
security when nanoseconds count


James Arlen, CISA BH USA - Preview - 2011



disclaimer

I am employed in the Infosec industry, but not authorized to speak on behalf of my employer or clients.


Everything I say can be blamed on the voices in *your* head.



credentials


- 15+ years information security specialist
- staff operations, consultant, auditor, researcher
- utilities vertical (grid operations, generation, distribution)
- financial vertical (banks, trust companies, trading)
- some hacker related stuff (founder of think|haus)

...still not an expert at anything.




before you ask...

- This is a talk about... \$\$
- I'm not going to mention any of those things on your buzz-word bingo card:
 - SCADA
 - APT
 - PCI DSS
 - wikileaks
 - (anti-|lulz)sec
 - hacktivism
 - ...insert more here.



finance at blackhat?

- You know it!
- Blackhat is all about offensive and defensive techniques and technologies
- Sometimes, knowing that a vulnerability exists to be exploited helps to focus attention.
- Sometimes, people like me tell you things that sound completely crazy but have a history of coming true.




trading history

- I200s Commodity and Debt trading
- 1500s Inter-market trading
- 1600s Equity trading
- early 1800s Reuters uses carrier pigeons
- late 1800s electronic ticker tape (market data feeds) become widespread
- mid 1900s quotation systems (next price rather than last price) become widespread
- late 1900s computers are used to maintain the records of the exchange
- early 2000s computers begin trading with each other without human intervention

definitions


- high speed trading: committing trades on a scale faster than human interactive speeds
- algorithmic trading: trades based on the mathematical result of incoming information from external sources (news, market data, etc.)



arbitrage


the practice of taking advantage of a price difference between two or more markets: striking a combination of matching deals that capitalize upon the imbalance, the profit being the difference between the market prices.


- in space between two geographically separated markets
- in time between the moment information is available and the moment information is widely known



time


- when markets were new (middle of last millennium) trade times were measured at a very human scale
- late 1800s brought trade times to minutes
- 1900s brought trade times to seconds
- 2000s bring trade times in 100s of microseconds
- Future trade times may well involve tachyon emissions






how fast is fast?

- seconds: you have no position
- milliseconds: you lose nearly every time
- sub-millisecond: big players regularly beat you
- I00s of microseconds: you're a bit player and missing a lot
- I0s of microseconds: you're usually winning




predictability

- Almost as important as sheer speed is predictable speed.
- Enemies are: jitter, packet loss, inefficient protocols (tcp)
- Dropped packet is dropped cash




proximity

- Proximity relieves many of the speed/latency/ jitter effects
- You're on the LAN, not the MAN or the WAN



latency costs \$

 latency has a \$\$cost associated with it measurable and therefore fundable




\$=c (speed of light matters)


distance light travels in a:

- millisecond ~300km (~186 miles)
- microsecond ~300m (~328 yards)

nanosecond ~30cm (~I foot)








dude, where's my firewall?


no firewalls...

- they add latency (a lot of latency)
- latency costs \$
- risk < cost < profit




acl me please?

- no acls
 they add latency
 (most) switches can't cut through switch while acls are on
- risk < cost < profit




harden this...

no (meaningful) system hardening
reduced system loading (stripped bare)
largely custom interfacing code (ethernet / infiniband / PCle)
and the usual complaints about maintainability and problem resolution




threat modelling

- we know what's missing in our usual suite of controls
- how do we describe it?
- how do we determine what is a reasonable threat to build protective measures against?




THREAT: developers

- In most algo-trading, the developer isn't a traditional developer with all of the usual SDLC controls
 - The developer is probably a trader or a trader underling who has live access to the production algo engine and can make onthe-fly changes




THREAT: the insider

not *that* kind of insider
how do you deal with a trader (or administrator) who is utilizing access to market data networks or exchange networks to cause negative effects on other participants?



THREAT: the market


- This is an odd kind of technical threat
 Can the market itself cause issues with your systems?
 - malformed messages
 - transaction risk scrutiny
 - compromised systems



questioning trust


• is it even possible to trust within this framework?

how to ensure that you monitor the threats?




traditional security fails

- 100,000 times too slow
- unwilling to learn that this is a fundamentally different world
- still focused on checkbox compliance




do something!

- I'm not talking about hard stuff like code review, custom application level firewalls, mysterious FPGA stuff...
- Party like it's 1999 -- NETWORK SECURITY BASICS
- even a little bit of Layer 4 goodness would help




answer the hard one - later

- how to secure custom everything?
- how to be fast enough
- how to make the case that security efforts reduce risk and preclude disaster




ITSecurity: TNG

- where's the next next generation...
- juniper and cisco are a start...
- weird severely custom stuff is a start...
- why aren't we aren't keeping up?




Well, thanks. What now?



DOANYTHING


- at this point step up do anything
- it sounds so terrible to say that but even developing an architectural understanding is better than nothing
- make friends and influence people



product vendors...


• time to challenge your vendors

- you want more than checkboxes
- there are other markets besides credit card compliance
- there is money to spend on whatever exotic thing you want to develop




risk / process / policy / grc

- work with your business folks
- they understand risk probably better than you do
- they have a different tolerance for risk
- understand how to use their knowledge to help you make good decisions
- do not blindly follow dogmatic statements



compliance

 IT compliance people, meet the financial compliance people - you have things to talk about.




in the trenches

- research everything
- understand your business partners' needs
- look for solutions
- build PoC rigs to test
- encourage vendors to get with it
- spend time looking at the truly weird stuff
- be prepared for the continued downward pressure on transaction times

35



twitter: @myrcurial james.arlen@pushthestack.com



Credits, Links and Notices

Thanks: All of you, Jeff Moss & the Blackhat USA team, My Friends, My Family

Colophon: twitter, wikipedia, fast music, caffeine, my lovely wife and hackerish children, blinky lights, shiny things, angst, modafinil & altruism.

Me:

http://myrcurial.com http://securosis.com http://doinginfosecright.com http://liquidmatrix.org

Credits:

Chicago Board of Trade Image: <u>Daniel Schwen</u> IBM Mainframe Image: <u>ChineseJetPilot</u> New York Stock Exchange Image: <u>Randy Le'Moine Photography</u> Toronto Stock Exchange Image: <u>Jenny Lee Silver</u>

