solution: Shadow Page Tables
  - Hypervisor owns real CPU page tables
    - GVA → SPA
  - These tables shadow the guest’s page tables
- Hypervisor demand faults in entries
  - Initially all zero, that is, not-present
  - Hypervisor walks guest’s page tables to convert GVA → GPA
  - Hypervisor maintains internal tables to convert GPA → SPA
- CPU honors access rights (r,w,NX) set in shadow tables
  - These typically reflect guest page table access bits, but don’t have to
Address Space Concepts (4/5)
Shadow Page Tables (SPT)

- This is transparent to guests
  - Hypervisor intercepts TLB/address translation instructions
    - `invlpg`
    - `mov` to/from `cr0, 3, 4`
  - SPTs entries removed on flushes
  - Guest always sees its own CR3
  - Overall, CPU behaves like it has a very large TLB

- Some common OS operations are more expensive
  - One example: A loop calling `invlpg` multiple times
  - Solution: OS Enlightenment
    - Make OS aware of hypervisor
    - More on this later
The hypercall page is an example of an overlay page. These pages “overlay” the guest’s normal GPA space. Overlaid page (RAM, etc.) is “obscured” and unreachable. But uncovered when the overlay page is disabled or moved. Principle is similar to APIC in PC. Small number of these in the design. Hypervisor chooses (undefined) order in case of overlapping overlay pages.
Time Virtualization
Three types of time

- Calendar time
  - Affected by Daylight Savings changes
  - Source is parent-created virtual RTC device

- Machine time
  - Unaffected by Daylight Savings changes
    - 5 seconds in the future, etc.
  - Sources
    - Per-VP virtualized APIC timer (periodic or single-shot)
    - Four per-VP SynIC timers (periodic or single-shot)
    - Per-partition constant-rate monotonically-increasing reference counter

- Scheduling time
  - How long has this processor been scheduled
**Time Virtualization**

**Design Choice**

- **How to handle RDTSC?**
  - When a VP is intercepted, a single instruction can appear to take a long time – namely, the time it takes to enter the hypervisor, perform actions, and return to a guest.

- TSC is recorded and can be modified in guest control structure (VMCS/VMCB)

**“Allow it to advance naturally”**
- Just leave it alone
- But…
- A VP can be rescheduled on a different LP, whose TSC could be smaller
- Can’t allow TSCs to jump backwards in time

**“Modify it to appear unchanged”**
- On entry into the Hv, record guest TSC.
- On return to guest, reload original TSC value minus some amount
- But…
- Never know how long the return instruction will take (caches!)
- Still observable at a certain granularity

Some software depends on knowing cycle counts between instruction blocks (video/audio codecs)

So, we allow it to advance naturally, with a guarantee that it will never appear to go backwards on a given VP.
Virtualization Support (1/5)

Intercepts

- A parent partition can install intercepts for certain child events
- Intercepts are triggered by child VP actions
  - Accessing I/O ports
  - Accessing MSRs
  - Exceptions
  - Etc.
- The hypervisor sends the parent an intercept message
  - The VP is left in a suspended state
- The virtualization stack in the parent partition must
  - Resolve the issue
  - Resume the VP
Virtualization Support (2/5)

Intercepts

- Intercepts can be installed for GPAs as well
  - GPAs = Guest Physical Addresses per earlier slide
  - Various combinations of “read/write/execute”

- Uses of intercepts
  - Simulating hardware
  - Profiling
  - Monitoring
  - Page sharing (copy-on-write)
Virtualization Support (3/5)

Virtual processors

- The parent can set any processor register
  - Virtualization stack would do this to emulate an instruction
  - Multiple registers can be set at once, including…
    - A pseudo “resume VP” register

- Registers also include
  - The basics
    - General-purpose registers
    - Selectors, MMX, XMM, CRn’s, DRn’s, xxTR’s
  - MSR
    - Architecture-defined: TSC, EFER, APIC base, etc.
    - Hypervisor-defined: SynIC, hypercall, etc.
  - x86 oddities
    - In NMI handler
    - In Interrupt shadow (pop ss)
    - Etc.
Virtualization Support (4/5)
Memory

- The parent virtualization stack can
  - Read & write to guest memory
  - Map and unmap guest memory
  - Restrict access
    - r/w/nx
  - Install intercepts on memory
  - Map shared pages between two children

- Most operations take GPAs
  - A parent can ask for VAs to be translated though
Virtualization Support (5/5)
Local APIC

- The hypervisor virtualizes the local APIC
  - True for all guests
- Virtualized APIC can differ slightly from physical APIC
  - Only some instructions supported
  - Operands must be four-byte aligned
  - APIC base MSR can be implemented as a global MSR
    - One write affects all processors at once
  - APIC timer in periodic mode may be less accurate
- Parent can inject virtual interrupts into child
  - Allows parent to emulate a legacy 8259 PIC
  - Edge- or level-triggered
  - Parent can install intercepts on APIC EOI register
    - Find out when interrupt is dismissed
Virtualization Stack

- Portion of traditional hypervisor that has been “pushed up and out” to make a micro-hypervisor
- Runs within a “parent” partition
- Manages a set of “child” partitions
- Handles intercepts passed up by hypervisor
- Includes
  - Legacy device emulation
  - Fast device access
  - VM lifecycle management (start, stop, save, restore)
  - VM management APIs
Windows Virtualization Stack

- Collection of user-mode & kernel-mode components
  - Runs within a partition on top of a (minimal) OS
  - Contains all VM support not in the hypervisor
- Interacts with hypervisor
  - Calls the hypervisor to perform certain actions
  - Responds to messages from the hypervisor or from other partitions
- Creates and manages a group of “child partitions”
  - Manages memory for child partitions
  - Virtualizes devices for child partitions
- Exposes a management interface
**Partition Lifecycle**

- **Parent**
  - Creates child partition
  - Creates VPs for child partition
  - Sets initial register values for child VPs
  - Sets up child’s GPA space
    - GPA → SPA mappings, memory contents
  - Installs intercept handlers
    - I/O ports, memory, fault handlers, etc.
  - Creates ports and connections for
    - parent ⇔ child I/O
  - Responds to intercept messages
  - Terminates, deletes child
  - Parent deposits memory in child’s pool when required
Device Virtualization (1/2)

- Method for sharing hardware efficiently
  - No emulation

- Physical devices controlled by existing device drivers
  - No new device drivers required

- Virtualization Service Provider (VSP)
  - Runs within parent partition (or other partition that owns the hardware device)
  - Talks to device driver
  - Acts as multiplexer, offering hardware services
Device Virtualization (2/2)

- Virtualization Service Clients (VSC)
  - Runs within child partition
  - Consumes service

- VSP/VSC pair per device type
  - Protocol is specific to device type, but is generally OS-agnostic

- Microsoft-provided VSP/VSC pairs
  - Storage, networking, video, input, USB
Device Virtualization

- Physical devices
  - Managed by traditional driver stacks
- Virtualization service providers (VSPs)
  - Virtualize a specific class of device (e.g. networking, storage, etc.)
  - Expose an abstract device interface
  - Run within the partition that owns the corresponding physical device
- Virtualization service clients (VSCs)
  - Consume virtualized hardware service
- VMBus
  - Software “bus” (enumeration, hot plug, etc.)
  - Enables VSPs and VSCs to communicate efficiently
  - Uses memory sharing and hypervisor IPC messages
Security Design Assumptions

- Guests are considered adversarial.
- Adversarial code in the guest will run in all available processor modes, rings, and segments.
- Adversarial software executing in a guest will be able to detect that it is running on a hypervisor and determine the specific version of that hypervisor.
- The interface from a guest to the hypervisor will be well documented and widely available to attackers.
- The internal design of the hypervisor will be well understood by attackers through public means as well as reverse engineering.
- All hypercalls and interceptable events can be attempted by an adversarial guest.
- Root must be trusted by hypervisor; parent must be trusted by children.
Security Goals

- Strong isolation between partitions at machine level
- Protect confidentiality and integrity of guest data
- Separation
  - Unique hypervisor resource pools per guest
  - Separate worker processes per guest
  - Guest-to-parent communications over unique channels
- Non-interference
  - Guests cannot affect the contents of other guests, parent, hypervisor
  - Guest computations protected from other guests
  - Guest-to-guest communications not allowed through VM interfaces
Security Non-Goals

Things we don’t do in Windows Server Virtualization*
- Mitigate hardware bleed-through (inference attacks)
- Guarantee availability
- Protect children from their parent
- Mitigate covert channels
- Protect the hypervisor from root
- Provide support for trusted hardware
  - TPM, Device Assignment, DMA protection, Secure Launch

*at least, not in this version
Hypervisor Security Model

- **Memory**
  - GPA to partition map maintained in Hv
  - Parent Child ownership model on memory
  - Can supersede access rights in guest page tables (R, W, X)

- **CPU**
  - Hardware guarantees cache & register isolation, TLB flushing, instruction interception

- **I/O**
  - Hypervisor enforces Parent policy for all guest access to I/O ports
  - WSV v1 policy is guests have no access to real hardware

- **Hypervisor Interface**
  - Partition privilege model
  - Guests access to hypercalls, instructions, MSRs with security impact enforced based on Parent policy
  - WSV v1 policy is guests have no access to privileged instructions
WSV Security Characteristics

- Hypervisor maintains own address space separate from any “guest”
- Guest addresses != Hypervisor addresses
- No 3\textsuperscript{rd} party code in the Hypervisor
- Limited number of channels, code paths from guests to hypervisor
- Guest to guest communication is channeled through message passing mechanism
- Parent can map shared memory between itself and children
- Root partition controls DMA hardware
Deployment Considerations

- Why two virtual machines can’t have the same degree of isolation as two physical machines:
  - Inference Attacks
  - Covert Channels
- Not recommended to host two VMs of vastly differing trust levels on the same system
  - e.g. a front-end web server and a certificate server
- Minimize the Root Partition
  - Don’t run arbitrary apps, no web surfing
    - Run your apps and services in guests
  - Ideally only connected to a back-end management network
  - Only expose guests to internet traffic
Future Security Benefits

- Many types of virtualization (app, OS, machine) each with increasing levels of isolation
- Powerful tool for virus isolation and analysis
- Improved forensic capability for compromised operating systems
- Investments in OS hardening through hypervisor features
- Potential for greater intra-OS isolation (e.g. Ring 0 separation of drivers)
- VMs can be leveraged for hosting security appliances
Security Challenges

- VM to VM network monitoring
- Managing VM OS patch levels
- Leakage of information between partitions due to shared hardware
- Larger attack surface than air-gapped machines
- Threat of malicious, unauthorized hypervisors (hypervirus, hyperjacking)
Conclusion

- Hypervisors kick ass.
- Beta available with Server 2008 RTM
- We want your feedback

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