

Hacking Google ChromeOS

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Who are we?

Kyle & Matt are both part of the Threat Research Center at WhiteHat Security and manually assess a large portion of WhiteHat's 4,000+ websites.

- Matt:
 - *Application Security Engineer turned Team Lead.*
 - *Background in Penetration Testing as a Consultant.*
 - *Bachelor of Science in Computer Science from Adelphi University*
- Kyle:
 - *Application Security Specialist*
 - *Primary focus on Offensive Security Research*
 - *Likes to push the Big Red Button*

WhiteHat Security Company Overview

- **WhiteHat Security: end-to-end solutions for Web security**
- **WhiteHat Sentinel: SaaS website vulnerability management**
Combination of cloud technology platform and leading security experts turn security data into actionable insights for customers
- **Founded in 2001; Sentinel Premium Edition Service launched in 2003**
- **400+ enterprise customers, 4,000 sites under management**
- **Most trusted brand in website security**



The FutureNow List

Google Cr-48 Beta Laptop



- First Chrome OS dedicated device
- Application to be a Beta Tester open to public
- WhiteHat one of few security companies to test it first

Chrome OS

“The time for a Web OS is now” – Eric Schmidt

What we know:

- Revolves around the browser
- Virtually nothing stored locally
- Cloud heavy (re: reliant)
- *Fast!*



Google Chrome OS

Chrome OS (cont'd)

Nothing stored locally = no usual software suspects.

Mobile = App Crazy




Chrome OS = Extension Crazy



In order to get usability / functionality out of a locked up device user's must use what is available.

What Does A Hacker See?



New attack surface!

With all of these new extensions that aren't necessarily developed by Google or any reputable company, security vulnerabilities are bound to be plentiful.

Let the Hacking Begin!

ScratchPad

Preinstalled note-taking extension

Auto Sync feature to Google Docs
“ScratchPad” Folder

Google Docs “Feature” – Folder/Doc sharing. No permission needed!



ScratchPad Video demo

Google fixed Scratchpad XSS very quickly but we have a video demo.

The image shows a screenshot of the Chrome Web Store interface. At the top left is the "chrome web store" logo. The user's email "WhiteHatSecInc@gmail.com" is visible in the top right, along with a search bar. The navigation path "Apps > Utilities > Scratchpad" is shown. The main content area features the Scratchpad app card, which includes the app icon, the name "Scratchpad", the source "from chrome.google.com - Verified website", and the price "Free". Below this, a description reads: "A simple note-taking app. Take notes offline and optionally sync to the cloud when you're online." The card also displays "174 ratings" with a star icon and "30,841 users". A "✓ Installed" badge is present in the bottom right corner of the card. Below the card, there is a section titled "This app can access:" with a list of permissions: "Your data on docs.google.com and www.google.com" and "Your browsing history". A "Learn more" link is provided below the list. The version number "Version: 2.2.3" is shown at the bottom of the card. In the background, a Scratchpad application window is visible, showing a text editor with a toolbar and a list of features: "Notes are saved offline" and "Sync to your Google Docs". A numbered list follows: "1. Install Scratchpad", "2. Write notes", and "3. Have fun!".

Permission Structure

Why are Extensions any different?

**PERMISSION
SLIP**

I, _____,
give myself permission to:

- Individual extensions have unique permissions
- Use chrome.* API
- Permissions set by 3rd party developer
- Some extensions require permission to talk to every website
- Similar to Mobile Apps

Malicious Extension Demo

Saving this one for BlackHat.


What can we do with a very vulnerable extension with wide open permissions which do exist in the wild.




Browser -> Extension Trust Model

Taking the old Software Security Model and moving it to the cloud.

Software Security Model



Browser Extension Trust Model



Security Implications

“Chromebooks run the first consumer operating system designed from the ground up to defend against the ongoing threat of malware and viruses. They employ the principle of “defense in depth” to provide multiple layers of protection, including sandboxing, data encryption, and verified boot.”

– Google.com/Chromebook

- ## Things Done Very Well
- Sandboxing tabs so they don't talk to each other
 - Local storage is virtually non-existent
 - Attack surface limited to client side browser exploits
 - Handles own plugins (flash, pdfs, etc.)
 - Eliminates most modern virus / malware threats

Thank You!

Q&A?

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