
# 2013 - The year in Review thinkst applied research @haroonmeer | @marcoslaviero



## Who we are (and why does it matter?)











## Who we are (and why does it matter?)



So... 2013



## 2013

Significant Events
Research Themes
Future Themes?



## References / Links

http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/dec/16/fake-mandela-memorial-interpreter-schizophrenia-signing http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/02/technology/washington-posts-joins-list-of-media-hacked-by-the-chinese.html http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/PEC/admin strategy on mitigating the theft of u.s. trade secrets.pdf http://thinkst.com/thinkstscapes • http://intelreport.mandiant.com/Mandiant\_APT1\_Report.pdf http://www.aliazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/02/201322510446268971.html http://blog.thinkst.com/2013/10/when-we-win-it-is-with-small-things-and.html https://media.blackhat.com/eu-13/briefings/Galvoronski/bh-eu-13-hybrid-defense-galvoronski-slides.pdf http://www.cert.org/flocon/2013/presentations/bellovin-keynote-thinking-security.pdf http://www.exploit-db.com/papers/25306/ HTP5 • https://www.troopers.de/wp\_content/uploads/2012/12/TROOPERS18-You\_wouldnt\_share\_a syntrae\_Would\_you\_share\_a\_USB\_port-Sergey\_Bratus
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• https://www.troopers.de/wp\_content/uploads/2012/12/TROOPERS18-You\_wouldnt\_share\_a syntrae\_Would\_you\_share\_a\_USB\_port-Sergey\_Bratus http://blog.erratasec.com/2013/09/masscan-entire-internet-in-3-minutes.html#\_UrHC5GOW1Ec Into://into:/corproducts/usucondoms
 http://conference.hitb.org/hitbsecconf2013ams/materials/D1T19620-%20Hugo%20Teso%20-%20Aircraft%20Haoking%20-Macking%20-M http://web.sec.uni-passau.de/papers/2013 Braun Genein Beiser Posegga Control-Flow Integrity in Web Applications.pdf http://forums.juniper.net/inet/attachments/inet/networkingnow/590/1/bsides%20intrusion%20deception.ppt • http://blog.ioactive.com/2013/08/car-hacking-content.html <u>http://ritter.vg/blog-deanonymizing\_amm.html</u> https://ruxconbreakpoint.com/assets/slides/building%20antibodies%2060%20min.pdf <u>http://www.slideshare.net/zanelackey/attackdriven-defense</u> http://blog.kaspersky.com/roundup-2013/


• http://www.icir.org/vern/papers/covert-dns-usec13.pdf

http://geer.tinho.net/geer.nro.6xi13.txt

## OMG!!! CHINA



### Hackers in China Attacked The Times for Last 4 Months










Exposing One of China's Cyber Espionage Units


### 3 Broad Sections:

- Unit 61398
- APT1
- Conclusion









"The secretary of state, Hillary Rodham Clinton, said on Thursday that a global effort was needed to establish rules for cyberactivity."





Exposing One of China's Cyber Espionage Units

### 3 Broad Sections:

- Unit 61398
- APT1
- Conclusion







Exposing One of China's Cyber Espionage Units

### Hacking incidents and the rise of the new Chinese bogeyman

Many are beginning to realise that the military digital complex can be more profitable than its industrial complex.

### 3 Broad Sections:

- Unit 61398
- **APT1**
- Conclusion



info@thinkst.com research@thinkst.com

Client: Haroon Meer
ThinkstScapes Ad-hoc Information Update 2013 / AH1







Exposing One of China's Cyber Espionage Units


### Hacking incidents and the rise of the new Chinese bogeyman

Many are beginning to realise that the military digital complex can be more profitable than its industrial complex.

The new policy document pushed through by the White House includes the promise of "Enhanced Domestic Law Enforcement Operations" and "Improved Domestic Legislations" as two of its five strategic action items.

The penny drops. First comes the bogeyman, and then comes the protection we need:

more legislation and more law enforcement.







There is little cost to posting analysis online, especially where the conclusions pass a basic smell test or reinforce preconceived ideas. But there are many types of analysis including recounts of hacks, malware analysis by both professionals and amateurs, intelligence analysis in tracking down attackers, statistics and metrics and general punditry. Each has different burdens of proof, depending on the conclusions drawn and the value assigned to the results.

The APT1 report was portrayed as conclusive evidence of Chinese military espionage, but instead it is more akin to an intelligence estimate, in which separate threads are woven together into a form acceptable to the analyst, but alternatives have not been excluded.

Mandiant provide no confidence interval for their estimate, except to state "beyond reasonable doubt"!







- #HTP vs. MIT
- Rival group on SwiftIRC
- SwiftIRC has Linode Servers
- Linode uses <u>name.com</u> for DNS
- Linode + old code
- Access to Nmap, Nagios,
  Sucuri. Hak5 (and the machine i still use to irc)

- Rational actor myth
- Determination & Patience
- Incident Response
- Detection
- Supply Chain Problems






- Dismissal
- Sysadmin danger!
- USB: Unlimited Secrets Bus
- US-centric Clouds



## 



## On the fringes



### UPDATE 3-Saab wins Brazil jet deal after NSA spying sours Boeing bid

Wed Dec 18, 2013 6:20pm EST





















By Alonso Soto and Brian Winter


Dec 18 (Reuters) - Brazil awarded a \$4.5 billion contract to Saab AB on Wednesday to replace its aging fleet of fighter jets, a surprise coup for the Swedish company after news of














#### BLARNEY AT A GLANCE Why: started in 1978 to provide FISA authorized access to communications of foreign establishments, agents of foreign powers, and terrorists **External Customers** Information Requirements Collection Access and Techniques (Who) (What) (How) DNI Strong Selectors DNR Strong Selectors DNI Circuits DNR Circuits Mobile Wireless Legal Authorities Partnerships (Where) (Approvals) NSA – SSO, TAO, NTOC, CTA, AAP CT FBI FISA FBI - Headquarters, NY and DC FISA Amendments Act (FAA) CI FBI FISA FBI - Engineering Research Facility BR FISA Commercial Providers PR/TT FISA



www.spiegel.de/international/europe/british-spy-agency-gchq-hacked-belgian-telecoms-firm-a-923406.html

### Belgacom Attack: Britain's GCHQ Hacked Belgian Telecoms Firm







### Revealed: how US and UK spy agencies defeat internet privacy and security

The documents show that the agency has already achieved another of the goals laid out in the budget request: to influence the international standards upon which encryption systems rely.

Independent security experts have long suspected that the NSA has been introducing weaknesses into security standards, a fact confirmed for the first time by another secret document. It shows the agency worked covertly to get its own version of a draft security standard issued by the US National Institute of Standards and Technology approved for worldwide use in 2006.

"Eventually, NSA became the sole editor," the document states.



### **Cryptographic Standards Statement**

September 10, 2013

Recent news reports have questioned the cryptographic standards development process at NIST. We want to assure the IT cybersecurity community that the transgerent, public process used to rigorously vet our standards is still in place.

NIST v uld not deliberately weaken a cryptographic standard. We will continue in our mission to work with the cryptographic community to create the stronge c possible encryption standards for the U.S. government and industry at large.

There has been some confusion about the standards development process and the role of different organizations in it. NIST's mandate is to develop standards and guidelines to prote

and guidelines to prote groups also voluntarily

NIST has a long history

reopened the public comment period

ity Agency (NSA)


participates in the NIST cryptography development process because of its recognized expertise. NIST is also required by statute to consult with the NSA.

Recognizing community concern regarding some specific standards, we reopened the public comment period for Special Publication 800-90A and draft Special Publications 800-90B and 800-90C to give the public a second opportunity to view and comment on the standards.

If vulnerabilities are found in these or any other NIST standards, we will work with the cryptographic community to address them as quickly as possible.












## Year of the Phish?














## Let's talk talks (& Research) Trends








Thinking the second of the sec



BlackHat Speakers







## Scale Defense

Metrics

Devices

CyberWar

Active Defense

Bounties

Exploitation



### Thinking Security

Steven M. Bellovin Federal Trade Commission/ Columbia University

These slide are in the public domain.





Scale

### Security's Progress

- 1. There is good research on a new defense
- Using this defense becomes a recognized "best practice"
- 3. It is inscribed on assorted auditors' checklists
- A change in technology or the threat model renders it all but useless
- It stays on the checklists... (Do you still shred your old punch cards and paper tapes?)

2







### Security Advice

- Pick strong passwords
  - The Morris-Thompson paper is from 1979, an era of electromechanical terminals and few logins
- Use a firewall
  - Smartphones, tablets, and laptops move around
- Run current antivirus software
  - It's increasingly ineffective
- Stay up to date on patches
  - What about 0-day attacks?

6







#### Flow Rate


- Assume actual traffic of P packets per second and F flows/ second
  - Implies P/F packets per flow
- Assume maximum capture rate of C flows/sec
- What is the relationship of F and C?
- If F>>C, we must down-sample and will miss important flows.
   Ultimate success may depend on technology changes: relative growth of F and C
- Statistical sampling may mean we'll something—and with an intelligent adversary, we may miss what the attackers want us to miss
  - Assumption: the attacker can't manage that. True?

26











Scale



```
root@supermicrol: -/masscan# bin/masscan 0.0.0.0/0 -p80 --max-rate 30000000 --pfring /etc/masscan/exclude.txt: excluding 3880 ranges from file

Starting masscan 1.0 (http://bit.ly/14GZzcT) at 2013-09-14 22:59:14 GMT -- forced options: -sS -Pn -n --randomize-hosts -v --send-eth Initiating SYN Stealth Scan Scanning 3508758232 hosts [1 port/host] rate: 25011.09-kpps, 56.72% done, 0:00:49 remaining, 0-tcbs,
```



Scale

### Talk about Talks



Scale

# Scale Defense

Metrics


Devices

CyberWar

Active Defense


Bounties









































#### Simplicity.

Security.

The USB Condom protects personal and private data stored on your mobile device, so now you can charge your battery anywhere without fear your data will be stolen, accidentally shared, or infected with a virus! USB Condoms only transfer power, not your data!





## Aircraft Hacking (2)

#### **Attack Overview**

**DISCOVERY:** 

» ADS-B

**INFO GATHERING:** 

» ACARS

**EXPLOITATION:** 

» Via ACARS

» Against on-board systems vulns.

**POST-EXPLOITATION:** 

» Party hard!

" Tarty Hard.



# Car Hacking





# Scale Defense

Metrics

Devices

CyberWar

Active Defense

Bounties



- Control-Flow integrity in Web Applications
- Sorry Your Princess is in Another Castle:
   Intrusion Deception to Protect the Web



Active Defense

# Scale Defense

Metrics

Devices

CyberWar

Active Defense


Bounties



- Reflection in Managed Languages: James Foreshaw
- Breaking XML DigSig: James Foreshaw
- UEFI Attacks
- Android Attacks
- De-Anonymizing Alt.Anonymous.Messages



#### **MOBILE MALWARE IN 2013**







twitter.com/Kaspersky

http://kas.pr/re2013





- Reflection in Managed Languages: James Foreshaw
- Breaking XML DigSig: James Foreshaw
- UEFI Attacks
- Android Attacks
- De-Anonymizing Alt.Anonymous.Messages



# Scale Defense

Metrics

Devices

CyberWar

Active Defense


Bounties



- A Password is Not Enough: Why disk encryption is broken and how we might fix it
- Finding DNS tunnels through information theory ("Practical Comprehensive Bounds on Surreptitious Communication over DNS")
- Attack Driven Defense
- Phishing as training "Building Antibodies The Phishing program at Twitter"



Defense



**Advanced Persistent Tapestries** 



#### Historically defense has:

Focused on the perimeter

 Deployed security products that don't address real attack scenarios

 Treated vulnerability enumeration (or worse, compliance) as "pentesting"





#### Fundamentally we have three goals:

- Raise cost to attackers
- 2) Increase the odds of detecting compromise
- Iterate defenses based on real attack patterns



Attack simulations should be done to learn how attackers are likely to achieve goals against your organization

NOT to show compromise is possible (spoiler alert: it is.)



Instrument detection mechanisms around key areas of the attack chain:

- Initial compromise
  - Defensive rootkitting
- Persistence/C2
  - Host level
  - Organizational level
- Lateral Movement
  - Network/systems discovery
  - Information discovery





- A Password is Not Enough: Why disk encryption is broken and how we might fix it
- Finding DNS tunnels through information theory ("Practical Comprehensive Bounds on Surreptitious Communication over DNS")
- Attack Driven Defense
- Phishing as training "Building Antibodies The Phishing program at Twitter"



Defense

### Phishing is a big deal.

These are some organizations that have been owned recently via phishing:

Google

Facebook

LinkedIN

Associated Press

BBC

CNN

The Onion

Sony

Sky News

The White House

**Palantir** 

HotMail

MySpace

WordPress

Zappos

Gawker

**HB** Gary

Arizona Sheriffs

Department

The FBI

Washington Post



# http://phish5.com



# Scale Defense

Metrics

Devices

CyberWar

Active Defense

Bounties



- Extremely prominent researchers shout them down, but the programs allow up-n-coming folks to get started.
- Google started paying for open source bugs and fixes.
- Microsoft now pays out for mitigation bypasses.
- Bugcrowd
- "An Empirical Study of Vulnerability Rewards Programs" shows that for the cost of roughly 1 security engineer, programs returned about 25% of all significant bugs.



Bounties

# [Rising|Falling] Trends



- BYOD
- Hacktivism
- SCADA
- Mobile (we hope)
- StrikeBack

- LE Hacks
- Big Data?
- OPSEC
- Drones
- Sensors
- AV Hacks
- Privacy
- Home Spun Security



### Dan Geer (Trends in CyberSec)

- Trend #10: Complexity in the supply chain
  - Security is non-composable
- Trend #12: Attack surface growth versus skill growth
  - we are expanding the society-wide attack surface faster than we are expanding our



### Dan Geer (Trends in CyberSec)

"Where there are so many questions and so few answers, such deep needs and such shallow appreciation of trend directions, the greatest risk is the risk of simplistic solutions carried forward by charismatic fools"



- http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/dec/16/fake-mandela-memorial-interpreter-schizophrenia-signing
- http://thinkst.com/thinkstscapes
- http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/02/technology/washington-posts-joins-list-of-media-hacked-by-the-chinese.html
- http://intelreport.mandiant.com/Mandiant\_APT1\_Report.pdf
- http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/IPEC/admin strategy on mitigating the theft of u.s. trade secrets.pdf
- http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/02/201322510446268971.html
- http://www.exploit-db.com/papers/25306/ HTP5
- http://blog.thinkst.com/2013/10/when-we-win-it-is-with-small-things-and.html
- http://www.cert.org/flocon/2013/presentations/bellovin-keynote-thinking-security.pdf
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- https://dominicspill.com/daisho/Daisho-Troopers13.pdf
- https://www.troopers.de/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/TROOPERS13-You wouldn't share a syringe Would you share a USB port-Sergey Bratus +Travis Goodspeed.pdf
- http://int3.cc/products/usbcondoms
- http://conference.hitb.org/hitbsecconf2013ams/materials/D1T1%20-%20Hugo%20Teso%20-%20Aircraft%20Hacking%20-%20Practical%20Aero %20Series.pdf
- http://blog.ioactive.com/2013/08/car-hacking-content.html
- http://web.sec.uni-passau.de/papers/2013 Braun Gemein Reiser Posegga-Control-Flow Integrity in Web Applications.pdf
- http://forums.juniper.net/jnet/attachments/jnet/networkingnow/590/1/bsides%20intrusion%20deception.ppt
- http://ritter.vg/blog-deanonymizing\_amm.html
- http://blog.kaspersky.com/roundup-2013/
- http://www.slideshare.net/zanelackey/attackdriven-defense
- https://ruxconbreakpoint.com/assets/slides/building%20antibodies%2060%20min.pdf
- http://www.icir.org/vern/papers/covert-dns-usec13.pdf
- http://geer.tinho.net/geer.nro.6xi13.txt

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